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Abstract 
 
The technological zeitgeist has transformed the social-cultural, legal and commercial 
aspects of society today. Networking technologies comprise one of the most influential 
factors in this. Although this transformation can be discounted as a mere historical 
phenomenon dating back to the advent of the printing press, empirical data concerning 
usage of these technologies shows that there has been a radical shift in the ability to 
control the dissemination of copyright works. Networking technologies allow, in an 
unprecedented manner, user-initiated activities including perfect replications, 
instantaneous dissemination, and abundant storage. They are immune to technological 
attempts to dismantle them, and impervious to legal attempts to control and harness 
them. They affect a global audience, which in turn, undermine at negligible costs, the 
legal and business parameters of copyright owners. 
The problem is whether it will now be possible to establish a copyright framework 
which balances the interests of the following groups: (a) copyright owners in their 
control of the dissemination of their works; (b) authors demanding remuneration for the 
exploitation of their works; (c) users wishing to consume works with clear immunity 
guidelines using networked technologies; (d) technologists striving to continuously 
innovate without legal and policy restrictions. 
Copyright law is not a mechanism for preserving the status quo or a particular 
business model. It is, as suggested above, a reflection of the needs and interests of 
authors, copyright owners, entertainment industries, users and technologists. This thesis 
examines whether the balance between these actors can be achieved and, if so, how it 
can be implemented within international, regional and national copyright laws. It finds 
that a balance can be struck; but that this balance should be aligned along three key 
concepts: user integrity; technological innovation; and authors‘ and owners‘ 
remuneration. The proposal is that the optimal method for achieving this triptych is the 
introduction and global implementation of a reasonable and unobtrusive system of 
remuneration. 
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Introduction 
- 
‗We are all pirates‘1 
 
Problem Review 
The development of copyright
2
 law has been profoundly shaped by a succession of ‗new 
technologies‘3 benefitting society, expanding the means of expression of human 
creativity, and often upsetting the established patterns of production, distribution and 
the consumption of goods. Those who base their existence or survivability upon pre-
existent technologies do not generally welcome new ones
4
. Not surprisingly, the music 
and film industries (hereinafter referred to as the entertainment industries
5
) appear to 
attempt to stop, circumscribe, and control new technologies that undermine their 
businesses
6
. 
                                                 
1
 ‗Nous sommes tous des pirates‘, Le Nouvel Observateur, 2100, 3-9 February 2005. 
2
 The term ‗copyright‘ in this work will generally include the author‘s right and related rights. When 
appropriate, distinction will be drawn. 
3
 Suthersanen, U. [2006], Technology, time and market forces: the stakeholder in the Kazaa era, in 
Pugatch, M. ed. [2006], The intellectual property debate: perspectives from law, economics and political 
economy, Edward Elgar, 230-231; Suthersanen, U. [2000], Collectivism of copyright: the future of rights 
management in the European Union, in Barendt-Firth (ed.) [2000], Yearbook of copyright and media law, 
Oxford University Press, 15-42. 
4
 During the industrial revolution, for instance, Ned Ludd and his followers destroyed factories and 
machineries, protesting against the technologies that were leaving workers unemployed. Thompson, E.P. 
[1980], The making of the English working class, 3
rd
 ed. Penguin. 
5
 The term ‗entertainment industries‘ refers to the music, film and videogames industries. 
6
 The following examples will be later discussed: White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 US 1, 
(1908); ‗Grundig‘, Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Supreme Court), ZR 8/54; 17 BGHZ 266; [1955] 
GRUR 492, 18 May 1955; ‗Personalausweise‘, Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Supreme Court), ZR 
4/63; [1965] GRUR 104, 29 May 1964; Teleprompter Corporation v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 
Inc., 415 US 394, 181 USPQ 65 (1974); Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios Inc., 480 
F.Supp. 429 (CD Cal. 1979), 659 F.2d 963 (9
th
 Cir. 1981), 464 US 417, 220 USPQ 665 (1984); CBS Song 
Ltd. v. Amstrad Consumer Electronics Plc. [1988] AC 1013; [1988] 2 W.L.R. 1191; [1988] 2 All.E.R. 
484; [1988] 2 FTLR 168; [1988] RPC 567; (1988) 132 SJ 789; affirming [1988] Ch. 61; [1987] 3 WLR 
144; [1987] 3 All.E.R. 151; [1987] 1 FTLR 488; [1987] RPC 429; (1987) 84 LSG 1243; Recording 
Industry Association of America v. Diamond Multimedia System Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 51 USPQ 2d 1115 
(9
th
 Cir. 1999); A&M Records Inc. v. Napster Inc., 114 F Supp 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000); 54 USPQ 2d 
1746 (N.D. Cal. 2000); 239 F 3d 1004; 57 USQP 2d 1729 (9
th
 Cir. 2001); WL 227083 (ND Cal. 5 March 
2001); 284 F.3d 1091 (9
th
 Cir. 2002); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studio Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 259 F Supp 2d 
1029, 65 USQP 2d 1545 (C.D. Cal. 9 January 2003); 2003 WL 1989129 (C.D. Cal. 25 April 2003); 
affirmed 380 F.3d 1154 (9
th
 Cir. 2004); 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005); on remand 454 F.Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 
2006); Universal Music Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Sharman License Holding Ltd., [2005] F.C.A. 1242, (2005) 
65 IPR 289; ‗Pirate Bay‘, Verdict B 13301-06, 17 April 2009, Stockholm District Court, Division 5, Unit 
52; Twentieth Century Fox Films Corp. & Others v. Newzbin Ltd., [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch), 29 March 
2010; Viacom International Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 07-Civ-2103 and The Football Association Premier 
League v. YouTube Inc., 07-Civ-582 (SDNY 23 June 2010). 
  13 
‗The relationship of copyright to new technologies that exploit copyrighted works 
is often perceived to pit copyright against progress‘7. 
In the 19
th
 Century, the problem was the piano roll
8
. Later, the entertainment 
industries attempted to control the manufacture of cassettes
9
, videocassette recorders
10
, 
and blank tapes
11
, arguing that such devices facilitated copyright infringements. 
‗I‘m scared and so is my industry. Changing technology is threatening to destroy 
the value of our copyrights and the vitality of the music industry‘12. 
However, the entertainment industries are alive and thriving, and these 
technologies have helped to expand the relevant markets more so than any degree of 
threat
13: the cassette recorder has increased the music industries‘ market share, 
promoting and helping the distribution of music to a wider audience
14
; videocassette 
recorders have opened up the film industry to the home videos market
15
.  
Historically, copyright had to accommodate a number of new technologies which 
caused broadly similar issues
16
: some technologies created new subject matters of 
protection
17
; some created new uses of existing works
18
; and, finally, some jeopardised 
the control over the dissemination of works, thereby making infringements cheaper and 
                                                 
7
 Ginsburg, J.C. [2001], Copyright and control over new technology of dissemination, 101 Columbia 
L.Rev. 1613-22, 1613. 
8
 White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 US 1, (1908). Coover, J. [1985], Music publishing, 
copyright and piracy in Victorian England, Mansell Publishing, 9. 
9
 ‗Grundig‘, Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Supreme Court), ZR 8/54; 17 BGHZ 266; [1955] 
GRUR 492, 18 May 1955; CBS Song Ltd. v. Amstrad Consumer Electronics Plc. [1988] A.C. 1013; 
[1988] 2 W.L.R. 1191; [1988] 2 All.E.R. 484; [1988] 2 F.T.L.R 168; [1988] R.P.C. 567; (1988) 132 S.J. 
789; affirming [1988] Ch. 61; [1987] 3 W.L.R. 144; [1987] 3 All.E.R. 151; [1987] 1 F.T.L.R. 488; [1987] 
R.P.C. 429; (1987) 84 L.S.G. 1243. 
10
 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios Inc., 480 F.Supp. 429 (CD Cal. 1979), 659 F.2d 
963 (9
th
 Cir. 1981), 464 US 417, 220 USPQ 665 (1984). 
11
 C.B.S. Inc. v. Ames Records & Tapes Ltd., [1981] RPC 307. 
12
 Statement of J. Valenti, president of the RIAA. Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearing on 
H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705, 97
th
 US Congress 297-563 (14 
April 1982), 311. 
13
 The original adversity eventually evolved into a ‗mutually beneficial interdependence‘. Fessenden, G. 
[2002], Peer-to-peer technology: analysis of contributory infringement and fair use, 42 IDEA, 391-416, 
391-393. 
14
 Plumleigh, M. [1990], Digital home taping: new fuel strokes the smouldering home taping fire, 37 
UCLA L.Rev. 733-759. From 1978 to 1988 unit sales of records rose 8% and continued to rise until 1990, 
declining only in 1993 when CDs dominated the unit sales. Krasolovsky–Shemel [1995], The business of 
music, Billboard, xx-xxi. 
15
 Sciorra, N.E. [1993], Self-help and contributory infringement: the law and legal thought behind a little 
‗black box‘, 11 A.E.L.J. 905, 918. 
16
 Hardy, I.T. [1998], Project looking forward: sketching the future of copyright in a networked world. 
www.copyright.gov/reports/thardy.pdf. [15/08/2010]. 
17
 The list of copyright‘s ‗subject matters‘ expanded steadily to accommodate new technologies, the 
changing perceptions of existing ones or of the need for protection them. Ibid. 
18
 For instance, musical compositions as such were protected before the advent of radio. Ibid. 
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more difficult to discover than before
19
. Notably, networking technologies
20
 belong to 
this last category. Unauthorised restricted acts can be generally categorised as 
infringements, but users
21
 continue to share protected works, notwithstanding the 
increasing number of infringement cases arising in courts on a worldwide scale. 
Moreover, software and service providers continue to create more powerful and secure 
tools to increase the security and secrecy of sharing networks. The picture becomes 
more unclear when considering the speediness of technology innovations and the 
borderless nature of the environment. 
Networking technologies seem to be constantly ‗a step ahead of the law‘, as the 
law has been reacting slowly to technologies which are promptly ‗circumventing‘ it. 
Napster, for example, was held liable because of its centralised ‗file-search‘ system22. 
Immediately after the court made its ruling, file-sharing software providers delivered 
products without centralised file-searching systems in order to avoid liability. 
Advocates within the entertainment industries argued that this made little difference, 
since these new softwares were still used for facilitating infringing activities. In 
Grokster
23
, the US Supreme Court, reversing the appealed decisions, held that: 
‗One who distributes a device with the objective of promoting its use to infringe 
copyright, […] going beyond mere distribution […], is liable for resulting acts of 
infringement by third party using the device, regardless of the device‘s possible 
lawful uses‘24. 
However, this decision did not stop the distribution of file-sharing applications. 
For instance, notwithstanding US law may recognise contributory and/or vicarious 
liabilities in a greater range of circumstances, it could be argued that anyone who 
merely distributes a device without the objective of promoting its infringing uses is not 
considered to be liable under the ‗active inducement‘ theory for resulting acts of 
infringement by someone using the device
25
. Accordingly, the entertainment industries 
decided to take direct action against individuals sharing files
26
 without authorisation, 
                                                 
19
 The photocopier and the cassette and videocassette recorders are obvious examples, as well as digital 
technologies. Ibid. 
20
 The term ‗networking technologies‘ refers to technologies that facilitate the exchange of content and 
information over a computer network, such as peer-to-peer file-sharing and Web 2.0. 
21
 The term ‗users‘ refers to individuals using the technologies under discussion. The term includes file 
providers, downloaders, and accessors. 
22
 A&M Records Inc. v. Napster Inc., 114 F Supp 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000); 54 USPQ 2d 1746 (N.D. Cal. 
2000); 239 F 3d 1004; 57 USQP 2d 1729 (9
th
 Cir. 2001); WL 227083 (ND Cal. 5 March 2001); 284 F.3d 
1091 (9
th
 Cir. 2002). 
23
 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studio Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005). 
24
 Ibid. 2774. 
25
 Para. 3.3.3.2. 
26
 The term ‗file‘ refers to a collection of data or information stored in a computer. 
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thereby serving thousands of users of file-sharing networks with lawsuits. A number of 
cases have been decided so far, but new file-sharing softwares have been created and 
distributed with the specific intent of guaranteeing users privacy and security, which 
enables them to share content
27
 protected by copyright without fear of being ‗caught by 
the law‘. 
Moreover, the internet is close to a ‗no man‘s land‘. Complex private international 
law problems arise: for instance jurisdiction, applicable law, and enforcement. 
Networking technologies make the situation critical. ‗Sharing‘ through networking 
technologies is a global phenomenon and has therefore become difficult to regulate 
networks expanding beyond one country. A global solution must be quickly found, as 
the continuous growth in popularity of these technologies is not likely to cease.  
With the aforementioned discussion in mind, this thesis will examine and 
analyse the causes and effects of the previously outlined problems. 
 
Objectives and Scope of Study 
This thesis studies the networking technologies phenomenon worldwide, with particular 
focus on the EU, US, Canada and Australia. The desirability to protect copyright works 
and to fairly compensate accordingly copyright owners in this environment is not 
disputed, nor discussed, within the thesis. However, it will be underlined how a 
balance
28
 must be struck so as to ensure that authors and other copyright owners are 
granted their due and justified rights, whilst ensuring that excessive enforcements of the 
rights do not have detrimental effects on society. This thesis proposes to achieve such a 
critical balance by introducing a remuneration right, and employing a reasonable and 
unobtrusive remuneration system. Due to the potential of networking technologies as a 
form of the distribution of works and the borderless environment, this work must 
examine whether or not the proper balance can be achieved and, if so, how it can be 
implemented within international, regional and national copyright laws. 
The primary considerations of this thesis are to describe the networking 
technologies phenomenon, their evolutions, the reasons as for why they have become so 
popular, and accordingly to analyse the problems arising in terms of copyright law. 
                                                 
27
 The term ‗content‘ generally refers to various categories of works, including literary and musical 
works, films, and videogames. 
28
 For an analysis of the introduction of the concept of ‗balance‘ in copyright law, see Dinwoodie, G. 
[2007], The WIPO Copyright Treaty: a transition to the future of international copyright lawmaking? 
57(4) Case Western Reserve L.Rev. 751-766, 754-758. 
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Using old rules to regulate new phenomena has the obvious disadvantage that they will 
not necessarily fit the current situation adequately: for instance, the dissemination of 
copyright works in digital form is hardly controllable, and some traditional copyright 
concepts do not fit well with the new environment and therefore need to be reinterpreted 
and adjusted as necessary
29
. Furthermore, it is not clear how to exercise—and 
subsequently enforce—rights over the internet, whether limitations exceptions and 
defences apply to file-sharing, and how, and also how to apply remedies and penalties 
in respect of infringing activities, which take place simultaneously in many different 
countries. Furthermore, where there are any perceived weaknesses and lacunae in the 
existing laws, this thesis will offer recommendations. 
The second major consideration is to explore whether or not new regulations, 
compensation systems or even new rights are justifiable. The objective is to analyse 
whether—and, if so, how—a compensation system could solve the problems created by 
networking technologies, and how such a system could be implemented on an 
international basis. This task has always been difficult. The challenge was stated over 
two hundreds years ago: 
‗We must take care to guard against two extremes; the one that … [authors] … 
may not be deprived of their just merits […]; the other, that the world may not be 
deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded‘30. 
It will be described how stronger and more uncontrollable networking 
technologies have emerged since Napster and how a new regime may be required. 
Firstly, however, we need to consider whether or not a different regime is justifiable and 
deemed necessary for electronic representation as well as traditional forms; in 
particular, in relation to the duplication of legitimately acquired representations for 
personal retention, and subsequent sharing. This involves the assessment of the 
justification of protection and, following that, the justification for specific exceptions. 
Secondly, we need to explore whether new regulations, compensation systems or even 
new rights are justifiable and, moreover, possible. This thesis will analyse, compare and 
criticise the solutions already proposed; it is then hoped that a solution, both logically 
just and politically acceptable, will emerge. 
It will be the author‘s contention that the struggle between networking 
technologies and the entertainment industries should not continue. In the past, the 
industries have profited from the advent of new technologies, and now they should not 
                                                 
29
 Concepts such as reproduction, communication, distribution, making available, publication, etc. 
30
 Lord Mansfield in Sayre v. Moore, (1785) 1 East 361. 
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prematurely dismiss the idea of embracing networking technologies and using them to 
their own advantage. A new way of compensating authors and other copyright owners 
needs to be determined. This thesis will explore whether and how a compensation 
system could solve the problems under consideration, and how such could be 
implemented on an international basis. The drafting of this compensation system will 
involve analysis of the entire entertainment business, collecting society structures, 
political and social lobbies and, most importantly, international, regional and national 
copyright laws. 
The thesis aims only at providing a feasible theoretical tool in order to address the 
issue of the unauthorised sharing of protected materials over the internet. Notably, it 
does not purport to provide technical or empirical guidelines concerning how to test 
such a theoretical tool. 
 
Methodology, Sources and Limitations 
In developing the arguments and recommendations set out in the thesis, the work had to 
draw upon several economic, technical and social propositions, all of which have served 
as theoretical justificatory basis. However, the recommendations made within the thesis 
have, at all the times, been primarily inspired and influenced by the inherent trends that 
exist within copyright statutory and case law. The theoretical tools of economics, 
computing engineering and sociology merely provide the explanatory basis of the law. 
An applied comparative law approach is deemed appropriate
31
 for analysing and 
interpreting the existing international, regional and national laws. Accordingly, the 
analysis adopted in the thesis is based on two main sources of reference: 
1. Legislative statutes and reported judicial decisions from various jurisdictions. 
References to statutes
32
 and judicial decisions from several countries‘ jurisdiction 
have been made. However, due to the superfluity of referencing every country‘s 
                                                 
31
 ‗Experience shows that this is best done if the author first lays out the essentials of the relevant foreign 
law, country by country, and then uses this material as basis for critical comparison, ending up with the 
conclusion about the proper policy for the law to adopt which may involve a reinterpretation of his own 
system‘. In respect of applied comparative law, one should investigate how ‗a specific problem can most 
appropriately be solved under the given social and economic circumstances‘. Zweigert–Kötz [1992], An 
introduction to comparative law, Claredon Press, 6, 12. 
32
 Citations and references to statutes currently in forces have been based on the official WIPO 
translations. References to repealed legislation have been based on such statutes, legal commentaries and 
treatises. 
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national law
33
, the thesis has concentrated on the law of countries which have a 
mature copyright law, which have offered considerable legal thought and 
jurisprudence to networking technologies, and which also distinctly advocate 
different approaches to their solution. These countries are Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the US. Furthermore, references have also 
been made to the sources of international treaties and EU Law. 
2. Legal literature, legislative reports and consultation documents. Wide ranges of 
public sources were consulted in the writing of this work. Legal literature, 
commentaries, treatises, committee reports, legislative reports and consultation 
documents from the various jurisdictions have all been relied upon as basis of 
comparison and upon which recommendations can be made. Recommendations 
and measures adopted in relation to these jurisdictions have been used, where 
appropriate, to fill any apparent lacunae in the existing law. 
The subject matter at hand has been approached from the perspective of copyright 
law—in particular, the economic rights of reproduction and communication to the 
public, including making available and distribution. The issues relating to moral rights 
reach beyond the scope of this thesis, and are therefore mentioned throughout the work, 
but not are deeply analysed. However, where deemed necessary, various references 
have been made to communication law, e-commerce law, privacy and data-protection 
law, private international law, and competition law. 
 
Chapters Outline 
The thesis is divided into six Chapters. 
The first Chapter provides a brief historical description of the inter-relationship 
between technology developments and copyright. The Chapter further concentrates on 
the history and laws of the US, the UK, France and Germany. 
Chapter Two aims to provide clear definitions concerning networking 
technologies, and further provides a description of the applications involved in the latest 
copyright cases, underlining, when appropriate, how the legal decisions have 
contributed to the technology evolution. 
                                                 
33
 ‗Here sober self-restraint is in order, not so much because it is hard to take account of everything as 
because experience shows that as soon as one tries to cover a wide range of legal systems, the law of 
diminishing returns operate‘. Zweigert–Kötz [1992], op.cit. 39-40. 
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Chapter Three analyses substantive copyright law issues with networking 
technologies, with particular consideration to the economics rights of reproduction, 
communication to the public, making available, distribution, primary and secondary 
copyright infringement, the concepts of authorisation and inducement, and exception, 
limitations and defences. The relevant cases are analysed and accordingly commented. 
Chapter Four shortly describes the relevant actors and their needs, and proceeds to 
explore various analytical approaches in order to determine whether new rights or levies 
could be a viable solution from socio-economic and philosophical perspectives. 
Chapter Five is dedicated to the proposed solutions and alternatives. It discusses 
and analyses licensing, proposed legislations, enforcement actions, online distribution, 
digital rights management, monitoring and filtering. 
Chapter Six preliminarily explores levies systems, compulsory licensing, and 
collective administration in order to introduce the author‘s proposal for a remuneration 
right. 
 
The thesis is based on the law and materials available as of 1 July 2010. 
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Chapter One 
A History of Decreasing Control over Dissemination 
- 
‗If there was no such thing as change which takes place through the passage of time, there would be no 
events for historians to analyse and therefore no history. It is therefore necessary to consider the concept 
of change and its relevance to intellectual property law‘34. 
 
1.1 - Introduction  
This Chapter contains a brief, non-exhaustive, historical analysis of selected 
technologies which undermine authors‘ and other copyright owners‘ control over the 
dissemination of their works. The analysis shows that, when a new technology 
undermines control, copyright attempts to restore the balance
35
: 
‗Creators should maintain sufficient control over new markets to keep the 
copyright incentive meaningful, but not so much as to stifle the spread of the new 
technologies of dissemination‘36. 
This equilibrium has been recalibrated over time; however, with the advent of 
networking technologies, there is wide concern that copyright is failing to adjust to the 
new environment
37
. 
 
1.2 - Printing Press 
Prior to the printing press, the possibilities of making multiple copies of literary works 
were minimal
38
. During the Greek and Roman civilisation, scribes or slaves generally 
                                                 
34
 Phillips–Simon [2005], Going down in history: does history have anything to offer today‘s intellectual 
property lawyer? 3 I.P.Q. 225-235. 
35
 Litman, J.D [2001], Digital copyright, Prometheus Books, 77-88; Fitzpatrick, S. [2000], Copyright 
imbalance: US and Australian responses to the WIPO DCT, 22(2) E.I.P.R. 214, 216; Landes-Posner 
[1989], An economic analysis of copyright law, 18(2) Journal of Legal Studies, 325, 326; Vinje, T. 
[1999], Copyright imperilled?, 21(4) E.I.P.R. 192, 194; Samuelson, P. [1998] Does information really 
have to be licensed?, A.C.M. September, 15. 
36
 144 Cong. Rec. S11,887, S11,888. Senator Ashcroft quoted in Ginsburg, J.C. [2001], op.cit. 1613. 
37
 Ginsburg, J.C. [2001], op.cit.; Litman, J.D. [2001], op.cit. 81-86; Cohen, J.E. [1999], WIPO Copyright 
Treaty implementation in the United States: will fair use survive? 21 E.I.P.R. 236, 237-8; Denicola, R.C. 
[1999], Freedom to copy, 108 Yale L.J. 1661, 1683-86; Denicola, R.C. [2000], Mostly dead? Copyright 
law in the new millennium, 47 J.C.S.U.S.A. 193, 204-07; Patterson, L.R. [2000] Understanding the 
copyright clause 47, J.C.S.U.S.A. 365, 387-89; Samuelson, P. [1999], Intellectual property and the 
digital economy: why the anti-circumvention regulations need to be revised, 14 B.T.L.J. 519, 566; 
Samuelson, P. [1999], Good news and bad news on the intellectual property front, A.C.M. March, 19, 24; 
Benkler, Y. [2001], The battle over the institutional ecosystem in the digital environment, A.C.M. 
(February), 84, 86. 
38
 Olmert, M. [1992], The Smithsonian book of books, Smithsonian Institution Press. 
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reproduced manuscripts. In the Middle Age, the primary keeper and reproducer of 
books was the Church, which used to rely upon the labour of monks. Later on, 
universities started controlling the business of producing manuscripts using paid 
scribes
39
. The potential market for manuscripts was limited to those who could both 
afford the services of scribes and who could read—commonly being the Church, the 
nobility and the professional class
40
. Hence, a structured system of laws for protection 
against unauthorised copies was lacking
41
. During such times, physical control over the 
original volume meant control to access and copy that work
42
; there was no practical 
need of separate rights on the work contained in the volume
43
. 
In the late 15
th
 Century, Gutenberg developed the movable type printing press, 
thereby providing the means to make multiple copies of works
44
. Within a few years, 
the economic importance of the printing industries grew dramatically. The state 
authorities soon realised the need of controlling this new communication medium, and 
arrogated the sole right of printing, and granting permissions to print
45
. In England, the 
Crown had the right to publish a specified work or group of works, as an exercise of the 
royal prerogative, namely ‗the printing patent‘, and, in 1556, with a Royal Charter 
empowered the Stationers‘ Company to regulate the book trade46. 
                                                 
39
 Atticus, an ancient Roman literary patron, with his slaves allegedly could produce one thousand copies 
of a small volume in a single day. Ransom, H. [1956]. The first copyright statute, University of Austin 
Press, 17-20. 
40
 Ricketson, S. [1999], The law of intellectual property: copyright, designs and confidential information, 
2
nd
 ed. LBC Information Services, 4.4. 
41
 Prior to the printing press the concept of ‗authorship‘ was not well developed. Instead, it was the owner 
of the copy who was compensated for the right to reproduce the book. Boorstin, D.J. [1983], The 
discoverers: a history of a man‘s search to know his world and himself, Publishing Mills, 492-493. 
42
 An early record of an ‗owner‘s right‘ case is Finnian v. Columba in 567 AD. Bowker, R.R. [1912], 
Copyright: its history and its law, Houghton Mifflin, 9. 
43
 Burke, J [1985], The day the universe changed, British Broadcasting Corporation, 107; Kaplan, B. 
[1967], Copyright: an unhurried view, Columbia University Press, 27; Boyle, J. [1996], Shamans, 
software and spleens: law and the construction of the information society, Harvard University Press, 53. 
Interestingly, one concept extensively debated in ancient times was plagiarism. Dock, M.-C. [1963], 
Etude sur le droit d‘auteur, Paris, 36-40. For a catalogue of act of plagiarism through the ages, see Paull, 
H.M. [1928], Literary ethics, Butterworth. 
44
 Burke, J. [1985], op.cit. 113; Steinberg, S.H. [1955], Five hundred years in printing, Penguin. 
45
 Generally Deazley, R. [2004], On the origin of the right to copy: charting the movement of copyright 
law in eighteenth century Britain (1695-1775), Hart Publishing; Deazley, R. [2006], Re-thinking 
copyright: history, theory, language, Edward Elgar. Apparently, the first ‗printing privileges‘ were the 
‗Venetian Privileges‘ in the 15th Century. Sterling, J.A.L. [2008], op.cit. 1.04. For the history of granting 
privileges, Brown, H.F. [1891], The venetian printing press, an historical study, J.C. Nimmo; Putman, 
G.H. [1962], Books and their makers during the Middle Ages, 2
nd
 ed. New York; Witcombe, C.L.C.E. 
[2004], Copyright in the Renaissance, Brill Leiden. 
46
 The printing press is generally accepted to have arrived in England in 1476. Ransom, H. [1956], op.cit. 
6. However, there is some evidence of a printing press in Oxford in 1468, Ricketson, S. [1999], op.cit. 
4.4; Holdsworth, W. [1937], A history of English law: volume VI, 2
nd
 ed. Methuen &Co. 362-365; 
Blagden, C. [1960], The Stationers‘ Company: a history, 1403-1959, G. Allen & Unwin, 33; Feather, J. 
[1980], The book trade in politics: the making of the Copyright Act of 1710, 8 Publishing History 19, 20-
37; Rose, M. [1993], Authors and owners: the invention of copyright, Harvard University Press, 14; 
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The concept of a ‗right‘ to ‗copy‘ emerged not directly owing to the printing 
press, but rather as a consequence of concerns raised by the proliferation of the written 
word, which the printing press made possible
47
. Authors were sometimes granted 
printing privileges, but the beneficiaries of the rights to print and sell books were mainly 
assigned to printers and publishers
48
. Only in the 17
th
 Century, the principle of granting 
rights to authors was developed
49
. During the 18
th
 Century, two distinct systems 
evolved, namely ‗copyright‘ and ‗author‘s right‘50. The copyright system was based on 
the Statute of Anne of 1710, and spread throughout the British dominions and the US
51
. 
In continental Europe, the author‘s right system developed from the French Laws of 
1791 and 1793. In the 19
th
 Century, the concept according to which the right of the 
author on his/her works was directly related to his/her personality evolved in France and 
Germany
52
.  
The printing press enabled the mass reproduction of works with a consequent 
decrease of control over dissemination of copies
53
, 
‗A legal mechanism was needed to connect consumers to authors and publisher 
commercially. Copyright was the answer‘54. 
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1.3 - Phonograph & Broadcasting 
In the UK, musical works were originally included in the category of books
55
, since 
they were printed and distributed on ‗music-sheets‘56. This situation did not change until 
Edison invented the phonograph machine in 1877
57
. At this time, authors and 
publishers, anxious that the new technology would undermine their income
58
, attempted 
to prevent the distribution of the piano roll in the US
59
. However, the Supreme Court 
maintained that piano rolls were not infringing copies since the musical composition 
was not directly appreciable from the perforations
60
. The 1909 US Copyright Act
61
 
introduced the first compulsory licence regime, thereby compensating authors whilst 
simultaneously permitting the development of the recording industry
62
; however, the 
music-sheet market for home sales was quickly supplanted by the phonograph and, 
later, by the radio
63
. 
Marconi invented the radio in 1895, whilst the first television set was 
commercialised in the 1930s
64
. The advent of broadcasting gave a new dimension to the 
concept of exploiting authors‘ works, since broadcasters extensively used copyright 
materials
65
. In the US, questions arose concerning whether authors had the right to 
control new uses
66
, and it was ultimately understood that the only viable solution was to 
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grant blanket licences to radio and television stations. In certain special circumstances, 
authors‘ control was limited by compulsory licences schemes67. 
One of the major problems associated with these technologies was the decreased 
capability of monitoring and policing infringements. The methods previously used to 
police the dissemination of printed copies were impractical; thus, collective systems of 
management and enforcement—in particular, through collecting societies—were 
created
68
. 
 
1.4 - User-Accessible Copying Technologies 
The development of user accessible copying technologies dramatically decreased the 
authors‘ and industry‘s control over dissemination. In 1938, for instance, it became 
possible to cheaply and efficiently make copies of any document without having to pass 
through the process of making a new printing press plate. The new printing process was 
invented by Carlson
69
 and dubbed ‗Xerography‘70. The new technology proved to be 
revolutionary, but the photocopying machine did not seriously threaten the book market 
since the cost and labour involved in making copies was still great enough to prevent 
photocopying from harming publishing industries
71
. Nevertheless, there were some 
exceptions
72
.  
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‗Until the advent of the photocopier, copyright owners substantially controlled the 
production and dissemination of copies of works of authorship, as the public 
could not obtain the work without purchasing a copy or borrowing one from a 
library or a friend‘73. 
Photocopying machines became popular during the 1950s and 1960s, and 
questions subsequently arose over their significance in terms of copyright law. One 
result was that certain actors—principally libraries—were essentially protected from 
liability, despite providing photocopying facilities. The liability of users was left to be 
assessed as a matter of fair use, fair dealing, and private copying
74
. Most countries dealt 
with the reprography problem in different ways, but copying was generally condoned
75
. 
The solutions involved owners‘ concessions, voluntary licensing schemes76 and 
statutory provisions
77
. However, the levies approach method is favoured in most 
European countries and in Canada
78
. The Copyright Directive allows Member States to 
provide limitations and exceptions for private and non-commercial copying, ‗on 
condition that the right holders receive fair compensation‘79, therefore the introduction 
on levies on equipments and blank tapes, as discussed below. 
Another widely recognised threat to copyright law was the invention of the 
cassette and videocassette recorders; in particular, the difficulties in controlling 
domestic copyright infringement. 
‗Before mass market audio and video recording equipment, copyright owners also 
controlled access to works made publicly available through performances and 
transmissions, because the public could not see or hear the work without 
attending a licensed live performance, or viewing or listening to it through 
licensed media‘80. 
It was considered impractical to stop the copying that took place in private 
homes
81
; thus, the entertainment industries tried to stop the production and distribution 
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of cassette recorders. In Germany, for example, although the 1901 Author‘s Right Act 
expressly allowed copying for personal use, the Supreme Court nevertheless ruled that 
this exception was not applicable to audio copying
82
. As a result, in 1955, home-taping 
formally required consent, and GEMA
83
 accordingly offered a licensing scheme
84
. 
However, the system became exponentially more difficult to enforce as the number of 
owners of cassette-recorder increased. In the new 1965 Act, home-taping was no longer 
considered to be infringement, whilst the right owners were compensated through a 5% 
levy on hardware, which was soon extended to blank tapes
85
. 
In the UK, the House of Lords made a distinction between granting ‗the power to 
copy‘ and ‗the right to copy‘86, and held the sale of cassette recorders as not constituting 
authorisation to make infringing copies, given that the element of control over the use 
was absent once the cassette recorders were sold
87
. Not satisfied by the court ruling, the 
BPI launched the campaign ‗home taping is killing music‘88. Notwithstanding this 
rhetoric, home taping appears to have increased music sales, promoting music to a 
wider audience
89
. 
Videocassette recorders have been developed and used since the 1950s, but only 
in 1975 did they become suitable for the home market. The first one was the Sony 
Betamax. Once again, it became almost impossible to stop the copying that took place 
in private homes, or, as Valenti
90
 famously argued: 
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‗I say to you that the videocassette recorder is to American film producer and 
American public as the Boston Strangler is to the woman at home alone‘ 91. 
Consequently, in the US, the film industry tried to stop the selling and distribution 
of the Betamax
92
. The Supreme Court held that the sale of videocassette recorders did 
not constitute contributory infringement
93, and that users‘ practice of reproducing a 
television programme to watch it at a more convenient time (time-shifting) would 
constitute fair use
94
. As a result, VHS quickly replaced the Betamax and opened one of 
the most lucrative markets of the film industry: home videos
95
. 
In summary, the advent of the aforementioned technologies undermined right 
holders‘ control over dissemination, simply because they were no longer able to enforce 
their exclusive rights in relation to private copying. The fact that enforcement is not 
feasible does not mean that infringement should be permitted; thus, the legislative 
intervention in some countries is to provide proper remuneration for owners whose 
rights have been infringed through a right to remuneration under a levy system 
administered by collecting societies in order to compensate them for the losses
96
. The 
system, which originally started in Germany
97
, was later adopted in other European 
countries
98
 with the exception of the UK, Ireland, Malta and Cyprus. It is present in 
Canada and, to a limited extent, in the US
99
. 
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1.5 - The Digital Revolution 
In 1854, Boole suggested the possibility of reducing all algebraic values to either ‗false‘ 
or ‗true‘. Subsequently, in 1945, combining Boole‘s logic, mathematical theory and 
electronics, von Neumann built Eniac
100
, the first modern computer, thereby paving the 
way for the ‗digital revolution‘101. The computer was unique amongst electronic devices 
in being programmable. Any information could be modified in practically any manner, 
which was the reason for its success, but there was also the crucial factor in many of the 
current concerns regarding copyright. As an immediate consequence, computer 
technology dramatically increased the simplicity, speed, and quality of the copying 
process, the ability to manipulate, and subsequent delivery to the public‘102, works 
‗liberated from the medium that carries them‘103 with huge potentials for domestic and 
commercial piracy. 
Digital technology permits the storage, transmission, access to and manipulation 
of authors‘ works and other materials in ways, and to an extent, previously unknown. 
Technology and case law evolved rapidly, with the first CD being introduced in 1979, 
followed by the development of the digital audiotape technology. The first low-cost 
easy-to-use CD-burner was commercialised in the 1990s
104
, and the first software 
Mp3
105
 player, Winplay3, was released in 1995; however, only in 1998 was the first 
portable player device commercialised by Diamond Multimedia in the US. In 
Diamond
106
, the court held that users of Mp3 Players merely make copies in order 
‗space-shift‘, or render portable, files already stored on their computers; therefore, this 
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reproduction is considered to be fair use
107
. The DVD reached the market in 1997 with 
two access control measures: Content Scrambling System (CSS) and regional code
108
. 
In 1999, a teenager wrote the DeCSS, a software which ‗hacks‘ through these access 
control measures and copies the unscrambled data into the computer hard drive
109
. The 
DeCSS was immediately associated with mass copyright infringement, since it opened 
access to unencrypted source video and accordingly provided the possibility to copy 
without degradation. A newer video format is already on the market and is slowly 
replacing the DVD: the optical disc storage Blue-Ray disc. 
Finally, the issue of digital libraries should be mentioned. These projects aim to 
record the contents of libraries in digital forms in order to facilitate online access and to 
preserve the works for future generations
110
, thereby challenging numerous aspects of 
copyright law
111
. 
 
1.6 - Origins of Networking Technologies 
The early idea of a network to allow general communication between computers was 
formulated by Licklider
112
. In the 1960s, the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the 
US Department of Defence (ARPA) developed a prototype network between many 
decentralised computers, ‗Arpanet‘, in order to solve the vulnerability problems113 
linked with the existent star-shaped networks used for military communication
114
. In 
1982, Cerf and Kahn defined the transmission control (TCP) and internet protocols (IP), 
subsequently creating the basis for the internet. In 1990, Arpanet was decommissioned 
as a military project and was allowed to develop as a civilian enterprise. In 1991, 
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Berners-Lee
115
 launched the World Wide Web
116
, thereby opening the internet to its true 
multimedia capability
117
. The internet has grown exponentially over recent decades 
(Figure 1), with its success mainly based on its major uses: accessing content, and 
transferring files between computers (Figure 2). 
Figure 1 - Internet Statistic
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 Berners-Lee convinced the CERN of Geneva to renounce the patent, as the Internet should not be 
propriety of anyone. 
116
 Back in 1989, Berners-Lee developed the Hypertext Markup Language (HTML), the Hypertext 
Transfer Protocol (HTTP), and the Universal Resource Locator (URL). Berners-Lee, T. [1999], Weaving 
the web: the original design and ultimate destiny of the World Wide Web by its inventor, Harper. 
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st
 Century, Scientific American, vol. 265(3), 94. 
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 Figure from www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm. [15/08/2010]. Copyright © 2008-2010, Miniwatts 
Marketing Group. 
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 Figures from arstechnica.com (left), and www.cisco.com (right). [15/08/2010]. 
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Although much of the internet runs over facilities provided by telephone 
companies, it nevertheless differs from the telephone network, which is a ‗connection-
oriented‘ network. The internet is a ‗point-to-point packet-based‘ network based on 
links between dedicated computers known as ‗routers‘120. The data are broken into 
‗packets‘ and then transmitted from the sender to the receiver121. The salient point is 
that these ‗packets‘ are continuously ‗copied‘ as they progresses from their origin to the 
their destination, and they may travel through different routes to reach their 
destination
122
, passing through a large number of computers, controlled by different 
users in different countries
123
. 
 
1.7 - Web 1.0 & Pre-File-Sharing Technologies 
The main characteristic of the internet relevant to this work is that every internet 
transmission inevitably involves constant reproduction of content
124
. One of the first 
results of the synergy between digitisation and the internet was MP3.com
125
, a popular 
music-sharing service. MP3.com offered ‗My.MP3.com‘, a service that enabled users to 
register their CD collections and listen to music online from a different place than that 
at which the original copy was held. The record industry successfully sued MP3.com for 
copyright infringement by reproduction and promotion of copyright infringements
126
, 
and MP3.com consequently discontinued the service
127
. 
Another pre-file-sharing technology worth mentioning, as it pre-dates the World 
Wide Web and is still active, is ‗Usenet‘ or ‗newsgroups‘. These are interest groups that 
share information using a system similar to a bulletin board
128
. Although Usenet was 
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 Stevens, W.R. [1996], TCP/IP illustrated, Addison-Wesley. 
121
 The destination IP address in each packet determines what route the packet should. This decision is 
made separately for each packet; therefore, the packets of a transmission may travel different paths 
through the network. Ibid. 
122
 This mechanism contrasts with the telephone network: phone calls travel over a single route for the 
duration of a call. 
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 Hardy, I.T. [1998], op.cit. 33-34. Generally on the related copyright issues: Ginsburg, J.C. [2002], 
Berne without borders: geographic indiscretion and digital communications, 2 I.P.Q. 110-122. 
124
 For this reason, the internet is often nicknamed the ‗giant copy-machine‘. 
125
 Today this is a website operated by CNET Networks (www.cnet.co.uk), but in 1999 the same web 
address hosted the progenitor of all .mp3 related website. 
126
 UMG Recordings Inc. v. MP3.com Inc., F.Supp 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). The ‗space-shifting‘ defence 
was rejected. Recording Industry Association of America v. Diamond Multimedia System Inc., 180 F.3d 
1072, 1081, 51 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1115, 1123 (9
th
 Cir. 1999). 
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 Music publishers filed a separate lawsuit against MP3.com with their own claims of payment due. 
Close to bankruptcy, MP3.com was sold to Vivendi Universal in 2001 that dismantled the original site 
and sold all of its assets including the web address and logo to CNET in 2003. 
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 Each one of news server stores all the messages of the newsgroups posted by its users. The servers 
periodically connect to each other exchanging all messages that are missing. Eventually any message sent 
by any user will be copied to every server. www.slyck.com/newsgroups_guide_intro. [15/08/2010]. 
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designed to transfer only text files, this system is ideal for sharing content by simply 
converting the digital file in order to appear as a text message. The message can then be 
distributed through the newsgroup, downloaded and converted (decoded) back into the 
original file type. In order to avoid extremely long text messages
129
, the file is divided 
into smaller parts, as shown in Figure 3 below. 
Figure 3 - Newsgroup Divide
130
 
 
Notwithstanding the simplicity and the vast use of this sharing technique, newsgroups 
did not attract the attention of the entertainment industries until very recently
131
. 
 
1.8 - Conclusion 
‗A review of past confrontations between copyright and new technological means 
of dissemination suggests that courts often are reluctant to restrain the public 
availability of new technologies, even when those technologies appear principally 
designed to exploit copyrighted works‘132. 
It is said that digital technology creates an ‗unprecedented‘ threat to copyright 
law, simply because it allows the creation of perfect copies; however, the main 
difference between analogue and digital appears to be in relation to the cost of making a 
competing substitute copy and, as a result, if something raises the costs of copying a 
                                                 
129
 For instance, a 700 MB film would take around 15 Million lines if it was encoded into one message, 
and no news servers would accept it, since the maximum accepted is 10.000 lines. 
130
 Figure from www.slyck.com/Newsgroups_Guide_Intro. [15/08/2010]. 
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 Arista Records LLC. v. Usenet.com Inc., Case no. 07-Civ-8822, 2009 WL 187389 (SDNY), 633 
F.Supp.2d 124 (SDNY 2009); and Twentieth Century Fox Films Corp. & Others v. Newzbin Ltd., [2010] 
EWHC 608 (Ch), 29 March 2010. 
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 Ginsburg, J.C. [2001], op.cit. 1616. ‗This does not mean, however, that courts refuse protection, or 
that [legislators impose] a compulsory license, each time copyright encounters new technology‘. Ibid. 
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work—i.e. levies or taxes on products and services which facilitates the copying—the 
difference between digital and analogue would decrease
133
.  
It is submitted that advances in technology alone did not cause the issues 
discussed in this work. Technology cannot be held responsible for mass consumerism 
and for the change of perception of what should be legitimate: 
‗It may be more accurate to state that technologies exacerbate existing problems 
inherent in attempting to balance the varied interest of authors, publishers and 
consumers‘134. 
Historically, the legal systems have responded in a number of ways, from 
increasing sanctions to compulsory licenses. The issues surrounding the history of the 
relationship between copyright and new technologies that decrease control are mainly 
two: first, enforcing copyright becomes more difficult; and second, users perceive that 
‗control‘ over distribution should stop at the private sphere of individuals. Notably, in 
the past—irrespective of the outcome of the discourse on private copying—a levy 
system turned out to be a balanced compromise
135
. Consequently, when it is not 
practical to ‗control‘ the dissemination of copyright works, an alternative for 
remuneration is advisable. 
‗One might therefore conclude that when copyright and new technology conflict 
the copyright owner‘s right to control the disposition of the work must yield to a 
greater public interest in promoting its unfettered (if not always unpaid) 
dissemination‘136. 
History has largely repeated itself, and the law has been forced to adapt to every 
technological development. With the advent of networking technologies, this interaction 
appears reversed and, notably, an unpredictable phenomenon is occurring. Rather than 
the law adapting to technology, it can be said that, today, the law remains the master, 
and it is technology which is sub-servant to the law. Conversely, a more cynical view 
states that technology will always circumvent the law. Technology changes rapidly: 
court decisions or legislative responses became quickly inapt or irrelevant. Past 
predictions are no longer valid, and future predictions may no longer be possible.  
We investigate these dilemmas in the following Chapters. Chapter Two begins 
this investigative journey by critically defining networking technologies. 
                                                 
133
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 Dutfield–Suthersanen [2008], op.cit. 237. 
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 An additional rationale for compulsory license schemes is reduction of the transaction costs that 
negotiated licenses would impose. Cassler, R. [1990], Copyright compulsory licenses- are they coming or 
going?, 37 J.C.S.U.S.A. 231, 249. 
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 Ginsburg, J.C. [2001], op.cit. 1616. 
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Chapter Two 
An Introduction to Networking Technologies 
- 
‗…history has shown that time and market forces often provide equilibrium in balancing interests, 
whether the new technology be a player piano, a copier, a tape recorder, a video recorder, a personal 
computer, a karaoke machine or an MP3 player. Thus, it is prudent for courts to exercise caution…‘137 
 
2.1 - Introduction 
Networking technologies have contributed to producing a radical shift in terms of the 
ability to reproduce and distribute content, and have accordingly dramatically reduced 
the entertainment industries‘ control in relation to dissemination138. Everyone with an 
internet connection has the capability and the opportunity to access and copy content—
theoretically, without limit—and from anywhere on the planet139. With this in mind, this 
Chapter presents an analysis of file-sharing and the Web 2.0 phenomena, providing a 
description of the technologies involved in the relevant copyright cases by noting, when 
appropriate, how litigation has driven the technology evolution. This understanding of 
the underlying technologies driving the current phenomenon is crucial, as it allows 
appreciation of the opportunities and challenges facing copyright law, as discussed in 
the following Chapters. 
 
2.2 - Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing 
Although the exact definition of peer-to-peer file-sharing is debateable, ‗peer-to-peer‘ 
mainly depends upon the participation of equal standing computers—‗peers‘— who 
contribute the resources on which the network is constructed
140
. Importantly, there are 
many applications which employ peer-to-peer technologies: for instance, distributed 
computing
141
, collaboration
142
, and, most importantly, content sharing. This last 
category includes several applications, the most common of which is ‗file-sharing‘, a 
                                                 
137
 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154(9
th
 Cir. 2004), 1159. 
138
 Potemkin, D. [2005], The pirates, or the navy?, 147 World Copyright, 10-12. 
139
 However, this can be limited using filtering technologies such as geo-blocks. 
140
 ‗[It] is a class of applications that takes advantages of resources available at the edge of network‘. 
Barkay, D. [2001], Peer-to-peer computing: technologies for sharing and collaborating on the net, Intel 
Press. 
141
 Applications where the peers cooperate in order to solve computational problems. Ibid. 
142
 In these applications, users interact with each other in real-time. For instance, instant messaging, audio 
and visual communications. Ibid. 
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term which means to pass a copy of a file on to someone else. All file-sharing systems 
have the similar goal of facilitating the location and sharing of files stored on the 
individual users‘ computers—i.e. ‗peers‘—amongst all the users connected through the 
network. The most popular method of sharing files is the use of dedicated software to 
access a network. Once the software is in use and the computer is connected to the 
internet, the user can then share files with all the other users connected to the same 
network, while retaining the original copy of the file. 
 
2.2.1 – ‘Generations’ 
File-sharing networks are generally described by their ‗generation‘143; however, the 
definition of which software belongs to which generation is often unclear. The author 
prefers using the following categorisation, based on how peers locate files and others 
crucial differences. 
 
2.2.1.1 - Centralised file list. - This class is characterised by the users being connected 
to a central server which indexes the files that each user is sharing. In order to download 
a particular file, the user asks the central server to search the network. The central server 
‗searches‘ the keywords in its list of known files, and accordingly provides the user with 
the location of files as shown in Figure 4 below. Upon receiving the results, the user 
initiates the download directly from another user. 
Figure 4 - Centralised File-Sharing System 
 
This model is efficient in handling searches, but requires a central server in order 
to function, otherwise the network is broken, and no sharing is possible. Napster
144
 
made this category redundant. 
                                                 
143
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2.2.1.2 - Gnutella/FastTrack. - This class is characterised by decentralised file lists
145
: 
users are directly connected to each other. In order to download a particular file, the 
user interrogates everyone connected to the network until the file is found and the 
download is initiated, as shown in Figure 5 below
146
. 
Figure 5 - Gnutella 
 
The major advantage of such a system is the lack of centralised control: the 
network is active as long as two peers are connected. However, the disadvantages are 
many: for instance, searches are slower, and the network is fractured often in small sub-
networks which are not connected to each other. This forced the introduction of 
‗SuperNodes‘. FastTrack, as opposed to working with a network where every user is an 
equal ‗peer‘, promotes certain users to SuperNodes, which act like a central server 
coordinating searches and providing a list of users connect, as shown in Figure 6 below. 
Figure 6 - FastTrack 
 
This new technique proved to be successful, and quickly became the standard
147
, 
notwithstanding some of the software providers being found liable under authorisation 
and inducement to copyright infringement theories
148
. Gnutella/FastTrack networks can 
be easily monitored on a large scale, thereby making it relatively easy for the 
entertainment industries to search and find users sharing unauthorised materials. 
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 Universal Music Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Sharman License Holding Ltd., [2005] F.C.A. 1242, (2005) 65 
IPR 289; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studio Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005); on remand 454 
F.Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
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2.2.1.3 – BitTorrent. - This class is peculiar because of its ‗one file-one network‘ 
structure. Rather than creating a network between all the connected users, BitTorrent 
creates a network for every file shared, as shown in Figure 7 below. 
Figure 7 - BitTorrent 
 
Servers running tracker programs keep these networks online. In order to share 
(‗swarm‘) a file, the user (the ‗seeder‘) creates a .torrent file149 and disseminates it over 
the internet
150. The BitTorrent software then starts a ‗seed node‘ allowing other users 
(known as ‗lechers‘) to connect to the seeder and to start downloading. Every lecher 
automatically ‗reseeds‘ the file, therefore becoming additional sources. In order to 
download a file, users must simply obtain the relevant .torrent file and open it with the 
BitTorrent software. The .torrent file tells the software the address of one of the trackers 
which maintain a list of the users sharing the file and where the file—or one of the file‘s 
parts, i.e. blocks—resides151. As soon as all of the blocks are obtained, the software then 
reassembles them and the download is complete. It is important to note how each block 
can be downloaded from different seeders. Furthermore, the BitTorrent software will 
connect to as many seeders as available to download several blocks at once, even in 
random order. BitTorrent networks cannot be monitored on a large scale; however, if 
connecting to a tracker, it is possible to obtain the list of every IP address that 
participates in one swarm. Importantly, BitTorrent does not offer its users anonymity; 
however, softwares have been created so as to encrypt transmissions
152
, and the trackers 
can then be hidden
153
. 
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 A ‗.torrent‘ is a small file which containing the name and size of the file to be shared, the address of a 
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 Such as Torrent Privacy. https://torrentprivacy.com. [15/08/2010]. 
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2.2.1.4 - Private Networks. - This class‘s principal feature is the creation of ‗virtual 
private networks‘ with in-built anonymity features. In order to share, users must firstly 
create a private network inviting other users they trust—i.e. ‗friends‘. These softwares 
do, in fact, allow only ‗trusted‘ people to share files directly within each other. In order 
to download a file, the user sends a request to the connected friends, who then transmit 
the request to their friends, and so on, until the file is found and the download starts, as 
shown in Figure 8 below. 
Figure 8 - Private Network 
 
Notably, owing to the high level of secrecy and the exclusivity of the network, it 
is difficult to monitor the data transmitted or to identify members of the network. In 
addition, various softwares create a cryptographic key which encrypts the user‘s IP 
address to increase security
154
 and to reduce the risks of traffic analysis
155
. 
 
2.2.2 – Softwares 
Below follows a list of file-sharing softwares relevant to this work, which rely upon the 
aforementioned networks schemes
156
. 
 
2.2.2.1 – Napster. - Napster is commonly referred to as the first file-sharing software, 
although alternative methods of sharing files were already relatively popular
157
. The 
software created by Fanning was freely available, and enabled users to share audio files 
(.mp3). As previously mentioned, Napster‘s architecture was built upon a central server 
directing the traffic between registered users, thereby making Napster a convenient legal 
target under indirect or ‗secondary‘ liability which, in the US, can take on the forms of 
contributory infringement and vicarious infringement
158
.  
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 For instance, OneSwarm. Para. 2.2.2.9. 
155
 Such as Tor. Para. 2.2.2.9. 
156
 For a constantly updated list of file-sharing softwares ranked by popularity, see www.p2pon.com/file-
sharing-programs. [15/08/2010]. 
157
 For instance the distributed Internet discussion systems such as IRC, Hotline, and Usenet. 
158
 Para 3.3.3.2. 
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In Napster
159
, the Court found the software‘s users were infringing copyright. 
Napster had knowledge, control, and had ‗materially contributed‘ to the infringing 
activities. It was also reasonable to believe that Napster had a ‗direct financial interest 
in the infringing activities of its users‘160. The case was partially settled: Napster was 
shut down, and users migrated to different file-sharing softwares. In order to avoid 
similar court rulings, software providers needed to find a way of remaining independent 
from central server, thereby avoiding control over the content shared
161
. The first fully 
distributed alternative was Gnutella
162
, but it quickly disappeared, generating a variety 
of softwares based on the same technology. 
 
2.2.2.2 – Aimster163. - Aimster enabled its users to share files with other users 
registered as ‗friends‘. In Re Aimster164, the court held that Aimster‘s users were 
infringing copyright, and that the provider had constructive knowledge of the 
infringements, was materially contributing to the activity, and was also influencing and 
encouraging direct infringement amongst its users. A preliminary injunction was 
granted, and the company was consequently closed down
165
.  
 
2.2.2.3 – Kazaa. - Kazaa is a file-sharing software created by Consumer 
Empowerment
166
. In 2001, a Dutch court ordered Kazaa to prevent its users from 
infringing copyright
167
. Consumer Empowerment sold Kazaa to Sharman Networks. 
The Amsterdam Court of Appeal later held Kazaa not liable for the infringements of its 
users
168
, and the Supreme Court upheld the decision
169
. In 2004, however, the 
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Australian Record Industry Association sued the new owner of Kazaa
170
 for authorising 
copyright infringements. The following year, the Federal Court of Australia held that 
Sharman had encouraged users to participate in file-sharing activities through its 
website
171
, and that the defendant authorised the copying and communication of 
protected recordings to the public, with such authorisation therefore constituting 
infringement
172
. The court ordered Sharman to disable the download of Kazaa in 
Australia. As a result, Australian users were greeted with the following notice (Figure 9) 
when visiting the Kazaa website
173
: 
Figure 9 - Kazaa Notice 
 
In 2006, Sharman Networks agreed a global settlement with the entertainment 
industries
174
 and sold Kazaa, which is now a licensed subscription-based music 
download service
175
, but it is only available to users in the US. 
 
2.2.2.4 - File Rogue, WinMX (WinNY), Soribada, & Kuro. - File Rogue was a 
software provided by YK MMO. Users had to create an account and a ‗personal 
catalogue‘ of files they wanted to share. The list was then uploaded to the ‗global 
catalogue‘ on the File Rogue server176. Users could then search the catalogue and 
download the files directly from other users. In both Columbia Music Entertainment KK 
v. YK MMO Japan
177
 and JASRAC v. YK MMO Japan
178
, the provider was held liable of 
infringement owing to its conduct, knowledge
179, control/supervision of users‘ 
conduct
180
, and financial advantage. 
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WinMX was the first software to implement ‗multi-point download‘, allowing 
users to download the same file simultaneously from several sources. The arrest of 
some users
181
 and the increasing presence of ‗dummy‘ files subsequently led to the 
development of WinNY
182—a server-less encrypted implemented version of WinMX. 
In 2005 in the US, RIAA asked the software provider
183
 to implement filters to prevent 
users from downloading protected material. Under the threat of litigation, the network 
and the homepage were discontinued
184
. The implemented version (WinNY) has been 
involved in two cases. In WinNY 1
185
 the defendant used WinNY to share films and was 
held guilty of infringement of the public transmission right. In WinNY 2
186
, the court 
held that WinNY had enabled copyright infringement by developing and distributing the 
software. However, in October, 2009, the Osaka High Court overturned this ruling
187
: 
‗merely being aware of the possibility that the software could be abused does not 
constitute a crime of aiding violations of the law, and the court cannot accept that 
the defendant supplied the software solely to be used for copyright violations‘188. 
Soribada was the first Korean file-sharing software, and was held to be abetting 
copyright infringement
189
 by facilitating users‘ infringement through the distribution of 
software and provision of services
190
. It was discontinued in 2005 because of the 
lawsuit, but it was re-launched in 2008 as a subscription-based licensed music download 
service
191
. 
Kuro was a commercial, subscription-based file-sharing service, mainly based in 
Taiwan. In Kuro Software
192
, the court held that a technology provider which is fully 
aware that its technology may be used for infringement but still encourages the use of 
such technology, could ultimately foresee that it would be used for criminal purposes, 
and thus has a general intention to commit a crime. The court held that the software 
providers knew the files shared were protected and the copying was unauthorised. The 
defendants were aware, and could foresee, that providing the Kuro software, network 
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search and download access facility to its users could ultimately result in copyright 
infringement
193
. 
 
2.2.2.5 - Morpheus (Grokster). - Morpheus reached worldwide popularity in 2003 
when the providers, Grokster and StreamCast, obtained in the US a ruling stating they 
were not liable for secondary infringement
194
. When questioned, the US Supreme Court 
agreed to hear the case
195
, and ruled that: 
‗One who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe 
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster 
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties‘196. 
The Supreme Court noted that Grokster took ‗active steps‘ to encourage 
infringement and held that a person: 
‗is liable of contributory infringement by intentionally inducing or encouraging 
direct infringement, and is liable of vicarious infringement by profiting from 
direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it‘197. 
The remanded District Court consequently found the provider liable for inducing 
infringement of copyright
198
.  
As today the network is still relatively active and the software can be downloaded 
from download.com
199
, however accompanied by the following message: 
‗editor‘s note: the publisher of Morpheus is no longer in business‘200. 
 
2.2.2.6 – eMule. - eMule is a popular open-source software201 featuring the direct 
exchange of links between users, and which further adopts a credit system to reward 
frequent uploaders increasing their download speed
202
. Hundreds of modifications of 
                                                 
193
 They also formed a criminal association together with the user, being joint principals in the crime of 
unauthorised reproduction. The court, also, held that the user had infringed copyright by using Kuro 
software to download copyright protected materials. 
194
 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 259 F Supp 2d 1029, 65 USQP 2d 1545 (C.D. 
Cal. 9 January 2003), affirmed 380 F 3d 1154 (9
th
 Cir. 2004). 
195
 Summarising, the defendant distributed a file-sharing program, had no control over its users‘ activities, 
but had notice from the claimants that users were engaged in copyright infringements. 
196
 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S Ct 2764 (2005), 2766. 
197
 Ibid. 125 S Ct 2764 (Supreme Court 2005). 
198
 Ibid. on remand 454 F Supp 966 (CD Cal., 2006). 
199
 download.cnet.com/Morpheus/3000-2196_4-10057840.html. [15/08/2010]. 
200
 Ibid. 
201
 For a definition of ‗open-source software‘, see opensource.org/docs/osd. [15/08/2010]. 
202
 Large files are divided and downloaded in parts. The downloaders automatically share the obtained 
parts until the download is complete. eMule automatically decreases the download speed of the users who 
attempt to decrease the uploading speed. www.emule-project.net. [15/08/2010]. 
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eMule are available; however, so far, none of them has apparently been involved in any 
lawsuits
203
.  
 
2.2.2.7 – LimeWire. - LimeWire was first released in 2000. Later, it was upgraded in 
order to allow users to search and share files using BitTorrent. LimeWire providers 
attempted to avoid liability by making the users fully aware that: 
‗Everything you share with the P2P Network […] becomes public and given 
sufficient resources, is trackable. To use LimeWire legally, you must have the 
permission of the owner of the copyright rights in the file for each file in your 
LimeWire shared Library‘204. 
LimeWire also provide an opt-in content filter, whereby users can have LimeWire 
actively attempting to filter out protected content from being shared. Nevertheless, 
LimeWire was sued in the US
205
 and subsequently filed a counterclaim on a on a 
number of grounds, stating that the entertainment industries impetus to shut down file-
sharing services is an attempt 
‗to destroy any online music distribution service they did not own or control, or 
force such services to do business with them on exclusive and/or other 
anticompetitive terms so as to limit and ultimately control the distribution and 
pricing of digital music, all to the detriment of consumers‘206. 
The counterclaims were rejected, and the court granted a summary judgement and 
found LimeWire liable for inducing copyright infringement, common law copyright 
infringement, and unfair competition
207
. In June 2010, the US National Music 
Publishers Association filed a new lawsuit against Limewire
208
. Nevertheless, Limewire 
is still online, and it is expected to ‗evolve‘ soon into a cloud computing209 subscription-
based music service
210
. 
 
2.2.2.8 – BitTorrent. - BitTorrent, written by Cohen, is a global standard for 
disseminating files over the internet and the leading sharing software
211
. Its unique 
                                                 
203
 As today is the most downloaded open-source file-sharing software. sourceforge.net. [15/08/2010]. 
204
 www.limewire.com/legal/copyright. [15/08/2010]. 
205
 Arista Records LLC. v. LimeWire LLC, no 06-cv-05936, 2010 WL 1914816 (SDNY 11 May 2010). 
206
 Answer and counterclaims, 18. www.digitalmusicnews.com/legal_docs/arista_limewire. [15/08/2010]. 
207
 Arista Records LLC. v. LimeWire LLC, no 06-cv-05936, 2010 WL 1914816 (SDNY 11 May 2010). 
208
 EMI Music Inc. & Others v. LimeWire LLC, no. 10-cv-04695, (SDNY). www.nmpa.org/pdf/whats_n 
ew/LimeWireFiled.pdf. [15/08/2010]. 
209
 For a description of cloud computing, see Para. 2.4.2. 
210
 www.cloudtweaks.com/2010/06/limewire-p2p-file-sharing-moving-to-the-cloud. [15/08/10]. 
211
 Malcom, J. [2005], The BitTorrent effect, Wired Magazine 13.01. Official website: bittorrent.com. A 
guide to BitTorrent is at www.mp3newswire.net/stories/2003/bittorrent.html. BitTorrent-related activities 
  44 
network and architecture make it is possible to download copies of large files—such 
films and softwares—in a fraction of the time it takes on regular peer-to-peer networks. 
The major distinguishing feature of BitTorrent is that the downloading speed increases 
with a higher number of users
212
. In the case of a regular file-sharing network or web-
hosting site, the number of users downloading and the downloading speed/capacity is 
limited by the uploading speed/capacity of the source. However, BitTorrent circumvents 
the problem by taking advantage of the uploading speed/capacity of every user 
participating in the swarm of the file, as described in Figure 10. 
Figure 10 - Regular P2P & Web-Hosting versus BitTorrent 
 
For instance, when a large number of users attempt to download a large file 
through the use of regular file-sharing or web-hosting, should the source may exceed its 
uploading limit, it would eventually collapse. BitTorrent avoids this risk by sharing the 
bandwidth burden between the downloaders. 
BitTorrent is popular for its legal uses, mainly the distribution of softwares
213
. 
Some use the software for infringing activities, but BitTorrent, apparently, has not been 
directly involved in a lawsuit, and it is open to doubt whether BitTorrent software 
providers would be liable for the infringements of their users
214
. BitTorrent appears to 
have substantial non-infringing use—there is no control over users‘ activities—and the 
consensus appears to be that Cohen has cautioned sufficiently users against using 
BitTorrent to infringe copyright in order to make it obvious how the actual intent is not 
                                                                                                                                               
are estimated to be 35% of the entire internet traffic, more than all the other file-sharing networks 
combined. www.chachelogic.com. [15/08/2010]. 
212
 Silver–Young [2006], Warner Bros movies to feature on BitTorrent, 17(7) Ent.L.Rev. 189-195, 191. 
213
 For instance, GNU/Linux distributions, large film trailers. Warner Bros‘ video, for instance, use 
BitTorrent for movie distribution. Silver–Young [2006], op.cit. 
214
 Giblin-Chen [2005], Rewinding Sony: an inducement theory of secondary liability, 27(11) E.I.P.R. 
428-436; Ganley, P. [2006], Surviving Grokster: innovation and the future of peer-to-peer, 28(1) E.I.P.R. 
15-25. 
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to promote or authorise copyright infringements
215
. However, local tests for liability 
will be considered in Chapter Three. As of today, the entertainment industries are left to 
prosecute the weakest links: users, tracker providers, and websites hosting .torrent files. 
BitTorrent does not offer its users anonymity. The software generally assigns to a 
tracker
216
 the job to identify which users have a copy of a requested file, and to 
accordingly ensure users upload and download such in the most efficient way possible. 
By accessing the tracker, it is possible to obtain the IP addresses of all users connected 
to it. In 2005, a BitTorrent user was convicted in Hong Kong for uploading three films‘ 
.torrent files to a newsgroup. He appealed on the grounds that no copies were made 
within the meaning of §118(1)(f) of the Hong Kong Copyright Ordinance (Cap 528), 
and that no distribution of copies took place
217
. Both defences were rejected. 
Importantly, BitTorrent does not offer facilities to search files: users need to find 
the .torrent files by other means, i.e. from the numerous websites which host them. 
These websites have consequently become a vulnerable target of lawsuits, since most of 
the time they offer both an index and a tracker
218
. The position of these websites is 
increasingly precarious. For instance, in 2004, Supernova was discontinued under the 
threat of litigation
219
; LokiTorrent shortly followed, and the website was changed to 
display a message (Figure 11 below) intended to intimidate users. In 2005, the FBI in 
the US shut down elitetorrents.org
220
. In 2008, the provider of OiNK.cd was arrested 
and charged with conspiracy to defraud in the UK, but was later acquitted of all 
charges
221
. In 2009, Pirate Bay was at the centre of a criminal case in Sweden. The court 
held the defendants of being accessories to a crime against author‘s right law222. 
Nevertheless, the Pirate Bay‘s website and tracker are still online223. 
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 Giblin-Chen [2005], op.cit. 434; Ganley, P. [2006], op.cit. 18; Baggs, S. [2005], The UK view - how 
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and conduct‘. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S.Ct 2764, 2780. 
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219
 www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/14/finnish_police_raid_bittorrent_site. [15/08/2010]. 
220
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this enforcement action was the website‘s early release of Star Wars Episode III: Revenge of the Sith. 
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 R. v Ellis (Alan), unreported 15 January 2010, Crown Ct (Teesside). 
222
 ‗Pirate Bay‘, Verdict B 13301-06, 17 April 2009, Stockholm District Court, Division 5, Unit 52. The 
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223
 However, users are quickly moving towards open-source trackers, such as OpenBitTorrent and 
PublicBitTorrent. torrentfreak.com/openbittorrent-tracker-muscles-in-on-the-old-pirate-bay-090705; torre 
ntfreak.com/publicbt-tracker-set-to-patch-bittorrents-achilles-heel-090712. [15/08/2010]. 
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Figure 11 - ‗You can click but you can‘t hide‘224 
 
Technical solutions to the anonymity and .torrent file-hosting liability problems 
have been implemented already and will be discussed in the following; however, these 
are limited examples. The BitTorrent technology is so efficient that the entertainment 
industries themselves favour it to distribute content
225
. 
 
2.2.2.9 – WASTE, OneSwarm, Tor & Torrent Privacy. - WASTE226 is a ‗virtual 
private‘ or ‗friend-to-friend‘ file-sharing software, which creates a network between 
groups of trusted users and encrypts the files shared
227. Users‘ activity cannot be easily 
monitored; therefore, the likelihood of case law over this software is, at present, 
improbable. 
OneSwarm is a file-sharing software expressly designed to ‗resist‘ the monitoring 
of those sharing files
228
. The software creates a cryptographic key, which encrypts the 
user‘s IP address229 and, as opposed to transmitting data from the sender to receiver, it 
transmits data through a number of intermediaries, thereby obscuring the identities of 
both the sender and receiver, thus creating something similar to a friend-to-friend 
sharing network, but more secure. However, OneSwarm only preserves user privacy 
when sharing files using the friend-to-friend network provided. 
                                                 
224
 Figure from the campaign ‗Respect Copyrights‘. 
225
 Osborne, D. [2008], User-generated content: trade mark and copyright infringement issues, 3(9) 
J.I.P.L.&P. 555-562, 557. 
226
 WASTE is an acronym for ‗We Await Silent Tristero‘s Empire‘, a reference to T. Pynchon‘s novel 
The Crying of Lot 49. It was developed by J. Frankel at Nullsoft in 2003, and it is currently being further 
developed by SourceForge. www.sourceforge.com. [15/08/2010]. 
227
 Users sharing their RSA public keys and connecting to the ring can form a ‗WASTE ring‘. WASTE 
randomly generates private and public keys. Once connected to the ring, the user can see everyone‘s 
virtual ID (nicknames and public key hashes) in the ring. www.sourceforge.com. [15/08/2010]. 
228
 oneswarm.cs.washington.edu/index.html. [15/08/2010]. 
229
 Isdal, T. et al. [2009], Friend-to-friend data sharing with OneSwarm. oneswarm.cs.washington.edu/ 
f2f_tr.pdf. [15/08/2010]. 
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Tor is an anonymous communication service, which can be used to share files. It 
protects the identities of users and hosting services running and maintaining the 
trackers, concealing the IP addresses
230
. The technology has been nicknamed ‗Onion 
Routing‘231. The aim is to reduce the risks of traffic monitoring by distributing 
transactions over several ‗places‘ on the internet, so that no single point can link the 
user to a destination. The system uses alternatively encrypted and clear random paths in 
order to maximise secrecy, as shown by Figure 12 below. 
Figure 12 - Tor
232
 
 
 
In particular, for file-sharing through BitTorrent, there are already softwares 
which configure automatically themselves, such as Torrent Privacy
233
. Upon 
installation, this software creates secure connections (tunnels) to most of the world 
trackers, encrypting all traffic. The tracker will therefore register TorrentPrivacy IP 
address instead of that of the user
234. As a result, users‘ IP addresses are kept hidden. 
‗Nothing is hidden except for the purpose of having it revealed‘235. 
However, ‗revelation‘ in this context may be cost-inefficient as it will be 
discussed in Chapter Five. 
                                                 
230
 Dingledine, R. et al. [2009], Tor: the second-generation Onion router, git.torproject.org/checkout/tor/ 
master/doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf. [15/08/2010]. 
231
 It was originally developed by the US Navy to protect government communications. www.torproject. 
org /torusers.html.en. [15/08/2010]. 
232
 Figure from www.torproject.org/overview.html.en#thesolution. [15/08/2010]. 
233
 https://torrentprivacy.com. [15/08/2010]. 
234
 The company is based in the Russia; the servers are in US, Canada and the Netherlands. They do not 
save logs of the connection. https://torrentprivacy.com/index.php?mod =how_it_works. [15/08/2010]. 
235
 Mark 4:22, International Standard Translation 2008. 
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2.3 - Web 2.0 
‗Web 2.0 is a trend in the use of World Wide Web technology and web design that 
aims to facilitate creativity, information sharing, and collaboration among 
users‘236.  
The development of such facilities has greatly increased the sharing of contents, 
uploading them to websites, aggregating them into reference websites, and creating 
virtual worlds comprising individual contributions
237
. Web 2.0 creates copyright issues 
which are not easily solved
238
. In particular, notwithstanding Web 2.0 service providers 
usually obtain warranties and indemnities from users
239
, it is arguable whether or not 
they fall in the definition of ‗information society service providers‘240, and are therefore 
entitled to the safe harbour provisions. Their legal position varies depending on the 
services provided, on the modus operandi, and on the jurisdiction, as will be discussed 
in the following and in Chapter Three. For instance, in France and the US, Google was 
held to merely host infringing videos and was entitled to enjoy protection from liability 
since the content was expeditiously removed
241
. In contrast, however, in Italy, Google 
has not been accorded the same privilege in relation to hosting offensive video due to 
privacy and data protection
242
. Importantly, there are three aspects of Web 2.0, which 
deserve to be analysed separately: 
1. semantic web: the use of software to analyse and index the web content; 
2. user-generated content: wikis (Wikipedia); content-sharing sites (YouTube); 
social-networks (Facebook); 
                                                 
236
 O‘Reilly, T. [2005], What is Web 2.0. Design patterns and business models for the next generation of 
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and Google Inc. Paris Commercial Court 20 February 2008. Viacom International Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 
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3. virtual worlds (Second Life, World of Warcraft). 
 
2.3.1 - Semantic Web 
The semantic web makes it possible to gather and index online content automatically in 
order to satisfy requests from users. The most common semantic web applications are 
the search engines‘ ‗crawlers‘ which provide a compilation of reference items 
concerning a particular subject matter, giving the links to the corresponding webpage
243
. 
In the Belgian case of Copiepresse v. Google
244, Google‘s crawlers made copies of 
article titles and brief extracts from news items made them available on the internet by 
the members of Copiepresse, without permission, in order to feed the Google News site, 
with consequent reproduction and communication of such material to the public. The 
court held that Google had breached the author‘s right law, rejecting Google‘s defences 
based on freedom of expression
245
, citation exception
246
, and news reporting
247
. 
Furthermore, in Germany, a court held that, because of the way in which the internet 
works, there is a general implied licence to link to legitimate content placed on the 
internet, unless this activity is explicitly revoked or prevented by technological 
measures
248
. In China, Yahoo! China‘s search engine, has been held liable for not 
filtering out links to infringing materials
249
. 
 
2.3.2 - User-Generated Content (UGC) 
The term ‗UGC‘ includes various forms of works created and/or uploaded by users250. 
There is no common agreed upon definition
251
, but UGC has been categorised by the 
content provided (Figure 13). 
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[2008], op.cit. 561. 
249
 IFPI v. Yahoo! China, Beijing No.2 Intermediate people‘s Court, 10 April 2007. 
250
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Figure 13 - Types of User-Generated Content
252
 
 
A significant amount of UGC is uploaded on hosting and storing services, which 
provides an online space where users can access content. These services have been 
categorised by the type of platform (Figure 14). 
Figure 14 - Platforms for User- Generated Content
253
 
 
                                                 
252
 Figure from OECD [2007], op.cit. 32. 
253
 Ibid., 33. 
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There are a number of copyright issues relating to UGC
254
, and so it is therefore 
deemed necessary to distinguish between: 
 works created by users, 
 mash-ups (i.e. works recombining and modifying existing works, which might be 
copyright protected), and 
 unauthorised protected works. 
Notably, this work will focus on ‗unauthorised protected works‘—i.e. the scenario in 
which the uploader is not the author or who otherwise lacks the necessary authorisation 
to upload. Chapter Three will focus on the potential liabilities of users and 
service/platform providers. Whether user-generated content platforms enjoy the so-
called ‗safe-harbour‘ exceptions is an on-going question255 which will later be 
addressed
256
. 
 
2.3.2.1 – Wikis. - A well-known example is Wikipedia, an online encyclopaedia which 
allows users to access, amend, and collectively contribute to, content
257
. The position of 
wikis as a merely hosting service has been successfully used as a defence in court
258
. 
However, in August, 2009, the National Portrait Gallery in London sued Wikipedia 
because a user had uploaded images from the gallery‘s collection website without 
permission
259
. The dispute has not yet been resolved. 
 
2.3.2.2 - Content-Sharing Sites. - Generally, such sites allow users to upload content, 
and to provide storage and other facilities. The most popular example is YouTube, a 
video sharing-site
260
. The terms of service states that: 
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‗Users may upload videos only with permission of the copyright holder and 
people depicted in the videos‘261. 
Users may only access videos—downloading or copying is not permitted. Google 
constantly attempts to legitimise its content through licensing
262
 and filtering; However, 
in the US, Viacom and the FA Premier League filed two separate lawsuits against 
YouTube and Google in the respect of copyright infringement for content uploaded by 
users—in particular, for inducing copyright infringement263. YouTube is not an isolated 
project; hundreds of similar sites are easily accessible. The phenomenon is so spread out 
and difficult to police that a group of entertainment industries and content-sharing sites‘ 
providers
264
 set-up some ‗principles‘ so as to reduce infringements265.  
However, various websites, such as Megavideo or YouKu, are popular for hosting 
thousands of films—allegedly without authorisation—which shield themselves thanks 
to a complex system of linking though linking sites, such as Surfthechannel or Project 
Free-TV. This complex system of linking renders the search of protected content on the 
hosting-site increasingly more expensive for the copyright owners. Films are often 
divided into smaller sections of 15-30 minutes each, and registered under non-
recognisable tags. Consequently, even knowing that the server hosts the film, the 
retrieval of such is complex
266
. Importantly, link providers facilitate this task by posting 
the list of the links to access the desired content
267
. The disclaimer commonly adopted 
summarises the position of the linking site: 
‗The author is not responsible for any contents linked or referred to from his/her 
pages. […]. X.com does not host any content. All X.com does, is linking to content 
that was uploaded to popular online video hosting sites. […] By clicking on any 
links to videos while surfing on X.com you leave X.com. […] X.com cannot take 
the responsibility for any content hosted on other sites‘268. 
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This ‗lack of responsibility‘ of the link provider has not been recognised by courts 
worldwide
269
, as will be discussed in Chapter Three. 
 
2.3.2.3 - Social-Networks. - Social networking sites allow users to create a personal 
page where they can post content, as well as send other users messages, and write or 
post content on other users‘ pages. The issue is that this content may be protected and 
that, owing to social interaction, an unauthorised copy posted immediately creates an 
infinitive number of unauthorised reproductions. The most popular social networking 
sites include Facebook and MySpace. Facebook
270
 has been involved in a number of 
controversies due to the concerns relating to surveillance, data mining
271, and the site‘s 
privacy agreement
272
. Finally, and most importantly for the objective of this study, is 
the ability to post and share any kind of content, which raises a number of copyright 
concerns. MySpace offers services similar to those of Facebook, but also provides 
dedicated facilities for musicians where they can upload content
273
. Universal Music has 
sued MySpace in the US for videos posted by its users, claiming MySpace encourages, 
facilitates and participates in the infringements carried out by its users
274
. The decision 
of this suit is still pending. Finally, Flickr should also be mentioned, which is the most 
popular photo management and sharing website
275
. 
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Belgium: IFPI Belgium v. Beckers Court of First Instance, Antwerp, 21 and 24 June, 21 December 1999, 
[2000] ECDR 440; Court of Appeal, First Chamber, Antwerp 26 June 2001. China: Sony v. Yuebo, 
Beijing No.1 Intermediate People‘s Court 2004/428, 23 April 2004; Appeal: Beijing Higher People‘s 
Court 2004/714, 12 December 2005. Go East v. Yuebo, Beijing No.1 Intermediate People‘s Court, 
2004/400, 23 April 2004; Beijing Higher People‘s Court, 2004/713, 2 December 2004. Denmark: KODA, 
NCB, Dansk Artist Forbund and IFPI Danmark v. Anders Lauritzen and Jimmy Egebjerg Vestre Landset 
(Western High Court), 20 April 2001, [2002] ECDR 25. France: Lafesse v. Myspace TGI Paris, 22 June 
2007, interlocutory injunction. Nord-Ouest Productions v. DailyMotion TGI Paris, 13 July 2007. Text 
available at www.gazettedunet.fr). Zadig Productions v. Google Vidéo TGI Paris, 19 October 2007. 
www.gazettedunet.fr. Germany: ‗MP3 Links‘ Landgericht (District Court) Berlin, 14 June 2005, [2005] 
ZUM-RD 398. Netherlands: Stichting Bescherming Rechten Entertainment Industrie Nederland (BREIN) 
v. Techno Design ‗Internet Programming‘ B.V. Court of Appeal, Amsterdam, Fifth Division for Civil 
Matters, 15 June 2006, [2006] ECDR 21. Norway: TONO and others v. Bruvik Supreme Court, 27 
January 2005, [2006] IIC 120. Sterling, J.A.L. [2009], op.cit. UK: TV-Links, http://torrentfreak.com/tv-
links-triumphs- with-landmark-e-commerce-directive-ruling-100212. [15/08/2010]. 
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 The website, created by M. Zukerberg, has more than 250 million users. www.facebook.com/press/ 
info.php?statistics. [15/08/2010]. 
271
 Data mining is a technique to gather information. For instance, one could search through FaceBook‘s 
data to determine its users‘ preferences. 
272
 www.facebook.com/policy.php. [15/08/2010]. 
273
 www.myspace.com. [15/08/2010]. 
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2.3.3 - Virtual Worlds 
Virtual Worlds—or, more appropriately termed ‗networked virtual environments‘276—
are computer-based simulations inhabited by avatars, i.e. textual, two-or three-
dimensional graphical representations, by which users can interact with each other
277
. 
Users access a computer-simulated world that they can manipulate and model, thereby 
experiencing a type of virtual-life
278
. Virtual worlds incorporate and rely upon 
individual contributions
279
, which may be protected by copyright, related rights or, in 
the EU, by the database sui generis right
280
. The legal issues posed by virtual worlds are 
numerous
281
. In particular, the issues associated with copyright law include determining 
authorship, publication, infringement, limitation, exceptions, defences, and applicable 
law
282
. The contents uploaded to a virtual world can be infringing; thus, virtual world 
providers tend to shield themselves from liability with clauses in the end-user license 
agreements and terms of service, such as the following: 
‗you agree that you shall not take any action or upload, post, e-mail or otherwise 
transmit Content that infringes or violates any third party rights‘283; and 
‗Copyright-infringing materials found within the world of Second Life can be 
identified and removed via Linden Lab‘s DMCA compliance process listed at 
http://secondlife.com/corporate/dmca.php, and you agree to comply with such 
process in the event you are involved in any claim of copyright infringement to 
which the DMCA may be applicable‘284. 
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 Duranske, B.T. [2008], Virtual Law, ABA, 4. 
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 Second Life ToS, article 4.1. 
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 Ibid. article 4.3. 
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2.4 - Future Synergies 
It is difficult to predict the evolution of shared networking technologies; however, 
various new threats to copyright can already be addressed. For instance, with the advent 
of 3G mobile technology
285
, users can share content between mobile phones through the 
internet, Bluetooth or infrared technology. Software providers are developing 
applications designed for facilitating this task. A mobile phone‘s application that should 
to be mentioned is BarTor
286
. The application allows users to scan product barcodes 
with a phone‘s camera, and then connect to the internet, which then makes it possible to 
retrieve information about the scanned product, to search for cheaper prices—or to 
search a .torrent file of the product and instruct the BitTorrent client on a previously 
programmed computer to download the related file. With this in mind, a user could 
theoretically visit a shop, scan the barcodes of favourite products, and start downloading 
the desired files. 
 
2.4.1 – Broadband 
‗The development of broadband has indeed transformed the internet into a vast 
network where one can exchange protected works, reduced to simple computer 
files, from one computer to another with the greatest of ease. However, as internet 
users began to unlock its potential, the negative effects attached to such potential 
also became apparent‘287. 
It is difficult to quantify the impact of broadband on the copyright market in 
consideration of the global scale
288
. Ten years ago, to download a complete CD (70 Mb) 
was technically impossible whilst today, owing to high-speed internet access
289
, entire 
DVDs (5Gb) can be obtained within few minutes. The internet traffic worldwide in 
                                                 
285
 Third Generation International Mobile Telecommunications allows wireless voice and video 
communications, internet access, and mobile TV. 
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[2006], File-sharing and individual civil liability in the United Kingdom: a question of substantial abuse, 
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 Typically contrasted with dial-up access over modems which are generally only capable of a 
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technologies supply up to 50 Mb per second without disrupting telephone use. 
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2006 was approximately five terabytes
290
 per second
291
, but now continues to grow due 
to ever-improving broadband connections, lower prices of such services, and wider 
availability
292
. The importance of a global access to the internet has been recently 
emphasised at the World Summit for the Information Society 2010
293
, which established 
the ITU-UNESCO Broadband Commission
294
, aiming at granting global access to the 
internet by 2015
295. The US government recently published ‗Connecting America: the 
national broadband plan‘296, defining broadband as the ‗the great infrastructure 
challenge of the early 21st century‘297. A number of issues beyond the scope of this 
work are associated to the expansion of broadband
298
. Nevertheless, it is submitted that 
the future of broadband and, in general, access to the internet, is linked to the solution to 
problems discussed in this thesis. Copyright law and, in particular, enforcement or 
alternative systems, play a fundamental role in determining the future of networking 
technologies. 
 
2.4.2 - Cloud Computing 
The idea behind cloud computing is simple: running software applications and storing 
data on someone else‘s computer and access them through the internet299. Web-based e-
mails, social-networking sites, and virtual worlds are just a handful of examples; soon, 
everything will be accessible with a web-browser or smart-phone. Much computing and 
storing will no longer be on personal computers, but in the ‗cloud‘—i.e. online. 
Everything will be stored on data centres hosting hundreds of servers in different 
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countries. Most of the transmissions will be encrypted. The consequences for copyright 
cannot be easily assessed
300
; however, it appears clear that monitor infringements and 
enforced copyright will continue to become increasingly complex
301
.  
 
2.5 - Conclusion 
Chapter One highlighted the fact that the movable type printing press, the photocopying 
machine, the piano roll, sound recording, the radio, the cassette and videocassette 
recorders, films and television, all appeared as technologies that would test the limits of 
copyright. However, the nexus between copyright and technologies has been without 
difficulties, despite concerns expressed by the entertainment industries. This Chapter 
has shown that networking technologies permit users to share huge quantities of data 
and are constantly evolving. File-sharing and Web 2.0 are not the first and will probably 
not be the last challenges to face copyright. However, the phenomenon started by 
Napster shows no signs of demise, with new programs and networks appearing almost 
every week. The ever-widening availability of broadband has made sharing 
technologies even more prevalent, since increasing download speeds means that the 
distribution of entire films and other large files is now possible. This modified the 
impact of networking technologies over the content industries. Until a few years ago, 
only the music industry saw itself threatened by file-sharing. Nowadays, as shown in 
this Chapter, owing to faster connections and improved compression, the film and 
software industries have been forced to face the problem as well. 
Nevertheless, the advent of networking technologies questions more traditional 
copyright approaches, thereby creating problems that need to be analysed in the 
following Chapters. Chapter Three continues the investigative journey. 
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 Audiogalaxy offers already a cloud-based streaming service. www.audiogalaxy.com. [15/08/2010]. 
LimeWire will offer soon a cloud computing service. Para. 2.2.2.7. 
301
 For instance, in the near future, someone could offer an open-source cloud-based BitTorrent file-
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(Para 5.3.1). Users‘ access to the cloud would be encrypted and it would appear as a streaming 
transmission in case of monitoring. Enforcement would be extremely complex/costly, if not impossible. 
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Chapter Three 
Contextualising Networking Technologies within 
Copyright Law 
- 
Dura lex, sed lex
302
 
 
3.1 – Introduction 
Analogue technologies allow the management of copyright with some degree of 
certainty
303
. Today, works are often created digitally, and content is designed in such a 
way so as to be interactive and likely to be copied, manipulated and modified. This 
evolution in terms of human creativity and interactivity combined with the lack of clear 
policies and the massive growth of laws and cases, all contribute to making it arduous to 
decide borderline cases. The debate is still on going
304
, and changes in copyright law, 
enforcement and international collaboration would probably be appropriate
305
. 
Nevertheless, in the networking technologies‘ context, the rights principally involved 
are economic rights of reproduction, the right of communication to the public, including 
making available, the right of distribution, and the moral rights of integrity and 
attribution. Notably, liability can arise in relation to committing, but also assisting, 
authorising, facilitating, inciting, or otherwise helping those acts
306
. The following 
actors are involved: 
1. users: the uploader or sharer307, and the downloader or accessor308;  
2. facilitators309: the software provider310, and the intermediaries311. 
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The tables below describe these actors‘ potential infringements (Figure 15), and the 
complexity of the environment in which the analysis will be conducted (Figure 16). 
Figure 15 - Actor‘s Potential Infringements 
A
ct
 
Description 
A
ct
o
r 
Potential Infringement 
R
ip
p
in
g
 
The process of copying audio or video content to a hard 
disk U
se
r 
Primary - Reproduction 
S
h
ar
in
g
 The act of copying a file to a folder which is publicly 
available; or the act of uploading a file to a hosting 
website; or the act of creating and distributing a .torrent 
file over the internet. 
U
se
r 
A. Economic: 
Primary – Reproduction, Communication to 
the Public (Making Available); Distribution 
of copies (?); 
Secondary – Facilitating Reproduction, 
Communication 
B. Moral: Attribution; Integrity 
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
in
g
 
The act of downloading a file from a website, or another 
user‘s hard drive; or the act of accessing a file from a 
hosting website through streaming technology 
U
se
r Primary – Reproduction;  
Secondary – Facilitating all the above 
S
tr
ea
m
in
g
 
The act of transmitting in a continuous stream of data a 
work which is played as it arrives. 
F
ac
il
it
at
o
r 
A. Economic: 
Primary – Reproduction, Communication to 
the Public (Making Available); Distribution 
of copies (?), Public Performance (?); 
Secondary – Facilitating Reproduction, 
Communication 
B. Moral: Attribution; Integrity 
F
ac
il
it
at
in
g
 
The act of providing software and other ancillary 
services that facilitate the above activities, or the act of 
providing a link to an infringing file or software and 
other ancillary services that facilitate the above activities F
ac
il
it
at
o
r 
Primary – Authorising all the above;  
Secondary – Facilitating all the above 
 
Figure 16 - Potential Primary and Secondary Infringements in a Network 
 
                                                                                                                                               
311
 Para. 3.4. 
  60 
This Chapter seeks to contextualise networking technologies within copyright law. It is 
meant to be more illustrative than exhaustive and it aims to demonstrate how various 
copyright rules and practices—mostly evolved in the world of physical artefacts—are 
not suitable in this environment. Furthermore, as the volume of traffic on networking 
technologies increase, questions arise as to which of the activities may be infringing 
copyright, and which of the actors involved should be liable and on which grounds. The 
analysis will focus on the rights of reproduction, communication to the public 
(including making available), and distribution. The remaining Chapters of this work will 
analyse possible technical and legislative solutions, including compensation systems. 
 
3.1.1 – Moral Rights 
In this work, the emphasis is placed on economic rights; however, the importance and 
application of moral rights in the context of online dissemination should also be briefly 
highlighted
312
. Sharing unauthorised protected works may infringe the moral rights of 
authors and performers—in particular, the right of attribution and integrity—by 
omission of relevant names, distortion, etc. of the work or performance
313
. In some 
jurisdictions, such as France, for example, the sharing of an unpublished work may 
infringe the moral right of dissemination
314
. 
 
3.1.2 - Reproduction Rights 
Copyright traditionally deals with copying
315. The ‗exclusive right to reproduce the 
work in a material form‘316 is the oldest right granted to copyright owners,317 and is 
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required by the Berne Convention
318
, the WPPT
319
, as well as the Copyright Directive
320
 
in the EU. In the world of physical artefacts, the use of a work does not involve 
reproduction, and making a copy requires explicit intent and carefully selected actions. 
With the advent of the computer, even routine access to information invariably involves 
making copies
321
. Nevertheless, apparently: 
‗The reproduction right […] fully applies in the digital environment, in particular 
to the use of works in digital form. It is understood that the storage of a protected 
work in digital form in an electronic medium constitutes a reproduction within the 
meaning of article 9 of the Berne Convention‘322. 
The international community failed to produce a more specific definition
323
; thus, 
a correct interpretation should be the key to resolving any ambiguities in the context of 
networking technologies. However: 
‗using old rules has the obvious disadvantage that the rules will not necessary fit 
the current situation very well‘324. 
For instance, various jurisdictions have determined difficulties in recognising 
infringements concerning works existing only in digital form
325
. 
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3.1.3 – Communication to the Public 
This right has traditionally included a wide range of activities; however, it needs to be 
re-shaped in the light of networking technologies
326
. In particular, it is difficult to 
determine what constitutes ‗public‘: for instance, there is debate concerning whether a 
single individual outside the domestic circle is ‗the public‘, where he/she receives a 
transmission of the work
327
. Article 8 of WCT, along with the WPPT, introduced the 
on-demand making available right
328
 as an attempt to terminate the debate concerning 
whether or not making a work available over the internet constituted a restricted act. 
This right form part of the general author‘s right to communicate the work to the 
public
329
; however, the situation differs for performers and phonogram producers, since 
article 10 and 14 WPPT do not directly refer to any general right of communication to 
the public
330
. Consequently, the Copyright Directive requires Member States to:  
‗provide authors with the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit any 
communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including 
the making available to the public of their works in such a way that members of 
the public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by 
them‘331. 
In Recital 27, the Directive specifies that:  
‗the mere provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a communication 
does not itself amount to communication within the meaning of this Directive‘332. 
Thus, the new right appears not directly aimed towards the services of 
intermediaries, i.e. internet access providers and/or, arguably, online service providers, 
who simply provide the ‗physical facilities‘; however, there is no international 
agreement—or agreement within the EU—concerning the scope and application of the 
on-demand making available right, and many questions therefore still remain 
unanswered. In particular, there are the following: 
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329
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 Ficsor, M. [2002], ‗The law of copyright and the internet-The 1996 WIPO Treaties, their 
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The Wipo Treaties 1996, Butterworths, 333-341. §20 and §182CA of the CDPA created the entirely novel 
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Rafael Hoteles SA (ECJ 7 December 2006). Cook, T. [2010], op.cit. 3.102-105. 
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 Which acts are involved in making available on-demand, and how do materials have 
to be placed online in order to be made available on-demand? 
 Who makes available on-demand, and when and where?333 
Litigation against infringers could ultimately fail on the fact that the above parameters 
are questionable
334
. Moreover, rendering a file accessible by others using networking 
technologies may not constitute ‗making available‘, since it might be argued that: 
 the word ‗public‘ is undefined, and applying national definitions is likely to create 
discrepancies
335
; 
 it is debatable whether actual transmission is required, or whether mere potential 
is deemed sufficient
336
; 
 it is debatable whether, in a file-sharing network, ‗time‘ and ‗place‘ are ‗chosen‘ 
by the members of the public, or by the file provider
337
; and 
 it is doubtful whether providing a .torrent file constitutes making available of the 
relevant file. 
 
3.1.4 – Distribution Right 
This right covers issuing to the public copies of the work, including the original
338
. The 
distribution right in a particular copy is exhausted
339
 once the copy has been lawfully 
                                                 
333
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335
 In the UK, for example, sharing of a specific link between small groups of users may fall outside the 
definition of public. PRS v. Harlequin Record Shops [1979] 2 All ER 828; Harms (Inc) & Chappell &Co 
v. Martans [1927] 1 Ch. 526. 
336
 The European Commission‘s view is that no transmission needs to take place. However, US courts 
disagree with this interpretation. LondonSire Records, Inc., et al. v. DOE 1 et al., No. 04cv12434-NG. 31 
March 2008. 
337
 Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd v. Easyinternetcafé Ltd [2003] W.L. 116984 made a similar point. 
Shiell, W.R. [2004], Viral online copyright infringement in the US and UK: the end of music or 
secondary copyright liability? Part 2, 15(4) Ent.L.Rev. 107-113. The Hague Court of Appeal referred to 
this in Church of Spiritual Technology v. Dataweb BV [2004] ECDR 258 [269], as well as a French court 
in Perathoner v. S. Joseph Société Free [2003] ECDR 76. Generally, Gervais, D.J. [2009], The tangled 
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released to the public. Notably, exhaustion can be national
340
, regional
341
 or, in some 
jurisdictions, international
342
. The right appears to particularly apply to the transference 
of the ownership of ‗tangible copies‘343; however, a wider interpretation has been 
suggested
344
. It is questionable whether the definition of distribution includes making 
available on-demand and, in particular, whether sharing files or web hosting involves 
distribution
345
. Nevertheless, it has been argued that ‗distribution‘ should not be limited 
to the transmission of material objects, and that the right should therefore apply to 
transmission in which a material object is created at the end
346
. 
 
3.1.5 – Other Rights 
It is open to debate whether or not other rights might be involved/infringed: for 
instance, the right of adaptation
347
, the right of equitable remuneration
348
, as well as 
other economic rights, such as public performance
349
, rental and lending rights
350
, and 
dealing with infringing copies
351
. 
 
3.1.6 – Infringement 
When unauthorised material is shared over a network, there is the potential for 
infringement to take place. However, in particular borderline cases, it seems difficult to 
determine precisely which rights are infringed, and to determine consequently any 
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[2000], op.cit. 40.9. 
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exceptions and defences under particular national laws
352
. Unfortunately, the latest cases 
do not help in terms of finding a clear answer
353
: for example, in a BitTorrent scenario 
where a .torrent file of protected material—but not the file itself—is disseminated, it 
could be argued not to infringe copyright
354
. Moreover, when content is transmitted 
through the use of streaming, the fragments copied are arguably too small to constitute a 
substantial part
355
. 
Furthermore, it is unclear whether or not an actual dissemination could be deemed 
necessary to infringe the making available right
356
; this is relevant since the only piece 
of evidence of ‗actual infringement‘ in most networking technologies-related cases are 
the file downloaded by the plaintiffs‘ agents357. One could then subsequently argue that, 
if these agents had not downloaded the file, no other actual infringement could be 
proven in court
358. This activity appears similar to a ‗police trap‘359, with the consequent 
legitimacy questions of whether, and under which circumstances, such a form of 
investigation may be justified.  
 
3.1.7 – Limitations, Exceptions and Defences 
Limitations, exceptions and defences are an essential aspect of copyright law; however, 
a number of myths and legends circulate over the internet, there by exacerbating the 
                                                 
352
 In this Chapter aspects of civil liability are considered, but the possibility of criminal sanctions must 
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already confused scenario
360
. Limitations, exceptions and defences have been 
commonly considered a matter of national legislations, which may fundamentally differ 
in terms of definitions and applications. In the past, there has been no general rule to 
govern the constant attempt of the government and courts to balance the interests of 
right owners, technology providers, and users. Today—at least for the reproduction 
right—the ‗three-step‘ test361 governs the way in which limitations and exceptions 
should be tested for validity
362
. However, it is ultimately difficult to accommodate 
limitations and exceptions to networking technologies
363
. 
‗Only a very small number of limitations included in the [copyright] Directive 
seems to be the result of a specific attempt to adapt the system […] to the digital 
environment‘364. 
 
3.1.8 – Jurisdiction and Applicable Law 
‗Services that employ peer-to-peer technology create vast, global networks of 
copyright infringements‘365. 
Copyright protection is territorial
366
; therefore, dealing with networking 
technologies usually involves cross-territorial actions raising questions of jurisdictional 
competence, applicable law and eventual enforcement of judgements in other 
countries
367
. The issues are not new; however, they have been exacerbated
368
. 
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‗Private international law was invented as a mechanism for the reconciliation of 
higher level natural law with the existence of diverse laws‘369. 
A full examination of these issues is beyond the scope of this work
370
. 
Nevertheless, even leaving aside all considerations in terms of jurisdiction and 
applicable law, in the online environment, the enforcing of rights under domestic law 
inevitably has consequences in foreign countries
371
. Furthermore, courts are often silent 
on the international consequences of their decisions
372
; it would be useful to identify 
common values in order to assist courts and legislators to deal with the differences 
between copyright systems
373
. 
 
3.2 – The Users 
Networking technologies seem to adapt quickly, thereby making it increasingly more 
difficult to dismantle such—both technologically and legally. Some users are engaged 
in potentially infringing activities
374
; therefore, the question concerning whether all 
these actions can be considered authorised or otherwise permitted under copyright law 
                                                                                                                                               
Communications Co. 24 F.3d 1088 (9
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becomes persistent. A straight general answer is difficult to formulate
375
. Undoubtedly, 
the different approaches in the debate over users‘ liability are left to a case-to-case 
analysis at a national level. In summary, users potentially infringe copyright by 
initiating, or partaking in, a number of activities, namely reproducing work, making it 
available, issuing copies to the public, dealing with infringing copies, failing to observe 
the attribution and integrity rights
376
, permitting, helping, inducing or otherwise 
authorising other users to copy the work to make it available on-demand, and acting as 
joint tortfeasor with other users in the respective infringements
377
. 
 
3.2.1 - Infringement by Copying 
Copyright infringement by copying is a ‗peculiar feature‘ of the digital age, with users 
frequently duplicating materials without questioning whether the activity in itself may 
or may not be legal. Nevertheless, as soon as the download of an unauthorised file is 
complete, the reproduction right is infringed, subject to exceptions. The situation is 
more complex in the case of an incomplete transmission from multiple sources, as it 
may actually be impossible to determine whether single packets or how many of them 
constitute a substantial part of the work. Courts may not accept that 
‗it is legitimate to arbitrarily cut out of a large work that portion which has been 
allegedly copied and then to call that the copyright work. […] The fact that one 
copyright work may be made up by blending together a number of smaller 
copyright works does not justify taking one large discrete copyright work and 
notionally splitting it into a myriad of artificial smaller parts, none of which 
existed as a discrete work in reality, simply as a means for avoiding the 
substantiality requirements of section 16(3) of the Act‘ 378. 
This may become of extreme relevance when it comes to multi-source file-
sharing, as the small file portion shared by a single user may not constitute an 
infringement
379
. Notably, multiple criteria have been traditionally used in order to 
determine whether or not a part taken is considered to be ‗substantial‘380: the quantity of 
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the portion taken
381
, the quality of the portion taken
382
, competition with the original 
work
383
, the intention of the defendant
384
, the capability of attracting copyright in itself, 
and repeatedly taking
385
. In relation to networking technologies, most of these criteria 
are impracticable, simply owing to the size of the data packets: it is impossible to 
determine whether or not the portion shared is qualitatively important, whether the data 
in each packet would be capable of being protected by itself, and whether it competes 
with the original, being too small
386
. With this discussion in mind, the following 
analysis will therefore be based on the assumption that the portions shared are 
substantial; otherwise, there would be no infringement. 
 
3.2.2 – Infringement by Communicating to the Public (including Making Available 
and Distribution) 
To what extent the right to communicate to the public is infringed by the unauthorised 
dissemination over a network is not straightforward
387
. For instance, it is still arguable 
whether it includes letting someone download a file from a shared folder (which is 
different from uploading)
388
, or whether the right covers posting on the internet a 
.torrent file
389
. Moreover, ancillary acts may theoretically constitute making available: 
for instance, linking to another‘s copy of the work or otherwise indexing portions of the 
work already available on the internet
390
. It is submitted that this right has been 
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designed for the act of posting a file on a website; this causes problems when it comes 
to more complex networking technologies
391
. 
As mentioned
392
, disseminating protected works over networking technologies 
arguably does not amount to ‗distributing‘ copies of the works393. However, some 
decisions, which will be later discussed, show different approaches, particularly in the 
US
394
, Canada
395
 and Hong Kong
396
. 
 
3.2.3 – Limitations and Exceptions 
Limitation and exceptions to copyright are frequent in national laws are discussed in the 
following paragraphs
397
. Preliminarily, it should be noted that despite concepts such as 
fair use, fair dealing, private use or private copying exist in most copyright laws as 
exceptions
398, ‗fair‘ and ‗private‘ lack proper definition. Moreover, these concepts have 
been, and continue to be, debated
399
. An important part of the argument is the 
controversial approach they are not defences, but affirmative rights of the ‗public‘400.  
Notably, harmonisation is lacking—even within the EU. For instance, in the UK, 
there is not a general concept of ‗private copying‘401. Although the Copyright 
Directive‘s option of including a ‗home copying exception‘ for private non-commercial 
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uses
402
, the UK Government declined to give full effect to such a broad exemption, 
instead amending the existing ‗time shifting‘ provision403.  
 
3.2.4 – Stealth Technology, Privacy Shields and Counterattacks 
In cases of networking technologies, it is problematic to determine whether an 
infringing activity is taking place-or took place previously-, in addition to the identity of 
the infringer. Thus, a distinction is needed between the technique utilised in order to 
collect evidence
404
, and subsequent court applications for the purpose of obtaining the 
names and addresses of potential infringers, which will be discussed later
405
. In order to 
collect evidence, the plaintiff must firstly determine the IP address of the alleged 
infringer‘s computer, and must then accordingly monitor the data stored in the computer 
and transmitted through that address. However, monitoring users‘ activities in their 
home is arguably an intrusion of the private sphere
406
.  
In 1964, GEMA experienced a similar problem in Germany. Grundig was 
supplying the magnetophone, but GEMA had no means to control whether users had 
subscribed for a licence to use it or whether they were unlawfully copying
407
. Therefore, 
GEMA attempted to obtain from Grundig the names and addresses of magnetophone‘s 
buyers to search their houses directly. Although home copying was unlawful, the 
German Bundesgerichtshof rejected GEMA‘s arguments408, simply because the request 
was deemed contrary to the ‗immunity‘ of the residence409. Some argue that ‗digital is 
different‘410: special software crawlers can be employed to search users‘ computers to 
assess infringements
411
 without violating the ‗immunity‘ of their residence. For 
instance, the US agency, MediaSentry, constantly monitors volume uses and identifies 
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potential infringements
412
; however, the use of softwares to monitor personal 
information is morally questionable, and therefore still raises privacy concerns
413
. 
Moreover, the crawlers, which track the unauthorised copies of files, register the users‘ 
IP addresses, which may be considered personal data
414
. Importantly, EU data 
protection laws permit the collection and processing of personal data only under limited 
circumstances
415
, which doubtingly includes the harvesting of IP addresses for filing 
lawsuit
416
. Moreover, various data-collection methods may be challenged under privacy 
provisions
417
: for instance, it appears that the interception of communication may be 
unlawful in the EU
418
, as well as the collection of data
419
. In Sharman, Wilcox J. told 
the witness from MediaSentry: 
‗you are in effect spying on a person who is in the act of downloading‘420. 
In France, the automated monitoring of users was forbidden, since the harvesting 
of personal data spans beyond what is necessary for fighting piracy
421
. In contrast, this 
argument did not succeeded in Canada and Ireland
422
. In the UK, right owners must use 
disclosure orders or similar civil procedures in order to secure an internet access 
provider to disclose the data
423
. In Germany, the Bundesgerichtshof allowed the use of 
data collected from a WIFI-spot for the enforcement of author‘s rights 424. In the US, 
courts tend to recognise users‘ privacy, thereby requiring separate subpoenas for each 
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alleged infringer
425
. However, a district court ordered a search engine to collect 
information concerning users‘ activities, simply because of electronic discovery 
obligations
426
. In Switzerland, the Supreme Court lately held that: 
 IP addresses are personal data within the meaning of data protection law; 
 the collection of these IP addresses, without the users’ consent, violates data 
protection law; 
 copyright enforcement does not justify the violation of data protection law. 
‘The interest of internet users in the protection of their personality rights  prevails 
over the interest of right owners to enforce their rights against them’427. 
The legal scenario remains unclear; therefore, methods have been implemented in 
order to ‗protect‘ privacy further. Users may ‗mask‘ their IP Addresses428, use a 
‗Network Address Translator‘429, or may become ‗accidental‘ internet access 
providers
430
. Besides, new generations of softwares have been designed in such a way 
so as to make it virtually impossible to monitor and harvest IP addresses using stealth 
technologies
431
. As the slogan of one of this software mockingly states (Figure 17)
432
: 
Figure 17 - ES5 
 
 
3.2.5 – National Approaches 
 
3.2.5.1 – UK. – British copyright law has its foundation in the CDPA 1988 as amended, 
most significantly to implement the EU Directives and the WIPO Treaties, and in court 
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rulings
433
. The parameters of the CDPA 1988, as amended
434
, remain largely untested 
since most of the cases brought against users for copyright infringement have been 
settled out of court
435
. Users are most likely to infringe copyright by copying the 
work
436
 and subsequently communicating it to the public
437
. However, UK legislation 
may not be appropriate regarding networking technologies
438
. The crucial point lies in 
the adoption of the words ‗by electronic transmission‘ in §20 CDPA, as opposed to 
international instruments ‗by wire or wireless means‘439. The word ‗transmission‘ is 
defined as a: 
‗conveyance from one person or place to another‘440. 
Therefore, with this definition, the making available right
441
 fits in the scenario of 
user uploading to a hosting site, since a transmission takes place from the user computer 
to the hosting site. However, it has been argued that storing a file into a folder to be 
shared over a file-sharing network arguably may not constitute ‗transmission‘442. The 
problem would have been avoided had the more appropriate term of ‗by electronic 
means‘ be utilised443. A better terminology is present in §10 of the Australian Copyright 
Act 1968 (as amended), where ‗communicate‘ is defined as ‗make available online or 
electronically transmit‘. The issue was omitted in Polydor Ltd. v. Brown444. The judge 
simply held that: 
‗connecting a computer to the internet, where the computer is running a peer-to-
peer software, and in which some music files containing copies of the claimant‘s 
copyright works are placed in the shared directory, falls within an infringing 
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act‘445. 
However, a court, it is thought, would find that users directly infringe the 
reproduction right by downloading a file protected by copyright without authorisation. 
However, the situation becomes more complicated when considering a streaming 
scenario, where content is delivered in ‗real-time‘446. The conversion of the signal is 
generally instant upon reception, but the data received often exceeds the volume 
required, thereby causing temporary ‗buffering‘447. A temporary/transient copy may be 
created; however, it is open to doubt as to whether this constitutes a ‗substantial part‘, as 
required by §16(3)(a)
448
. The issue has apparently so far not been discussed in UK 
courts in its digital form
449
; thus, most commentators prefer to refer to Australian Video 
Retailer Association
450
, where these fragments were held to be too small to be 
‗substantial‘451. In Gilham452, however, the temporary copies created on the screen 
whilst playing a video game were held to be ‗substantial‘. Notably, whichever position 
is taken, basing the answer on a case-to-case substantiality test seems too arbitrary
453
. 
Users may also infringe by implicitly authorising each restricted acts; however, this 
appears doubtful, and appears not to have been argued in courts at this point. 
Furthermore, users potentially infringe §18
454
, §24(2)
455
, and could be criminally liable 
under §107(1), and §107(2A)
456
. 
The CDPA does not extend exceptions and defences to users for private and 
domestic unauthorised copying through the use of networking technologies. The ‗time-
shifting defence‘457 concerns only broadcasts or cable programmes. A private right to 
copy was one of the key recommendations of the Gowers Review
458
 and, in Digital 
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Britain, the government promised to keep this issue under review
459
. However, the 
Digital Economy Act 2010 is silent on the issue. 
 
3.2.5.2 – US. – Copyright law in the US has its foundation in Article 1§ 8cl 8 of the 
Constitution and lays principally in the Copyright Act, Aection 17 of the US Code as 
amended, and in court rulings
460
. The US has been constantly ahead of other countries 
in terms of confronting networking technologies and their consequences
461
. Case law is 
extensive; however, the outcomes are varied, and most actions have been settled out of 
court
462. The RIAA has apparently dropped its mass lawsuits‘ programme in favour of 
cooperative enforcement agreements with a number of internet access providers
463
. 
Furthermore, aggressive litigation did provide noticeable effects in some areas, although 
the number of user-sharing files has actually increased
464
. Nevertheless, users are most 
likely to infringe §106(1), the reproduction right. However, it nevertheless still remains 
unclear as to whether they infringe §106(3), the distribution right
465
. The issue has been 
described as ‗problematic‘466. Specifically, the question is concerned with whether, 
without any copying being made, merely ‗making available‘ without access is 
considered to be a copyright infringement
467
. In Denise Barker
468
, the defendant moved 
to dismiss, contending that: 
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‗the allegation of ‗making available‘ did not ‗state any known claim under the 
Copyright Act‘469.  
The judge accepted the argument, but ultimately gave the opportunity to amend 
the defective pleading into 
‗offering to distribute for purposes of distribution‘470.  
This theory was later rejected in Brennan
471
, where the judge held the complaint 
to be insufficient because: 
‗distribution requires an ‗actual dissemination‘ of a copy‘472 
In LondonSire
473, the court agreed that ‗files‘ are ‗material objects‘, and can be 
‗distributed‘ when shared but, unless a ‗distribution‘ actually occurred, the right is not 
infringed
474
. In Howell
475
, the court rejected the ‗making available‘ and the ‗offer to 
distribute‘ theories: 
‗Merely making a copy available does not constitute distribution [...] The statute 
provides copyright holders with the exclusive right to distribute ‗copies‘ of their 
works to the public ‗by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending‘ […] Unless a copy of the work changes hands in one of the designated 
ways, a ‗distribution […] has not taken place. […] An offer to distribute does not 
constitute distribution‘476. 
The court affirmed the notion that the distribution right is not infringed when the file is 
simply stored in a shared folder, unless the file has been actually distributed to the 
public
477
. 
Thomas
478
 provided the opportunity of clarification when the plaintiff submitted 
the ‗Proposed Jury Instruction n. 8‘: 
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‗the act of making copyrighted sound recordings available for electronic 
distribution on a peer-to-peer network, without license from the copyright owners, 
violates the copyright owners‘ exclusive right of distribution, regardless of 
whether actual distribution has been shown‘479. 
This definition was rejected by the District Court, subsequently concluding that it 
was a manifested error of law, and accordingly ordered a re-trial. In the renamed 
Thomas-Rassett
480
, the judge did not define that which constituted distribution, but the 
defendant was nevertheless held liable of infringing the right of reproduction. 
In Rodriguez
481, the theory was dismissed as ‗speculation‘, and the complaint was 
accordingly amended not to refer to such, but nevertheless reintroduced the ‗offer to 
distribute‘ theory482. No definite answer is therefore presently available, thereby leaving 
commentators free to speculate as to whether or not the US has implemented correctly 
the WIPO Treaties. In order to complete the scenario, users may also be liable under 
§106(4), the right of public performance. However, in ASCAP
483
, downloading a music 
file has been held not to constitute performing the work publicly. 
Moving on to defences, the main limitation to copyright in the US is fair use
484
, 
but a number of courts
485
 have constantly held that this notion does not apply to 
networking technologies: 
‗user sending a file cannot be said to engage in a personal use when distributing 
that file to an anonymous requester‘486. 
Rather, it appears that all the factors considered by courts
487
 when striving to 
determine whether or not a use is ‗fair‘ held against file-sharing. The files shared are 
‗highly creative‘ and mere substitute of the originals488. Users copy entire works. The 
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use is not transformative and commercial
489
. Furthermore, in order to determine fair use, 
the use should not be harmful to the market; the harm is presumed as such when the use 
is commercial, thereby leaving the users to prove otherwise
490
. Thus, it is not likely that 
sharing protected works constitutes fair use. In fact, in Gonzalez
491
, the Court of 
Appeals rejected the fair use defence
492
. The situation may be different for user-
generated content; in particular, when the work uploaded has been modified by the user, 
or when a protected work is simply incidentally included in a new one
493
. 
In a limited scenario, the so-called ‗space-shifting‘ defence494 may apply495. 
Finally, in Brennan
496
, the Court itself suggested numerous other possible defences: for 
instance, anticompetitive behaviour constituting copyright misuse
497
 and, most 
importantly, unconstitutionally excessive damages
498
. Damages awarded to plaintiffs in 
the US have been claimed to be: 
‗not only astronomical, [but also] offensive to [the] Constitution and offensive 
generally‘499. 
It seems that there is a tendency in the US to over-punish users with exemplary 
damages schemes on the motto of ‗strike one to educate one hundred‘500. The 
framework designed by the Supreme Court
501
 appears to have been abandoned
502
: 
                                                 
489
 As to the commercial nature of the use, ‗users are getting something for which they would otherwise 
have to pay; they are obtaining an economic advantage through the use of technology thereby converting 
non-commercial use to commercial use‘. Piasentin, R.C. [2006], op.cit. 
490
 For an analysis of the issue of market harm, Para. 4.4. 
491
 BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888 (7
th
 Cir. 2005). 
492
 However, this is of limited applicability since the defendant admitted copying and downloading over 
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493
 Great expectations are posed in Lenz Stefanie Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. Case No. C 07-3783 JF 
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general—and still controversial—question of whether fair use is an affirmative right. 
494
 Recording Industry Association of America v. Diamond Multimedia System Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 51 
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1115, 1123 (9
th
 Cir. 1999). 
495
 Defendants would need to prove they already own all the works downloaded, and that they 
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unsuccessful. A&M Records Inc. v. Napster Inc., 114 F Supp 2d 896 (N.D. Cal., 2000); 54 USPQ 2d 1746 
(N.D. Cal. 2000); 239 F 3d 1004; 57 USQP 2d 1729 (9
th
 Cir. 2001); WL 227083 (ND Cal. 5 March 
2001); 284 F.3d 1091 (9
th
 Cir. 2002). 
496
 Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Brennan, 534 F. Supp.2d 278 (D. Conn. February 13, 2008) FN2. 
497
 Lava Records LLC v. Amurao, No. 07-321 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2007); Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC, v. 
WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir.2003). 
498
 UMG Recordings Inc. v. Lindor, No. 05-1095, 2006 WL 3335048, 3(EDNY 2006) (finding the 
defence non-frivolous); Zomba Enters. Inc. v. Panorama Records Inc. 491 F.3d 574, 588 (6
th
 Cir.2007). 
Generally, Evanson B. [2005], Due Process in Statutory Damages, 3 Geo.J.L.&P.P. 601, 637. 
499
 Ibid. Successful Defendant Motion for Retrial, 12. 
500
 Italian Brigate Rosse‘s motto. Attributed to Mao Zedong. 
501
 BMW of North America Inc. v. Gore 517 U.S: 559 (1996); and State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
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punitive damages 500 times—or even 145 times—the compensatory damages were 
deemed 
‗grossly excessive […] and a violation of the defendant‘s due process right‘503.  
In the instance of Thomas-Rassett
504
, the punitive damages were over 228,000 
times the compensatory damages
505
. Finally, in Noor Alaujan
506
 and Joel Tenenbaum
507
, 
it was also argued that the Digital Theft Act
508
 1999 is unconstitutional
509
. The debate 
remains on-going. 
 
3.2.5.3 – France. - French author‘s right law is codified in the Intellectual Property 
Code 1992, as amended
510
. Most of the recent amendments were required to 
implemented the EU Directives and to introduce the so called ‗graduated response‘ 
mechanism
511
. In 2005, it was held that file-sharing was legal because all users enjoyed 
a private copy exception
512
. The decision was later reversed on appeal
513
. Thus, 
notwithstanding the private copy exception, users in France may be liable for infringing 
the reproduction right
514
 by downloading a protected work, whilst uploading or sharing 
a protected work may infringe the right of communication to the public
515
. Since Roche 
and Battie
516
 with regard to uploading mp3 files to a website, few decisions have been 
held by French courts with regard to file-sharing
517
. The majority of the cases are 
                                                                                                                                               
502
 Generally Samuelson-Wheatland [2009], Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of 
Reform, William & Mary L.Rev. Forthcoming; UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1375604. 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1375604. 4/3/10. 
503
 BMW of North America Inc. v. Gore 517 U.S: 559 (1996), 574. 
504
 Capitol Records v. Thomas-Rassett, D.Minn. 15 June 2009. 
505
 Thomas was ordered to pay $ 1.92 million for infringement of copyright in 24 songs, while the actual 
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May 2010. 
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 Capitol Records Inc., et al. v. Noor Alaujan, Civ. Act. No. 03-CV-11661-NG. 
507
 Sony BMG Music Entertainment, et al. v. Joel Tenenbaum Civ. Act. No. 1:07-cv-11446-NG. 
508
 Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999. 
509
 blogs.law.harvard.edu/cyberone/files/2008/10/2008-oppositiontomotiontodismiss.pdf. [15/08/2010]. 
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 For an analysis of French author‘s right law and a description of the legal framework in which the 
cases discussed in this paragraph have been decided, see Lucas-Plaisant [2010], France, in Nimmer-
Geller [2010], International copyright law and practice, New York, Matthew Bender. 
511
 Para. 5.3.1. 
512
 Societé Civil des Producteurs Phonographiques v. Anthony G. 31éme chamber/2, 8 December 2005. 
513
 Societé Civil des Producteurs Phonographiques v. Anthony G. Cour d‘Appel, Paris, 13ème chambre, 
sec. B Arrêt 27 April 2007. www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-decision.php3?id_Article=1954. [15/08/2010]. 
514
 Article L 122-3 and L 212-3. 
515
 Article L 212-3 for performers, L 213-1 for phonogram producers and L 215-1 for film producers. The 
right to perform could be also infringed. Article L 122-2. 
516
 SACEM and others v. Roche and Battie, TGI Strasbourg, February 3, 1998 (1999) I.I.C. 974; Tribunal 
de Grande Instance, Saint-Etienne, 3e Chambre, 6 December 6 1999, (2000) 184 RIDA 389. 
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 Tribunal de Grande Instance, Vannes, 29 April 2004; Court d‘Appel, Montpellier, 10 March 2005; 
Tribunal de Grande Instance, Châteauroux, 15 December 2004; Tribunal de Grande Instance, Pontoise, 2 
Feb 2005. Tribunal de Grande Instance, Meaux, 21 April 2005; Tribunal de Grande Instance, Toulouse 10 
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criminal
518
, and courts have rendered somewhat conflicting decisions
519
, all of them 
related—either directly or indirectly—to the private copying exception520. Article 
L.122-5 lists five series of exceptions; of particular relevance are the two regarding 
private gratuitous performances within the family circle, and private copy
521
. 
‗Mulholland Drive‘522 gave the Cour de Cassation an opportunity to redefine private 
copying in the digital environment
523
: in France, private copying is a legal exception to 
the rights of authors and other right owners, but not an absolute right of the users. 
Moreover, the Conseil d‘Etat524 specified that, notwithstanding private copy levies are 
applied to a wide range of media
525
, the private copying exception should not be 
interpreted broadly, and accordingly introduced the distinction between legally copied 
and illegally copied files
526
.  
It may be argued that such an exception is applicable to file-sharing, since users 
are enjoying the copied works in the privacy of their own home and are not making 
commercial use of them
527. However, networking technologies are not ‗passive‘: users 
incite to share and download from each other, thus contextually reproducing and 
making files available
528
. Courts have struggled with these two acts: with respect to 
                                                                                                                                               
May 2005; Tribunal de Grande Instance, Créteil, 19 May 2005; Tribunal de Grande Instance, Lyon 8 July 
2005; Tribunal de Grande Instance, Bayonne, 15 November 2005; Tribunal de Grande Instance, 
Châteauroux, 16 November 2005. www.juriscom.net. [15/08/2010]. 
518
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519
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Grande Instance, Paris, 8 December 2005. Under Article 121-3 of the French Criminal Code. Although in 
infringement cases the French Supreme Court has consistently held that criminal intent is presumed, this 
presumption may nevertheless be overcome. Since most softwares automatically share the downloaded 
files, the criminal intent threshold may not be met. Hugot, J.P. [2006], op.cit. 
520
 Hugot, J.P. [2006], op.cit. 
521
 Even though a literal interpretation could mean that only the person making the copy may enjoy this 
copy, courts admit that friends and family can enjoy it. Hugot, J.P. [2006], op.cit 
522
 05-15.824, 05-16.002 Arrêt n.549, 28 February 2006, Cour de Cassation- Première chamber civile. 
www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence2/premiere_chambre_civile_568/_16.002_8777.html. [15/08/2010] 
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 Also the French Conseil d‘Etat decision of 11 July 2008. 
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 Conseil d‘Etat‘s decision of 11 July 2008.  
525
 For instance, the Private Copy Commission‘s decisions of 20 July 2006, and of 9 July 2007, applied 
the private copy remuneration to USB keys and external hard-drives. 
526
 The reasoning behind was apparently the advice of the Commissaire du Gouvernement who considered 
that applying the private copy remuneration to illegal downloading would create a ‗global licence‘. Thus, 
it appears that, when considering digital reproduction, copying from an original copy is legal and the 
author is fairly compensated, whilst in the case of a copy being made from an unauthorised copy, the 
author not only suffers infringement but he/she is also forced to file a lawsuit in order to obtain the 
deserved prohibitions and damages. Ruelle, J. [2008], Does the private copy levy include remuneration 
for illicit copies?. www.twobirds.com/English/news/articles/pages/Private_copy_levy_remuneration_ 
illicit_copies.Aspx. [15/08/2010]. 
527
 Furthermore, users contribute to the just compensation fee purchasing blank CD or DVD. 
528
 Hugot, J.P. [2006], op.cit. 
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reproduction, courts tend to apply the private use exception
529
; in contrast, the issue of 
the dissemination of the works to the public through networking technologies has led to 
almost unanimous rulings, since the exception regarding performances with friends and 
family may not be deemed applicable, where the work is communicated to an entire 
network
530
.  
Notably, in most cases, users were sentenced to pay a small fine but greater civil 
damages
531
. It appears that downloading (even without uploading) from an online 
service will not qualify as private copying. However, such a case may create difficult 
discrepancies in the private copy exception: many previously lawful acts may be 
unlawful under the current law
532
. For instance, copying for private use from an 
unlawful source is probably deemed unlawful. Furthermore, it might also be considered 
unlawful to copy a work lawfully accessed, as already detailed in Mulholland Drive
533
. 
The introduction of HAPODI
534
 appears not to provide any advantage to the right 
holders
535
, as will be discussed in Chapter Five.  
 
3.2.5.4 – Germany. - German author‘s right law most important legislative source is the 
Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte -Urheberechtsgesetzes vom, 9 
September 1965, as amended, mainly to implement the EU Directives and the WIPO 
Treaties
536
. In Germany, the file provider and the uploader to a webhosting site infringes 
the author‘s right to make the work available on-demand537. However, downloading or 
otherwise accessing through streaming has different legal consequences. The private 
copy exception operating in Germany applies to private copy of a protected work, 
                                                 
529
 Tribunal de Grande Instance, Rodez, 13 oct. 2004, Cour d‘Appeal, Montpellier, 10 March 2005; 
Tribunal de Grande Instance, Meaux 21 April 2005; Tribunal de Grande Instance, Havre, 20 September 
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 Cassation Civile 1er, 28 February 2006. 
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 HADOPI I & II will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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 Hugot, J.P. [2006], op.cit. 
536
 For an analysis of German author‘s right law and a description of the legal framework in which the 
cases discussed in this paragraph have been decided, see Dietz, A. [2010], op.cit. 
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 Article 17 UrhG. 
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unless the copy is made from an evidently illegal or unlawful source
538
. However, 
interestingly enough, file-sharing (from a criminal law perspective) has been defined a 
Bagatellkriminalität (petty offence) by German courts
539
. Moreover, currently, if the 
criminal prosecution authorities know the name and postal address of a user, it is open 
to doubt whether right owners are then allowed to view this information as part of their 
right to inspect files. The Landgericht München I
540
 and the Landgericht Saarbrücken
541
 
prohibited the public prosecutor‘s office from granting to the right holders the authority 
to inspect the alleged infringing files in a file-sharing case, since the violation of 
personality rights weighed more heavily than ‗rights under civil law‘. Both courts 
referred to Article 406(e) of the Strafprozessordnung (Code of Criminal Procedure), 
under which the right to inspect files should be refused if violating the legitimate 
interests of the alleged infringer
542
. Finally, it must be noted how Germany—along with 
Greece—was one of the first European states to extend the private copy levy to 
computers and printers
543
. 
 
3.2.5.5 – Italy. - Italian author‘s right law is codified in the Law 633 of the 22 April 
1941, as amended. Users in Italy potentially infringe Article 16(1) the right of 
communication to the public and Article 13, the reproduction right, nothwithstanding 
the private copying exception under Article 71-sexties
544
. Copyright infringement in 
Italy can be both a civil and a criminal offence. However, the Suprema Corte di 
Cassazione acquitted, owing to a lack of profit, two students who made protected 
content available on a university website. The behaviour was not considered to be 
‗criminal‘, whilst it nevertheless remains a ‗civil‘ offence545. In 2004, the so-called 
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 Article 53 UrhG. 
539
 Amtsgericht Offenburg (Offenburg Local Court) of 20 July 2007, Az. 4 Gs 442/07. Para. 6.4.6.4. 
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costs, 149 Copyright World, 15-17. 
544
 
544
 For an analysis of Italian author‘s right law and a description of the legal framework in which the 
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[2010], International copyright law and practice, New York, Matthew Bender. 
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‗Decreto Urbani‘546 modified the LdA—in particular, article 171-ter of the LdA—
changing the wording ‗a scopo di lucro‘, meaning for profit, into ‗per trarne profitto‘, 
meaning for the purpose of gaining an advantage. With this modification, even private, 
non-commercial file-sharing is a matter of criminal law in addition to the administrative 
sanctions
547
. The situation may change depending on the interpretation that could be 
given to paragraph 1bis to article 70 of the LdA added by the Law of 9 January 2008, 
no. 2. This refers to a limitation regarding use without profit on the internet of low-
resolution images and degraded music for teaching and scientific purpose
548
. 
 
3.2.5.6 – Spain. - Users in Spain potentially infringe the right of exploitation (Derechos 
de explotación) under Article 17 of the Ley de Propiedad Intelectual as amended, which 
includes the right of reproduction and the right of communication to the public
549
. 
However, in 2006, it was held that a user who downloads copyright protected files for 
personal use should not be punished, since it is 
‗a practised behaviour where the aim is not to gain wealth but to obtain private 
copies‘550. 
This called for immediate lobbying from the entertainment industries to amend 
the law, which was subsequently successful. Under the new Ley de Propiedad 
Intelectual
551
, unauthorised file-sharing is unlawful notwithstanding the private copy 
exception
552
,. However, the situation is not clear, in particular, owing to Article 270 of 
the Criminal Code
553
, which refers to commercial copying  
                                                 
546
 D.L. nr.72/04. ‗Interventi per contrastare la diffusione telematica abusiva di materiale audiovisivo, 
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‗for profit and to the detriment of a third party‘554. 
It could be argued, however, that users realise a profit and detriment the 
entertainment industries. Nevertheless, in 2009, the Criminal Court of Pamplona 
acquitted a defendant of author‘s right infringement charges because there was no 
evidence that he profited from sharing and downloading the files
555
. 
 
3.2.5.7 – Canada. - Canada has a unique approach to networking technologies issues556. 
The Copyright Act
557
 provides that a copyright owner has the 
‗sole right to produce or reproduce a work or any substantial part of a work in 
any material form whatever‘558. 
However, §80(1) provides users in Canada with a broad private copying exception
559
, 
and the Supreme Court clarifies that exceptions should be broadly interpreted since they 
are an ‗integral part‘ of the Act560. It therefore appears that downloading is 
permissible
561
. With regards to making a work available, in BMG Canada
562
, copying a 
file on a shared folder connected to a file-sharing network does not constitute 
distribution in itself
563
. For distribution to occur: 
‗there must be a positive act by the owner of the shared directory, such as sending 
                                                                                                                                               
1696993.htm. [15/08/2010]. SGAE (Sociedad General de Autores y Editores) vs. Jesus Guerra, n 
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out the copies or advertising that they are available for copying‘564. 
The Federal Court of Appeal upheld this interpretation. However, the court noted that 
technology should not be allowed to 
‗obliterate those personal property rights which society has deemed important‘565. 
Notably, the Federal Court Trial Division refused to grant access to the identities 
of alleged file-sharers to the Canadian Recording Industry Association (CRIA) because 
no evidence of infringement was provided
566
. Following this pro-user approach of 
Canadian courts, the CRIA is lobbying to amend the copyright legislation
567
. 
Furthermore, although Canada ratified the WIPO treaties in 1997, these have yet to be 
implemented into domestic law. 
In June 2010, an amendment to the Copyright Act
568
 has been proposed and it is 
currently under discussion
569
. 
 
3.2.6 – User Status 
Summarising, the international consensus appears to be that users are potentially liable 
for the infringement of the right of communication to the public (including making 
available and distribution) for the unauthorised acts of sharing and uploading of 
protected materials; and they are potentially liable for the infringement of the 
reproduction right for the acts of downloading and accessing unauthorised materials. 
                                                 
564
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There are arguably no limitations, exceptions or defences applicable
570
. However, as 
illustrated above, different jurisdictions approach networking technologies differently. 
Notwithstanding new legislations and extensive case law, the scenario still remains 
unclear and arguably successful. It is submitted that copyright law appears not to cope 
well with decentralised, non-commercial activities, and that enforcement against users is 
not the solution to networking technologies; in actual fact, enforcement against such a 
large number of potential infringers may even disrupt the judiciary systems
571
. When a 
similar problem emerged in Germany in the 1960s, the legislator made sure that 
copyright holders were not deprived from their rightful income, introducing a right to 
equitable remuneration. A similar approach would be appropriate considering how 
easily users can avoid lawsuits using softwares and sites which allow stealth 
technologies, encrypting or codifying file names, avoiding large amounts of files in the 
shared folder, sharing only on-demand, and using non-registered internet access. 
Nevertheless, it is submitted that a successful global strategy should focus on balancing 
the interests of the actors involved
572
 in order to determine a system to which views all 
such unauthorised uses of protected material profitable for the right owners, as will be 
later discussed
573
. 
 
3.3 – The Facilitators: Software Provider 
‗Such software permits the exchange of any sort of digital file […] There may be 
other now-unforeseen non-infringing uses that develop for peer-to-peer software, 
just as the home-video rental industry […] developed for the VCR. But the 
foreseeable development of such uses, when taken together with an estimated 10% 
non-infringing material, is sufficient to meet Sony‘s standard‘574. 
It is submitted that file-sharing softwares are not expressly aimed at the exchange 
of infringing files; however, in the event that they are used for infringing purpose, the 
software providers may become potentially liable by permitting, aiding, authorising or 
                                                 
570
 With the exception of the private copy exceptions in a limited number of jurisdictions. For instance, 
the Netherlands. FTD BV v  EYEWORKS FILM & TV DRAMA BV, The Hague District Court, case 
number/docket number: 366481/KG ZA 10-639, 2 June 2010. Interestingly the issues of authorisation and 
secondary liabilities of users appear to be still unexplored by courts worldwide. 
571
 In the UK, during ‗Operation Ore‘, police and courts handled with extreme difficulties 7,000 alleged 
criminal offenders. www.theregister.co.uk/2006/08/21/operation_ore_class_action. [15/08/2010]. The 
estimated number of copyright infringers in the UK is 7 million.  
572
 Weatherall, K. [1999], An end to private communications in copyright? The expansion of rights to 
communicate works to the public: Part 2, 21(8) E.I.P.R. 398. 
573
 In the remaining Chapters of this thesis. 
574
 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005), 2789-2790. Also Merges, 
R.P., [2004], A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 Chicago L.Rev. 183. 
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otherwise inducing users‘ infringing activities; and for acting as joint tortfeasor with the 
file provider and the file receiver in the respective infringements
575
. 
The first case regarding software providers was that of Napster
576
. The court held 
that Napster‘s users were infringing copyright577, and Napster‘s success was based on 
these infringements; thus, it was liable for contributory and vicarious infringement
578
. 
Napster‘s defences were rejected based on the software‘s non-infringing uses, fair use579 
and §512(a) and (d) DMCA
580
. Napster, however, was hardly a neutral service 
provider
581
. The preliminary injunction caused the bankruptcy of Napster, and the court 
did not reach a final decision, but spelled out some guiding principles concerning 
liabilities for contributory
582
 and vicarious infringement
583
. These guidelines were used 
to implement a new ‗generation‘ of softwares, designed to avoid liability584. 
Notwithstanding 
‗the possibility that [software providers] may have intentionally structured their 
business to avoid secondary liability for copyright infringement, while benefiting 
financially from the illicit draw of their wares‘585, 
                                                 
575
 Moreover softwares using a central index may be liable for failing to observe the author‘s attribution 
and integrity moral rights (only authors and performers). For a complete list, Sterling, J.A.L. [2008], 
op.cit. 13.01. 
576
 Even before that the company could officially launch the product into the market. A&M Records v. 
Napster Inc., 114 F.Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal 2000); 54 USPQ 2d 1746 (N.D. Cal 2000). Suthersanen, U. 
[2002], Napster, DVD and all that: developing a coherent copyright grid for internet entertainment, in 
Barendt–Firth (ed.) [2002], Oxford yearbook of copyright and media law, Volume 6, Oxford University 
Press, 207-250. 
577
 The copying and distribution of music files was a direct infringement of copyright. The use was not 
‗fair‘ within the meaning of §107 USC. Act. A&M Records Inc. v. Napster Inc., 114 F Supp 2d 896 (N.D. 
Cal. 2000); 54 USPQ 2d 1746 (N.D. Cal. 2000); 239 F 3d 1004; 57 USQP 2d 1729 (9
th
 Cir. 2001); WL 
227083 (ND Cal. 5 March 2001); 284 F.3d 1091 (9
th
 Cir. 2002). Randle [2002], op.cit, 33-34. 
578
 The court claimed that ‗financial benefit exists where the availability of infringing material acts as a 
draw for customers‘, and the growing user base makes the company more attractive to investors. Ibid. 
579
 In particular, Napster argued that the file transfer was completely legal because individuals were 
merely making personal non-commercial copies of music permitted by the US Audio Home Recording 
Act, by fair use and by ‗space-shifting‘. Ibid. 
580
 However, the information did not go through the Napster system (§512(a)), and Napster had ‗actual 
knowledge‘ (§512(a)). McEvedy, V. [2002], The DMCA and the E-Commerce Directive, 24(2) E.I.P.R. 
65-73. 
581
 Reichman-Dinwoodie-Samuelson [2009], A reverse notice and take down regime to enable public 
interest uses of technically protected copyrighted works, in Strowel, A. [2009], Peer-to-peer file sharing 
and secondary liability in copyright law, Edward Elgar, 229-304. 
582
 Napster was required to take ‗reasonable steps to prevent further distribution of the work‘ after 
receiving notice from a copyright owner in order to avoid been held liable for contributory infringement. 
583
 ‗Napster…should bear the burden of policing its system within the limits of the system‘. A&M Records 
Inc. v. Napster Inc., 57 USQP 2d 1729 (9
th
 Cir. 2001). Napster had the duty to terminate the account of 
the infringing users. Beyond that, the court never fully resolved the problem. von Lohmann F. [2003], 
Peer-to-peer file-sharing and copyright law: a primer for developers, TPS Berkeley, 5. 
584
 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 259 F Supp 2d 1029, 65 USQP 2d 1545 (C.D. 
Cal. 9 January 2003). Even if these softwares are conceptually analogous to Napster, they neither 
‗operate a centralized file sharing network‘, nor they ‗provide the site and facilities for direct 
infringement‘. A&M Records Inc. v. Napster Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022. 
585
 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 259 F Supp 2d 1029, 1046. 
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such new softwares do not provide a ‗central index‘, nor do they depend upon any 
interventions initiated by the provider
586
, nor can they successfully filter and block the 
content shared
587
. Theoretically, they were not liable under secondary liability theories 
because the 
‗Sale of copying equipment […] does not constitute contributory infringement if 
the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it 
needs merely to be capable of substantial non-infringing uses‘ 588. 
Nevertheless, two high profile cases in the US and Australia found the software 
providers liable for copyright infringement. The courts interpreted different laws and 
accordingly reached their conclusions owing to different reasoning
589
. However, it is 
submitted that such cases did not judge the software per se, but the way in which it was 
distributed and advertised
590
. 
Grokster had ‗substantial non-infringing uses‘591, did not ‗materially contribute‘ 
to, or had ‗actual knowledge‘ of, its users‘ infringements592. Grokster‘s involvement 
was simply concerned with providing the software
593
. Even if the providers would have: 
‗closed their doors and deactivate all computers within their control, users of 
their products could continue sharing files with little or no interruption‘594. 
The US Supreme Court reversed the appeal decision, and relied upon its decision 
concerning the theory of inducement drawn from patent law
595
: a software provider who 
actively induces copyright infringement is liable, notwithstanding its potential non-
infringing uses or lack of material contribution
596
. The court justifies this apparently 
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 Sullivan-Bell [2005], To the Top, Copyright World 148, 8-9. 
587
 Kazaa BV v. BUMA/STEMRA, CA Amsterdam, 29 March 2002 [2002] E.I.P.R. N-130 
588
 In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7
th
 Circuit 2003). 
589
 Jackson-Shelly [2006], Black hats and white hats: authorisation of copyright infringement in Australia 
and the United States, 14(1) I.J.L. & I.T., 28-46. 
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 The Australian Federal Court‘s decision was handed down on 05/09/2005, after the publication of 
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differences in the statutory framework within which the courts gave their judgments. 
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 Grokster relied on Sony Corp of America v. Universal City Studios Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984): ‗the 
distribution of a commercial product capable of substantial non-infringing uses do not rise contributory 
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 Flint, D [2005], Stemming the peer-to-peer outflow at source – maybe, 16(8) Ent.L.Rev. 199-200. 
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 The non-infringing uses of the software were also emphasised by the Supreme Court. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios Inc v. Grokster Ltd. (S.Ct, 2005), 2789-91. Merger, R. [2004], op.cit. 183. Grokster was 
not vicariously infringing. 
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 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc v. Grokster Ltd., 259 F.Supp.2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003) 1041. 
595
 35 USC §271. 
596
 Reichman-Dinwoodie-Samuelson [2009], op.cit. Giblin-Chen, R. [2007], On Sony Streamcast, and 
smoking guns, 29(6) E.I.P.R. 215-226.  
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abandonment of Sony
597
 with the evidence that Grokster went beyond merely providing 
the software: Grokster‘s statements and actions encouraged and promoted 
infringements; the defence of Sony does not apply when the infringing uses are 
‗not only expected but invoked by advertisement‘ 598. 
Notably, the Supreme Court found that Sony should not be interpreted broadly
599
; 
however, it should be noted that Sony would have probably been applied if Grokster‘s 
intent was not to ‗actively induce copyright infringement‘600. 
Furthermore, in Australia, Sharman Networks was held liable for authorising 
copyright infringements
601
. The claim was that Sharman had provided Kazaa 
‗knowing and intending that, or being recklessly indifferent to whether […] 
Kazaa‘s users downloaded infringing files‘602; 
and accordingly authorised the users‘ infringements603. Sharman responded that it 
could not control the users‘ activities, that the software had ‗substantial non-infringing 
uses‘ and was ‗content neutral‘604. Sharman argued that there is: 
‗a critical distinction between giving a person the power to do an infringing act 
and purporting to grant to a person the right to do that act‘605. 
However, the evidence illustrated that Sharman encouraged, rewarded, and was 
profiting from infringing activities
606
. Moreover, Sharman advertised the software 
through a campaign entitled ‗Join the Revolution‘, and on the website one could read: 
‗30 years of buying the music they think you should listen to … Over. With one 
single click‘. 
                                                 
597
 Sony Corp of America v. Universal City Studios Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). The Betamax was ‗capable 
of commercially significant non-infringing uses‘; thus the court held Sony not liable of the copyright 
infringements of the Betamax‘s users. 
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 Common law principle. Kalem Co v. Harper Brothers, 222 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1911). 
599
 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studio Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 259 F Supp 2d 1029, 65 USQP 2d 1545 (C.D. Cal. 
9 January 2003); 2003 WL 1989129 (C.D. Cal. 25 April 2003); affirmed 380 F.3d 1154 (9
th
 Cir. 2004); 
125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005); on remand 454 F.Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 2006). The court also noted how Grokster 
aimed ‗to satisfy a known demand for copyright infringement‘, ‗did not attempt to filter or diminish the 
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 Reichman-Dinwoodie-Samuelson [2009], op.cit. 
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 Universal Music Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Sharman License Holding Ltd., [2005] F.C.A. 1242, (2005) 65 
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 Ibid. 
603
 Also Sharman ‗had acted as joint tortfeasors with Kazaa users‘. Ibid. 
604
 It was unable to discriminate the infringing files from the non-infringing ones. Ibid 
605
 Ibid. Similarly, CBS Song Ltd. v. Amstrad Consumer Electronics Plc., [1988] 2 All ER 490. 
606
 Sharman‘s business model relied mainly on advertising revenues. Although the Kazaa was free to 
download, the more people use it, the more attractive the network becomes to advertisers. 
  91 
The Australian Copyright Act
607
 explains that, in order to assess ‗authorisation‘, a 
court should consider
608
: the power to prevent infringement; the nature of the actors 
involved and whether reasonable steps have been taken to prevent infringement
609
. In 
the case of Sharman, the court considered previous case law
610
 in conjunction with 
§101, and further stated that Sharman actively encouraged infringement by inviting 
users to ‗Join the Revolution‘ by using Kazaa in order to share their files611. The court 
also maintained that Sharman had the power to control users‘ infringing activities612, 
and although copyright infringement‘s warnings were displayed613, this was not 
sufficient. 
Notwithstanding the differences between Australia and US copyright systems, the 
courts in both countries found that software providers were liable if they were to reach 
beyond merely providing the software: Grokster and Sharman actively encouraged, and 
financially benefited from, users‘ infringing activities, and accordingly failed to adopt 
filters to prevent such infringements. However, with the diffusion of open-source 
decentralised file-sharing software offering user anonymity and secrecy, the relevance 
of these cases was reduced, hence the on-going arguments over filtering technologies
614
, 
which will be covered in Chapter Five. 
 
3.3.1- Potential Defences 
Potentially, file-sharing softwares provide the same duality function as the Betamax
615
 
or Amstrad
616. However, in the US, the presence of ‗substantial non-infringing uses‘ 
appears to be irrelevant when the provider has knowledge, control, derives a financial 
benefit, or induces its users to infringe copyright
617
. However, Grokster did not provide 
any guidelines in consideration of determining the lawfulness of file-sharing 
                                                 
607
 1968 as amended by the Copyright Amendment Act 2000. 
608
 §101. 
609
 Daly, M. [2007], Life after Grokster: analysis of US and European approaches to file-sharing, 29(8) 
E.I.P.R. 319-324. 
610
 In particular, University of New South Wales v. Moorhouse (1975) 133 C.L.R. 1. (Authorisation means 
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 (2005) 65 IPR 289, 384-6. 
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 (2005) 65 IPR 289, 387. 
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 Zittrain, J. [2006], A history of Online Gatekeeping, 19 1 J.O.L.T. 253-298. 
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 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
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 CBS Song Ltd. v. Amstrad Consumer Electronics Plc., [1988] 2 All ER 490. 
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 A&M Records Inc. v. Napster Inc., 293 F.3d 1004, 1011-13 (9
th
 Cir. 2001); In Re Aimster Copyright 
Litigation, Appeal of John Deep, 334 F.3d 642, 646-47 (7th Cir. 2003); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 
Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005). 
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software
618
, nor did it re-define the Sony defence in the light of file-sharing softwares or 
services
619
. With this in mind, Grokster was disqualified from the defence since it was 
inducing copyright infringement
620
. It appears, therefore, that the defence would still 
apply when a software provider does not go beyond providing the software, and 
‗unless the technology in question will be used almost exclusively to infringe 
copyrights
621.‘ 
In the UK, although the argument was rejected in the case of Newzbin
622
, it still 
remains uncertain whether Amstrad defence
623
 could be applied to software providers. 
In the Netherlands, for example, the simple unchallenged academic opinion that Kazaa 
could not control the infringing activities was enough to succeed against 
BUMA/STREMA‘s motion for summary judgement624. The defence for the same 
software was rejected in Sharman
625
. 
Software providers appear not to be included in the definition of internet services 
providers enjoying the DMCA
626
 and E-Commerce Directive‘s ‗safe harbour‘ 
defences
627
. Courts have rejected other defences
628
. 
 
3.3.2 - Dodging Lawsuits 
A non-legal defence largely used by some software providers concerns trying to 
virtually disappear behind ‗Chinese-boxes‘, i.e. businesses based in improbable 
locations. Kazaa, for example, argued that  
‗because we are everywhere, we are nowhere‘629. 
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619
 Reichman-Dinwoodie-Samuelson [2009], op.cit. 
620
 Ibid. Samuelson, P. [2005], op.cit. 
621
 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studio Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005). Breyer J. concurring, 10. 
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A.N. [2009], Liability of users and third parties for copyright infringements on the internet: overview of 
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Kazaa was originally based in the Netherlands, but transferred to Vanuatu. The 
domain name is registered in Australia
 630
. Other companies prefer to set their 
headquarters and servers in the West Bank
631
 or in Russia and the Ukraine. 
 
3.3.3 – National Approaches 
 
3.3.3.1 – UK. - Copyright is infringed when a person without licence ‗authorises 
another to do any of the acts restricted by the copyright‘632. The House of Lords in 
Amstrad
633
 held that ‗to grant the power to copy‘ is not ‗authorisation‘, as it is different 
than ‗to grant or purport to grant the right to copy‘634. The High Court has since 
confirmed that mere distribution of a product, irrespective of whether or not it could be 
used to infringe copyright, is not deemed to be authorisation when there is no ‗further 
control over the use of the product‘635. The analogies between Amstrad and software 
providers are clear
636
; however, the exact legal position remains uncertain: 
‗The problem is this: it is the end-user that directly carries out the restricted act, 
not the software or access provider. This means that a copyright owner would 
have to show in court that a peer-to-peer operator […] had authorised the 
carrying out of the restricted act and, given the uncertainty that has resulted from 
[Amstrad], to date right holders have perhaps be unwilling to embark upon costly, 
time consuming and risky litigation‘637. 
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Some commentators concluded that ‗English courts might not follow Amstrad638, 
whilst others state that a court would not need to move away from it in order to find 
software providers liable
639
. Decisions in other common law jurisdictions are of limited 
guidance
640
. However, various parallelisms can be found with the Australian 
Sharman
641. The issue in discussion is the one of ‗control‘, more than incitement since, 
‗Amstrad‘s advertisement was deplorable […]. [It] was cynical because […] 
advertised the increased efficiency of a facility capable of being employed to 
break the law‘642. 
This was not different from Sharman‘s advertisement campaign. ‗Control‘, 
however, in the sense of ‗ability to prevent the infringement‘, would mainly depend 
upon the architecture of the software itself. Napster would have probably been found 
liable, but not the providers of new generation softwares. It has been since argued that 
the authorisation theory in Sharman would have a ‗narrower application‘ in the UK643 
since 
‗authorisation must be by way of advertisement and give rise to a specific 
infringement as a result of the communication to an individual infringer‘644. 
However, the recent Newzbin
645
 appears to have broadened this approach
646
. 
Nonetheless legal uncertainty in this field remains. 
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3.3.3.2 – USA. - Notwithstanding Grokster647, the legal position of software providers is 
still uncertain
648
. The decision was based on facts limited to Grokster, and consequently 
left many questions unanswered. The court attempted to explain that the providers fell 
under the new inducement standard
649
, since they ‗communicated an inducing message 
to their software users‘650 in the following ways: advertising651; absence of filtering652; 
and revenue model
653
. However, notwithstanding knowledge remains relevant to 
secondary liability for contributory and vicarious infringement, ‗active inducement‘ is 
arguably a third basis for secondary liability in which 
‗it seems that the knowledge requirement has been replaced with intention‘ 654. 
Apparently, when a provider promotes infringement, the Sony
655
 doctrine does not 
preclude liability
656
. Grokster promoted its product as a mean of infringing copyright 
and the court noted that it was superfluous to prove any further link between the 
inducement and the users‘ copyright infringements. Therefore, 
‗one, who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe 
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster 
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties‘657.  
A general rule concerning how this could be determined was not definitively 
addressed
658
; however, the court acknowledged that mere distribution is not considered 
adequate, even when the provider has knowledge of users‘ infringing activities659.  
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The Supreme Court did not conclude on the admissibility of file-sharing software. 
Thus, a number of infringement proceedings against software providers have been filed 
since 2005
660
, in particular Arista v. LimeWire
661
, in which the record companies 
separated the distinct theories into three different complaints for indirect liability: 
contributory, vicarious, and inducement of copyright infringement. Summary judgement 
was granted for inducing copyright infringement, and the court held LimeWire liable for 
committing a ‗substantial amount of copyright infringement‘, inducing users to commit 
infringements, and engaging in unfair competition. However, summary judgement was 
denied for contributory and vicarious infringement
662
. The court did not mention ‗Safe 
harbour‘ defences663. In an earlier summary judgement664, however, it was specified that 
‗inducement‘ to infringe copyright eliminates the eligibility for the ‗safe harbour‘ 
defences
665
. 
 
3.3.3.3 – France. - The legal landscape in France surrounding software providers did 
not expressly support the possibility of a similar finding to that of Grokster and 
Sharman
666
. There was no offence of author‘s law infringement by inducement under 
the French Intellectual Property Code
667
. However, article 1382 Civil Code could 
possibly be applied: 
‗an act whatever of man, which cause damages to another, obliges the one by 
whose fault has occurred, to compensate it‘. 
The situation has changed following the adoption of the DADVSI Act
668
 under 
which software providers are liable when 
                                                                                                                                               
659
 ‗The inducement rule, instead, premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and 
thus does nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful 
promise‘. Ibid. 
660
 For instance, Arista Records LLC v Usenet.com, 633 F.Supp.2d 124 (SDNY 2009); Columbia Pictures 
Industries, Inc., v. Fung, 2:06-cv-05578-SVW-JC (C.D. Cal. 21 December 2009). A complete list is 
available at http://info.riaalawsuits.us/documents.htm. [15/08/2010]. 
661
 Arista Records LLC et al. v. LimeWire LLC, 2010 WL 1914816 (SDNY 11 May 2010). 
online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/051110limewireop.pdf. [15/08/2010]. Goldman, E. [2010], 
LimeWire smacked down for inducing copyright infringement- Arista Records v. Lime Group (13 May). 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2010/05/limewire_smacke.htm. [15/08/2010]. 
662
 Arista Records LLC et al. v. LimeWire LLC, 2010 WL 1914816 (SDNY 11 May 2010).  
663
 §512 17 USC. 
664
 Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., v. Fung, 2:06-cv-05578-SVW-JC (C.D. Cal. 21 December 2009). 
665
 Ibid. Goldman, E. [2009], Torrent site induce infringement and lose DMCA safe harbor- Columbia v. 
Fung (30 December). http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/12/torrent_sites_i.htm. [15/08/2010]. 
666
 For an analysis of French author‘s right law and a description of the legal framework in which the 
cases discussed in this paragraph have been decided. see Lucas-Plaisant [2010], op.cit. 
667
 The only equivalent action in France would have been under the criminal law. Daly, M. [2007], op.cit. 
668
 Loi n. 2006-961 du 1 août 2006, Droit d'auteur et aux droits voisins dans la société de l'information. 
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichtexte.do?cidTexte=legitext006054152&datetexte=20090819. [15/08/2010]. 
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‗they knowingly publish, make available to or communicate to the general public 
in any form whatsoever, software obviously intended to provide unauthorised 
access to protected works or objects; or knowingly encourage, including through 
advertisements, the use of such software‘669. 
This provision appears to be inspired by Grokster
670
. 
 
3.3.3.4 – Germany. - Under German law, the distribution of file-sharing software per 
se does not appear to imply liability for author‘s right infringement671. However, the 
Higher Regional Court of Hamburg
672
 maintained that software providers have a 
responsibility to provide suitable and reasonable measures to protect the copyright 
material
673
. Generally, article 830 of the German Civil Code provides that, where an 
unlawful action is jointly committed by several persons and consequently causes 
damages, each person is accordingly considered responsible for the damage. The 
provision also covers the person/persons who induce or contribute to the action
674
. 
 
3.3.3.5 – Australia. - In Australia, authorisation only requires to control and make 
available the means by which the infringement takes place
675
, whether or not the 
‗authorised‘ person actually infringes676. In Sharman677, the court notes that, since 
Kazaa was used for sharing music files, copyright infringements were necessarily 
involved: authorised transmissions alone would not have sustained the enormous traffic 
on the Kazaa system
678
. The court held that six out of the ten defendants were liable of 
                                                 
669
 Article L.335-2 Intellectual Property Code. Hugot, J.P [2006], op.cit. 140. 
670
 Benabou-Torremans [2008], Letter from France, 30(11) E.I.P.R. 463-469, 466. 
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 Daly, M. [2007], op.cit. 
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 University of New South Wales v. Moorhouse [1976] R.P.C. 151.  
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Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Sharman License Holding Ltd. [2005] F.C.A. 1242. For an analysis of Australian 
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have been decided, see Sherman-Lahore [2010], Australia, in Nimmer-Geller [2010], International 
copyright law and practice, New York, Matthew Bender. 
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 Universal Music Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Sharman License Holding Ltd. [2005] F.C.A. 1242. 
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 Ibid. [184] and [186]. 
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the authorisation of the infringement
679
, simply because they provided and maintained 
the means for infringement; they had knowledge of the infringement, financial interest, 
and exhorted users to infringe copyright with their ‗Join the Revolution‘ campaign. 
Kazaa was accordingly held to have predominant infringing uses: the warnings on the 
website and in the EULA
680
 were ineffective, and filtering was not implemented 
because it would decrease the file-sharing traffic, which was able to generate revenue 
from advertisements
681
. Thus, it appeared that the list of factors in the Act was not 
exhaustive in terms of what should be considered by the court when deliberating 
whether authorisation of infringement has occurred. It is probable that, with a different 
advertising and less control, the authorisation theory would not apply. This appears to 
have been confirmed in Cooper
682
 and iiNet
683
; however, with different outcomes, as 
will be discussed later
684
. 
 
3.3.4 – Software Provider Status 
In summary, file-sharing softwares are not illegal per se, and courts worldwide have 
experienced difficulties in terms of holding software providers liable under traditional 
secondary liability provisions. There is no international consensus over the nature of the 
liability; the spectrum ranges from primary infringments such as the authorisation 
theory in the UK and other common law jurisdictions, to secondary liabilities such as 
contributory and vicarious infringement and inducement theory in the US, to general 
civil liability, such as in Germany. Moreover, finding a software provider liable does 
not stop the network from being used for infringing activities, nor does it prevent the 
distribution of the software in other jurisdictions or by other providers; however, it has 
been noted how regardless of the applicable law and factual differences, a common set 
of elements to determine the software providers‘ liability, can be broadly suggested685, 
as summarised in Figure 18 below. 
 
 
                                                 
679
 Hyland, M [2006], Judicial pragmatism prevails in Sharman ruling, 12(4) C.T.L.R., 98-108  
680
 End User Licence Agreement. 
681
 The parties settled the litigation in 2006. IFPI [2006], Kazaa settles with record industries and goes 
legitimate. www.ifpi.org/content/ section/_resources/piracy-report-current.html. [15/08/2010]. 
682
 Cooper v. Universal Music Australia [2006] FCAFC 187. 
683
 Roadshow Films Pty Ltd & Ors v. iiNet Ltd [2010] FCA 24 
684
 Para. 3.4.6.8. 
685
 Dixon, A.N. [2009], op.cit. 37-40. 
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Figure 18 – Factors in Court Decisions686 
 Grokster Sharman Kazaa (Buma) 
Relationship with the User Minor Minor Minor 
Involvement with the Infringing 
Activity 
Minor Minor Minor 
Knowledge Minor Major Minor 
Intention Major Major Minor 
Substantial Non-Infringing Uses Major Major Major 
Financial or Other Benefit Major Major Major 
Faliure of Duty of Care/ Ability to 
Prevent or Deter Infringements 
Major Major  
Liability YES YES NO 
 
The case law discussed suggests that, in order to avoid liability, it is fundamental to lack 
both knowledge and control. Thus, the network has to be decentralised and the provider 
has to avoid any involvement with the users beyond merely providing the software. It 
also appears important that business models be avoided whereby the revenues directly 
depend upon the traffic to the network. Finally, it appears that the reasons and intents 
behind software creation and distribution are deemed relevant in determining liability. 
Consequently, BitTorrent appears to be the ideal software, simply because the burden of 
liability shifts to others ‗facilitators‘ as described in the following. 
 
3.4 – The Facilitators: Intermediaries 
 
3.4.1 - Definition 
Networking technologies have led to the appearance of a number of actors providing 
users with internet access and a range of various other services. These are broadly 
referred to as ‗internet service providers‘, ‗online service providers‘, ‗information 
society service providers‘, ‗intermediary service providers‘ or, simply, ‗intermediaries‘. 
The E-Commerce Directive defines them as: 
‗any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic 
means and at the individual request of a recipient of services‘687. 
                                                 
686
 Ibid. 39. 
687
 Article 2(a) E-commerce Directive refers back to Article 1(2) Directive 98/48/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 1998 amending Directive 98/34/EC laying down a procedure for 
the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations. The definition is further 
discussed in Recitals 17 and 18. 
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The rights and responsibilities of these actors have not been clearly defined, as 
their activities vary and are ultimately dependent on the service provided. Thus, it is 
necessary to specify that: 
1. internet access providers are companies which provide users with access to the 
internet, such as BT-Broadband, Virgin, AOL, Freeserve, etc.; 
2. online service providers are websites and Web2.0 applications which can 
potentially host, store or link
688
 to protected materials, such as websites, content-
sharing sites, web-hosting sites, online networking sites, blogs, wikis, online 
auctions, and virtual worlds; 
3. communication network providers are those companies providing connections and 
bandwidth to the internet access providers, i.e. British Telecom. 
Traditionally, different degrees of control fundamentally determine different 
responsibilities and liabilities
689
. In this scenario, it remains to be clarified whether such 
intermediaries should be liable for their users‘ activities. 
 
3.4.1.1 – Internet Access Providers. - They 
‗are the gatekeepers of the internet and have a vital role to play in curbing 
copyright abuse. They have the technical ability to do so, and increasingly the 
commercial incentive as well. The full cooperation of ISPs could lead to a very 
significant change in the music sector‘s ability to tackle copyright infringements 
while reducing the amount of litigation needed to deal with online piracy‘690. 
The issues concerning the collaboration of internet access providers will be 
discussed later in Chapter Five. However, it is worth mentioning here how they are not 
passive intermediaries; being the ‗gatekeeper‘ involves a much more active role691. 
Internet access providers grant users, software providers and online service providers 
with access to the internet, and accordingly reproduce whatever is transmitted over the 
internet. Moreover, their profits increase parallel with the increase of online content 
distribution and, most of the time, they are also online service providers, providing 
users with online storage space and similar services. 
                                                 
688
 The issue of hyper-links will be not in-dept analysed. Generally on the issue, Strowel-Hanley [2009], 
Secondary liability for copyright infringement with regards to hyperlinks, in Strowel A. [2009], Peer-to-
peer file-sharing and secondary liability in copyright law, Edward Elgar,  71-109; Harrold-McClenaghan 
[2010], Steering clear of hyperlink trouble, 199 Copyright World, 13-19. 
689
 Generally on the evolution of internet service providers‘ liability, Hays, T. [2006], The evolution and 
decentralisation of secondary liability for infringement of copyright-protected works: Part 1, 28(12) 
E.I.P.R. 617-624. 
690
 IFPI [2008], op.cit. 21. 
691
 Zittrain, J. [2006], op.cit. 253-298. 
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3.4.1.2 - Online Services Providers. - Complex issues arise when considering online 
service providers‘ liability for content transiting or being stored on their servers692. 
Protected material may be uploaded on the server without authorisation; therefore, not 
only the uploader but also the online service provider potentially infringes copyright by 
reproducing, communicating to the public, making available, permitting, helping or 
inducing the uploader and accessor to make the work available on-demand and copying 
the work, authorising or contributory or vicariously infringing by providing a link to 
another site, and acting as joint tortfeasor with the uploader and the accessor in the 
respective infringements
693
. 
Online service providers mainly participate in activities classified as ‗mere 
conduit‘ transmitting content through the internet, ‗caching‘, intermediate and 
temporary storage of content on their servers, and ‗hosting‘, storage of content. 
Moreover, they can also provide links and aggregate content
694
. Online service 
providers normally use softwares which automatically process data without obtaining—
or trying to obtain—information on the content status. Thus, the online service provider 
may not know that infringing materials are hosted on its servers. However, this lack of 
knowledge does not render them immune from legal actions
695
. For instance, in 
Aimster
696
, the court noted that: 
‗Wilful blindness is knowledge, in copyright law‘697. 
Thus, a provider that knows or even suspects its users are infringing copyright will not 
automatically be precluded from liability
698
. 
 
3.4.1.3 – Communication Network Providers. - Phone companies and broadband 
suppliers are the main intermediaries in the communication of contents worldwide. It is, 
therefore, necessary to mention their potential liability. 
 
                                                 
692
 Sutter, G. [2007], Online intermediaries, in Reed-Angel [2007], Computer law, Oxford University 
Press, 233-79. 
693
 In limited scenarios, also failing to observe the author‘s attribution and integrity moral rights (only 
authors and performers). 
694
 Content aggregation can be infringing if the content aggregated is protected. Copiepresse v. Google, 
TFI Brussels, February 13, 2007. 
695
 Sutter, G. [2007], op.cit. 240. 
696
 In Re Aimster Copyright Litigation 334 F. 3d 634 (7th Cir. 2003). 
697
 Ibid. [4]. 
698
 Daly, M. [2007], op.cit. 
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3.4.2 – Disclosure of Personal Data 
The information required in order to identify alleged infringers can only be obtained 
from the respective internet access providers; it is only such entities that can link IP 
addresses to the names and addresses of individuals
699
. 
 
3.4.2.1 – EU. - The ECJ held that 
‗European Law does not require Member States to lay down an obligation to 
disclose personal data in civil proceedings‘700.  
Thus leaving Member States to decide whether or not to impose an obligation. This 
would be equally entirely consistent with EU Law
701
. In the UK, copyright owners have 
the powerful ‗Norwich Pharmacal Order‘702, which achieves a disclosure obligation on 
internet access providers
703
. Similar obligations are present in Ireland
704
 and the 
Netherlands
705
. In Germany, courts have been more reluctant to order such disclosure
706
. 
In Italy, the issue remains controversial
707
. 
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 Wollgast, H. [2007], op.cit. Article 47 of TRIPS agreement includes an optional provision regarding 
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3.4.2.2 – US. - In early 2003, the RIAA attempted use of the controversial subpoena 
provisions
708
 in order to obtain the names of subscribers of Verizon
709
. The District 
Court of the District of Columbia ordered the disclosure, but Verizon successfully 
appealed later the same year
710
. As a result, the RIAA had to use the more conventional, 
expensive, and procedurally slow ‗John Doe‘711 application processes when striving to 
unmask anonymous infringers. Under these proceedings, internet access providers are 
obliged to disclose the identities of the alleged infringers
712
. 
 
3.4.3 - Potential Defences 
The E-Commerce Directive provides various safe-harbour provisions for a number of 
categories of intermediaries, exempting them from monetary damages (but not from 
injunctive relief) for specific activities deemed essential
713
. Comparable provisions in 
the DMCA operate in the US
714
. The following are the provided defences under the E-
Commerce Directive
715
: 
‗Mere Conduit‘- Article 12. - ‗The service provider is not liable for the 
information transmitted, on condition that the provider: (a) does not initiate the 
transmission; (b) does not select the receiver of the transmission; and (c) does not 
select or modify the information contained in the transmission‘. 
Arguably, however, such service providers would be an ‗involuntary copier‘ anyway716, 
or a ‗neutral carrier‘ such as the Post Office or the telephone company717. 
‗Caching‘- Article 13. - ‗The service provider is not liable for the automatic, 
intermediate and temporary storage of that information, performed for the sole 
purpose of making more efficient the information‘s onward transmission to other 
recipients of the service upon their request, on condition that [the provider]: (a) 
[…] does not modify the information; (b) […] complies with conditions on access 
to the information; (c) […] complies with rules regarding the updating of the 
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 §512 17 USC. 
709
 Re: Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 240 F.Supp.2d 24 (D.C.D.C. 2003). 
710
 Recording Industry Association of American Inc. v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 
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liability online, in Edwards-Waelde [2009], Law and the internet, 3
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information […]; (d) […] does not interfere with the lawful use of technology, 
[…], to obtain data on the use of the information.  
The ‗notice and takedown‘ provision (e) qualifies this defence. 
(e) […] acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information it has 
stored upon obtaining actual knowledge […]‘. 
However, it appears that Article 5(1) of the Copyright Directive has resolved the 
issue of liability for caching, since arguably these activities are excluded by the 
reproduction right. There are still doubts that these two provisions are 
reconcilable
718
. 
‗Hosting‘- Article 14. - ‗The service provider is not liable for the information 
stored at the request of a recipient of the service, on condition that [the provider]: 
(a) […] does not have actual knowledge […]; or (b) […], upon obtaining such 
knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the 
information‘719. 
This defence also depends on the compliance to the ‗notice and takedown‘. 
‗No General Obligation to Monitor‘- Article 15. – (1) Member States shall not 
impose a general obligation on providers, when providing the services covered by 
Articles 12, 13 and 14, to monitor the information which they transmit or store, 
nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal 
activity. (2) Member States may establish obligations for information society 
service providers promptly to inform the competent public authorities of alleged 
illegal activities undertaken or information provided by recipients of their service 
or obligations to communicate to the competent authorities, at their request, 
information enabling the identification of recipients of their service with whom 
they have storage agreements
720
. 
The Directive and DMCA ‗safe harbour‘ defences have been criticised for lack of 
foresight
721
 in terms of the complexity of the definition of the eligible providers
722
. 
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Moreover, it is not clear whether or not they are defences or immunities
723
. In the EU, 
the scenario is further complicated by the necessity to balance a number of different 
Directives covering similar grounds
724
: e-commerce, copyright, enforcement, and 
personal data. The issue was addressed by the ECJ in Promusicae
725
 and LSG
726
. 
 
3.4.4 – Take-Down Notice 
As previously noted, the moment an online service or internet access provider has 
knowledge of an infringement taking place, they are required to speedily remove the 
material from their host server under the penalty of liability. There are basic differences 
between the EU and US. In summary, the EU rules are more general, whereas those of 
the US are more practical; however, both leave unanswered various important issues. 
For instance, the content and scope of the take-down notice itself, where it should be 
notified, whether it should include the identity of the infringer, whether it should prove 
the validity of the claim
727
, whether the identity of the claimer should be verified, how 
long the provider has to remove the content, and the consequence with contract between 
the user and the provider
728. Finally, it is controversial what ‗expeditious‘ means in 
Article 14(1)(b) of the Directive, since no guidance is provided
729
. The answers to these 
questions have been left to the right owners and providers to determine on a national 
basis. Notably, owing to the obvious risk of confusion and conflicting solutions in the 
EU, the Commission has established a project—the Rights Watch—to study the 
possible alternatives
730
. 
 
3.4.5 – User-Generated-Content Licence 
Various Web 2.0 service providers enable users to upload user-generated content but 
tend to shield themselves from liability by requiring users to agree to a ‗click-wrap‘ 
                                                 
723
 Even thou in Scarlet they were considered defences. SCRL Societe Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs et 
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licence containing a range of warranties and undertakings
731
. For instance, users may be 
required to guarantee that infringing material is not uploaded
732
, or to otherwise agree to 
indemnify the provider against all losses suffered because of the user‘s infringing 
activities, and often coupled with broad exclusions or limitations of the provider‘s 
liability
733
. These clauses, however, may not be sufficient to protect the provider
734
. 
 
3.4.6 – National Approaches 
 
3.4.6.1 – UK. - A significant action was the shutdown of Oink, a website facilitated file-
sharing
735
. However, on criminal grounds, the website administrator was found not 
guilty of conspiracy to defraud and copyright infringement
736
. On civil grounds, more 
recently, the High Court held the operator of a Usenet indexing website liable for 
infringement of copyright by authorisation, communication to the public, and 
procurement and engagement with its users in a common design to infringe 
copyright
737
. Curiously, the case involved one of the first content-sharing techniques 
based on a technology (Usenet) which not only pre-dates file-sharing, but also the world 
wide web. In this scenario, human control over the service provided is high and, 
therefore, it is still questionable as to what extent this decision would be relevant to file-
sharing softwares, such as BitTorrent and Web 2.0 platforms. 
In particular, concerning authorisation, the key elements of Amstrad
738
 appear to 
have been confirmed. The Amstrad court differentiated between ‗conferring the power 
to copy‘ and ‗granting the right to copy‘739 and Newzbin was held to have reached 
beyond merely providing the means to copy. However, Kitchin J. concluded: 
I am entirely satisfied that a reasonable member would deduce from the 
defendant‘s activities that it purports to possess the authority to grant any 
                                                 
731
 Miles, J. [2007], Distributing user-generated content: risks and rewards, 18(1) Ent.L.Rev. 28-30. 
732
 Many sites do not operate a pre-moderation regime, but instead rely on post-moderation or moderation 
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733
 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. 
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[2005], op.cit.; Bentley-Cornish [2010], op.cit. 
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 R. v. Ellis (Alan), Unreported, 15 January 2010, Crown Ct (Teesside). Fry, R. [2010], Criminal 
charges fail to stick in copyright case, 197 Copyright World, 14-15. 
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 Twentieth Century Fox Films Corp. & Others v. Newzbin Ltd., [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch), 29 March 
2010. Dimita, G. [2010], Newzbin held liable for copyright infringement, 6 Journal of Business Law, 532-
535. 
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 CBS Song Ltd. v. Amstrad Consumer Electronics Plc. [1988] A.C. 1013. 
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 Para. 3.3 and 3.3.3.1. 
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required permission to copy any film that a member may choose from the Movies 
category […]740. 
Arguably, whether a ‗reasonable‘ member would believe that Newzbin had the authority 
to grant permission to copy is far from convincing
741
. 
In regard to communication to the public, since §20 is silent on the point, some 
argued that is the user who makes content available, and the service provider is 
therefore a mere intermediary; with this in mind, the latter does not make content 
available to the public
742
. However, the judge held that Newzbin was not remotely 
passive but materially intervened to make the works available to a new audience, with 
full knowledge of the consequences of its activities, and accordingly concluded that it 
was making the works available
743
.  
Moreover, online service providers could be liable under §178 CDPA; however, 
the question remains problematic
744
. On the issue of defences, Article 17 of the E-
Commerce Directive has been successfully applied to websites linking to unauthorised 
content
745
, although the application of §28A CDPA
746
 and its relationship with 
Regulation 17 of the E-Commerce Regulations 2002
747
 nevertheless remains 
controversial
748. §28A CDPA appears to relate only to ‗reproduction‘ and it has been 
argued that if 
‗as part of the same process, the work is communicated to the public […]; there is 
no defence under this provision to the act of communication‘749. 
                                                 
740
 Twentieth Century Fox Films Corp. & Others v. Newzbin Ltd., [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch), [102]. 
741
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 Sutter, G. [2007], op.cit. 248. 
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 ‗Making of temporary copies‘. §28A transposes Article 5(1) of the Copyright Directive. 
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Commerce Regulations transposes art.12 of the E-Commerce Directive.  
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 Larusson, H.K. [2009], op.cit, 130. 
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 Garnet, K. et al. [2005], 9-16. 
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If this is correct, an internet service provider would never benefit from §28A CDPA 
since it is involved in both copying and making files available
750
. Some commentators 
also argue that this provision overlaps with Regulation 17
751
. 
 
3.4.6.2 – US. - The issue of hosting and the online service provider‘s liability in general 
has been extensively analysed by courts in the US—both before and after the DMCA752. 
Nowadays, with the introduction of the DMCA, the ‗safe harbour‘ defences are in place 
and some potentially infringing online service providers‘ activities have been held to be 
fair use
753
. However, a search engine dedicated to index .torrent files has been held 
liable for the inducement of copyright infringement, contributory and vicarious 
infringement
754
. Two cases are of interest: Google Book
755
 and Viacom
756
. 
The first case concerns ‗Google Book Search‘, a tool that searches for books 
previously scanned and stored in a digital database by Google. The plaintiffs claim 
reproduction by digital copying of the plaintiffs‘ works without the copyright holders‘ 
permission. Google‘s argument is based on ‗fair use‘. The case is currently awaiting 
court approval of the settlement agreement
757
. However, it would have been of great 
interest to have the case resolved by a court ruling. The second concerned YouTube. 
Viacom claimed that Google and YouTube 
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Research Paper Group, Ganley, P. [2004], op.cit. 282-332, Stokes, S. [2005], op.cit. §7.78. 
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 Columbia Pictures, Inc et al. vs. Justin Bunnell, US District Court, CD Cal., 2:06-cv-01092 FMC-JCx, 
19 August 2008. The case is under appeal. 
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 The Authors Guild, Inc., Association of American Publishers, Inc., et al. v. Google Inc.  
1:2005cv08136, filed on 20 September 2005, SDNY. 
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[2009], op.cit. 70. 
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‗wilfully infringe copyrights on a huge scale […] profiting from the illegal 
conduct of others as well. […]. [They] know and intend that much of the content 
on the YouTube site consists of unlicensed infringing copies of copyrighted works 
[and they] actively engage in, promote and induce this infringement
758
. 
YouTube claimed that it could not monitor the files it hosts, but it discourages users‘ 
infringing behaviours
759
. Moreover, complying with the take-down notices, YouTube 
claimed to be ‗immune‘ from liability under §512. However, on this point, it was 
important to determine whether YouTube: (a) had ‗actual knowledge‘ of the infringing 
material hosted on its servers
760; (b) received ‗a financial benefit directly attributable to 
the infringing activity‘761; and (c) removed the material ‗expeditiously‘ upon 
notification of the potential infringement. 
In June 2010, a summary judgement was granted for Google. The judge held that 
general knowledge of infringements of copyright is not enough not to benefit from 
§512. In particular, the judge specified that in order to disqualify from the safe harbour, 
a service provider must have: 
‗knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements of particular individual 
items. Mere knowledge of prevalence of such activity in general is not enough‘762. 
Notably, the judge indicated that file-sharing software provider cases
763
 were not 
relevant to determine the eligibility to §512 of an internet service provider which is 
unaware of item-specific infringing activities
764
. 
‗Grokster, Fung and Lime Group involved peer-to-peer file-sharing networks 
which are not covered by the safe harbour provision of the DMCA defence under 
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760
 §512(c)(1)(a) 17 USC. 
761
 §512(c)(1)(b) 17 USC. 
762
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Usenet.com Inc., Case no. 07-Civ-8822, 2009 WL 187389 (SDNY), 633 F.Supp.2d 124 (SDNY 2009); 
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 Viacom International Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 07-Civ-2103, and The Football Association Premier 
League v. YouTube, Inc., 07-Civ-582 (SDNY 23 June 2010-LLS), 12-13. 
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§512(c)
765
. […] ‗The differences between YouTube‘s behaviour and Grokster‘s is 
staggering‘766 
Consequently, it is questionable whether the ‗inducement theory‘ applies to the internet 
service providers. In particular, whether an internet service provider eligible to §512 is 
nevertheless ‗immune‘ from liability when it induces its users to infringe copyright. 
Furthermore, it is open to discussion whether §512 would apply to a file-sharing 
software provider 
‗who furnishes a platform on which its users post and access all sort of materials 
as they wish, while the provider is unaware of its content, but identifies an agent 
to receive complain of infringement, and removes identified material when he 
learns it infringe‘767. 
Notwithstanding these doubts, the main finding of Viacom appears to be the 
clarification that the burden of monitoring infringements lays on the right owners and 
not the service providers. 
 
3.4.6.3 – France. - Article 6-I-2 of LCen768 excludes internet service providers from 
liability when they have no actual knowledge and promptly remove the material or 
render access impossible as soon as they gain such knowledge
769
. Few cases are of 
particular interest
770
. In Lafesse
771
, for example, MySpace was held to be an 
editor/publisher and not a host, simply because it predetermines the presentation of the 
user‘s pages and includes advertisements on such; therefore, it was not eligible for the 
hosting immunity. In contrast, DailyMotion
772
 was sued for author‘s right 
infringement
773
 but was held not to be a host or publisher
774
, but was still held liable for 
providing users with the means to commit infringement, because of the site‘s structure 
and business model. It was the duty of the provider to check a priori the content hosted. 
The court also held that providers inducing and generating infringing activities could 
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April 2008. www.juriscom.net/documents/tgiparis20080415-Lafesse.pdf. [15/08/2010]. 
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not invoke ‗safe harbour‘ defences. These decisions have been criticised for the 
classification of host providers as editors/publishers
775
 and the controversial 
interpretation of the monitor obligations
776
.  
Other courts have accepted online providers as mere hosts
777
. In particular, two 
decisions confirm that there is no general obligation to monitor, but subsequently 
suggested an obligation to monitor particular works after an infringement takes place
778
: 
Tranquillity Bay
779
 and Le Monde selon Bush
780
. In both cases, infringing content was 
uploaded to Google Video by users, was removed by Google after notification, and 
subsequently uploaded again by users. Both courts agreed that Google was merely 
hosting the content and was protected from liability by Article 6-I-2. However, in both 
cases, this limitation of liability was held to apply only for the first uploading—not for 
subsequent ones. The argument was that, after the first notice, the host acquires 
knowledge and has the obligation to prevent further infringements. In Le Monde selon 
Bush, the court rejected the argument that it is technically impossible to monitor 
content, since Google is able to trace and block other illegal content
781
. These decisions 
show how the legal framework for online service providers in France remains 
uncertain
782
. 
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3.4.6.4 – Germany. - German Law may oblige online service providers to monitor the 
content hosted on their servers
783
. Despite heavy criticism, the Federal Supreme Court 
reaffirmed this position in 2007
784
, but nevertheless went on to stress that online service 
providers should not be imposed unreasonable obligations to monitor. In practice, 
however, it is difficult to predict what courts will consider ‗reasonable‘785. For instance, 
in Gema v. RapidShare
786
, the court maintained that it is a legal duty of an online 
service provider to ensure that no copyright infringement takes place through the service 
provided
787
. Moreover, online service providers may be liable for providing facilities to 
download
788
 and for linking
789
, but not for providing searching facilities
790
.  
 
3.4.6.5 – Belgium. - Notwithstanding the doubts concerning whether the decision will 
be confirmed on appeal
791
, in the case of Scarlet
792
, the court ordered the internet access 
provider to block and filter infringing transmission
793
. The court specified how these 
technical measures are necessary to prevent copyright infringement, and they are not 
‗monitoring‘ within the meaning of article 15 E-Commerce Directive794. Interestingly, 
SABAM did not demonstrate that Scarlet‘s customers were actually infringing the rights 
of any of SABAM‘s members795; the court simply accepted that, considering the market 
share of the internet access provider, it was statistically inevitable that a portion of 
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Scarlet‘s customers had infringed the rights of SABAM‘s members796. The case has 
been referred to the ECJ on two questions
797
: 
1) Does the EU Law frameworks
798
 ‗allow Member States to authorize a national 
court, […] to order an ISP to put into place, vis-à-vis all of its customers, in 
abstracto and as a preventive measure, at the expense of the ISP and without 
limitation in time, a system filtering all electronic communications, […], passing 
through its service, in particular by means of peer to peer software, with the aim 
to identify the circulation on its network of electronic files containing a musical, 
cinematographic or audiovisual work to which the claimant alleges to enjoy 
rights and to then block the transfer thereof, either at the request or at the time it 
is sent? 
2) If question 1 is answered in the positive, do these directives require that the 
national court, […] applies the principle of proportionality when it is asked to 
rule over the efficacy and the dissuasive effect of the requested measure?‘ 
An answer to these questions is awaited. 
Finally, online service providers have been held liable for infringing author‘s right 
by ‗crawling‘799, hosting800, and linking801. 
 
3.4.6.6 – Italy. - In Corte di Cassazione 33945/06802 two online service providers were 
charged for freely broadcasting soccer matches through the use of linking, software and 
various streaming techniques for internet users, thereby violating Sky Italia‘s exclusive 
broadcasting rights on the Italian ‗Serie A‘ and ‗Serie B‘ leagues803. The Corte di 
Cassazione held that, in order to be liable for the distribution of infringing content, the 
LdA does not require a specific conduct or technology. Liability comes from the fact of 
someone‘s actions to make content visible over a computer network. This means that 
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also aiding the distribution of unlawful/infringing content through computer networks 
may result, in the Court‘s opinion, in sanctions under article 171. This potentially 
establishes criminal liability under Article 171 for an online service provider—and 
arguably for a software provider—who intentionally provides links to or, as in this case, 
advances information concerning how to connect to, an unauthorised streaming of 
protected content
804
. 
 
3.4.6.7 – Spain. - A number of decisions make it possible to argue that file-sharing is 
accepted in Spain
805
. In particular, linking to files available on file-sharing networks and 
hosting .torrent files is not a criminal offence in absence of profit
806
.  
 
3.4.6.8 – Sweden. - In Pirate Bay807, the defendants‘ website provided a catalogue of 
.torrent files and a tracker
808
. The plaintiffs claimed complicity in breach of the §2 
Swedish Author‘s Right Act (‗making available to the public‘), and under Chapter 23, 
§4 of the Swedish Criminal Code (Act of Complicity). The defendants presented an 
argument based on ‗mere conduit‘809. The Court concluded that Pirate Bay‘s users 
infringed author‘s right. Pirate Bay was an accomplice and facilitated the execution of 
the principal offence, regardless of any knowledge concerning the infringements. The 
defendants‘ negligence to take action prevented them from benefiting from the E-
Commerce Directive protection. The court held the defendants guilty of being 
accessories to a crime against the author‘s right law, strengthened by the commercial 
and organised nature of the activity
810. The ‗Pirate Bay‘ is still online, and the decision 
is currently on appeal; however, in the meantime, a number of recording companies 
have attempted to obtain an injunction against an internet access provider to block 
                                                 
804
 Prosperetti, E. [2007], Are you liable for your links? 18(5) Ent.L.Rev. 189-192. 
805
 Para. 3.2.5.6. For an analysis of Spanish author‘s right law and a description of the legal framework in 
which the cases discussed in this paragraph have been decided, see Bercovitz-Berkovitz-del Corral 
[2010], op.cit. 
806
 For instance, SGAE (Sociedad General de Autores y Editores) vs. Jesus Guerra, n 879/2009, 11 May 
2010; and Columbia Tristan Home Entertainment v. CIA SRC et Otros, n 582/08, 18 September 2008. 
807
 Verdict B 13301-06, 17 April 2009, Stockholm District Court, Division 5, Unit 52 For an analysis of 
Swedish author‘s right law and a description of the legal framework in which the cases discussed in this 
paragraph have been decided, see Karnell, G. [2010], Sweden, in Nimmer-Geller [2010], International 
copyright law and practice, New York, Matthew Bender. 
808
 Edström-Nilsson [2009], The Pirate Bay verdict– Predictable and yet .., 31(9) E.I.P.R. 483-487. 
Manner-Siniketo [2009], The Pirate Bay ruling– When the fun and games end, 20(6) Ent.L.Rev. 197-205. 
809
 Article 12 of the E-Commerce. 
810
 English translation (commissioned by IFPI, but not endorsed by the Stockholm District Court) at 
www.ifpi.org/content/library/Pirate-Bay-verdict-English-translation.pdf. [15/08/2010]. 
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users‘ access to the website. In Telenor811, the court held that internet access providers 
have no duty to monitor or investigate how their customers use the internet, and 
accordingly concluded that Telenor contribution to the users‘ infringing activities: 
‗either active or passive, cannot be regarded as unlawful. As the contribution is 
not regarded as unlawful, it is not necessary for the court to consider whether 
liability and causality exist. Nor is it necessary to consider whether basis for 
provisional measure exists. The petition has not been heard, and will subsequently 
be rejected‘812. 
 
3.4.6.9 – Australia. - In Cooper813, the Federal Court of Australia ruled that online 
service providers are liable under the authorisation theory when they provide links to 
infringing files. The finding of authorisation was based on knowledge of infringing 
activity and acquiescence in its occurrence
814
: 
‗Cooper has permitted or approved, and thereby authorized, the copyright 
infringement by internet users who access his website and also by the owners or 
operators of the remote websites from which the infringing recordings were 
downloaded‘815. 
Cooper could not control the presence of infringing files on his website; however, 
this was not considered to be the relevant inquiry when determining whether he had 
authorised infringements by internet users
816
. 
‗The issue is whether Cooper had sufficient control of his own website to take 
steps to prevent the infringement. In my view, Cooper clearly did have sufficient 
control regarding both the user accessing his website and the remote operator 
placing hyperlinks on the website‘817. 
In iiNet
818
, an internet access provider was claimed as having authorised its users 
to infringe copyright by downloading and sharing files using peer-to-peer softwares—in 
particular, BitTorrent. The plaintiffs claimed breach of copyright by failing to take steps 
to prevent account holders from engaging in unlawful file-sharing and, in particular, by 
refusing to forward the plaintiff‘s complaints to the relevant users. The judge recognised 
                                                 
811
 Bonnier Amigo Music Norway AS et al. v. Telenor Telecom Solutions AS, Case number 09-
096202TVI-AHER/2, pronounced on 06.11.2009. 
812
 Ibid. 
813
 Universal Music Pty Ltd v. Cooper [2005] FCA 972 (14 July 2005). For an analysis of Australian 
copyright law and a description of the legal framework in which the cases discussed in this paragraph 
have been decided, see Sherman-Lahore [2010], op.cit. 
814
 Williams-Seet [2006], Authorisation in the digital age: copyright liability in Australia after Cooper 
and Kazaa, 12(3) C.T.L.R. 74-77. 
815
 Ibid. 84. 
816
 Ibid. 86. 
817
 Ibid. 86. 
818
 Roadshow Films Pty Ltd & Ors v. iiNet Ltd [2010] FCA 24 
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that users were infringing copyright on a wide scale, but ultimately dismissed the claim 
because the internet access provider did not control, nor was responsible for, the 
BitTorrent system, and it could therefore not prevent the infringements. Moreover, the 
internet access provider merely provided users with internet connection and did not 
‗sanction, approve or countenance copyright infringements‘819. 
 
3.4.6.10 – Canada. - SOCAM820 brought action against the Canadian Association of 
Internet Service Provider
821
 to obtain the payment of royalties, basing the claim on the 
fact that internet service providers contribute to users‘ infringements. The Supreme 
Court of Canada ruled that internet service providers are not liable
822
, since merely 
transmitting data without knowledge of the content does not constitute ground for 
liability
823
: 
‗the preconditions to copying and infringement are set up … the element of 
authorization is missing‘824. 
Notably, even if the case did not directly address networking technologies, in Law 
Society of Upper Canada
825
, paraphrasing in technology neutral terms, the Court ruled 
that providing copying technologies does not constitute infringement nor authorisation 
of infringement when the copying falls within the fair dealing defence. 
As mentioned
826
, Bill C-32 has been proposed in June 2010
827
, and it is currently 
under discussion. The proposed §27(2.3) makes it an infringement to: 
 ‗provide, by means of the internet or another digital network, a service that the 
person knows or should have known is designed primarily to enable acts of 
copyright infringement if an actual infringement of copyright occurs. 
 
                                                 
819
 Ibid. 
820
 The Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada. 
821
 http://www.cata.ca/Communities/caip. [15/08/2010]. 
822
 Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Association of Internet 
providers and others, [2002] FCA 166; 2004 CSC 45. For an analysis of Canadian copyright law and a 
description of the legal framework in which the cases discussed in this paragraph have been decided, see 
Gendreau-Vaver [2010], op.cit. 
823
 Article 2.4(1)(b) Copyright Act. 
824
 Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Association of Internet 
providers and others, [2002] FCA 166; 2004 CSC 45, Para. 27. The judge noted how there is little 
difference with a library providing a photocopy machine. 
825
 Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada [2004] S.C.C. 13 (CCH). 
826
 Para. 3.2.5.7. 
827
 Bill C-32. www.digital-copyright.ca/billc32/blog. [15/08/2010]. 
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3.4.6.11 – Iceland. - In Iceland, a case against a BitTorrent file-sharing site, 
‗Torrent.is‘, was dismissed by the District828 and the Supreme Court829 due to the 
.torrent files provided having been held not to be protected by author‘s right law830. 
Therefore, online service providers appear not to be liable for providing BitTorrent 
facilities, such as tracker and databases of .torrent files. 
 
3.4.7 – Intermediaries Status 
It could be argued that, until recently, intermediaries could not control the use of the 
technologies they provided, nor were they legally obliged to do so. Moreover, they 
could not be held liable or ‗morally‘ responsible for the actions of their users831. 
However, late decisions—such as BREIN832, Scarlet833 or Pirate Bay834—as well as new 
legislation
835
 are all putting the intermediaries in a new position. The reasons for this 
change of perception over the intermediaries‘ activities and liability are multiple, but 
can be summarised as the following: 
 the increased belief that technology may permit automatic filtering836; 
 the increased belief that intermediaries profit from their users‘ infringing 
activities
837
, and therefore should be liable; 
 the increased demand for pre-emptive filtering over the take-down notice. 
Generally speaking, communication networks providers appear not be liable for the 
infringements taking place using their networks. Their activities generally do not go 
beyond merely providing connection and bandwidth to the internet access providers. 
                                                 
828
 ÚRSKURDUR Héraasdóms Reykjaness fimmtudaginn 27 march 2008 í málinr. E-2836/2007: Samtök 
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&Serial=2. [15/08/2010]. Morris, P.S. [2009], Pirates of the internet, at intellectual property‘s end with 
torrents and challenges for choice of law, 17(3) I.J.L.&I.T. 282-303. 
829
 Samtök myndrétthafa á Íslandi Framleiðendafélagið – SÍK Samband tónskálda og eigenda 
flutningsréttar og Félag hljómplötuframleiðenda v. Istorrent ehf. og Svavari Lútherssyni, Fimmtudaginn 
(Supreme Court) 8 May 2008. There is no available official translation, the decision in the original 
languare is available at www.haestirettur.is/domar?nr=5153. [15/08/2010]. 
830
 They are ‗meta-data‘. Para. 2.2 and 2.2.12. What it might be protected is the content of the files they 
facilitated the transmission of. 
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 Clark, R. [2009], op.cit. 222. Edwards, L. [2009], op.cit. 84. 
832
 Stichting Bescherming Rechten Entertainment Industrie Nederland (BREIN) v. Techno Design Internet 
Programmin‘ B.V. Court of Appeal, Amsterdam, 5th Division, 15 June 2006, [2006] ECDR, 21 
833
 Societe Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs at Editeurs v. SA Scarlet (formely known as Tiscali), 
Tribunal de Première Instance de Bruxelles, 29 June 2007, [2007] ECDR, 19. 
834
 ‗Pirate Bay‘, Verdict B 13301-06, 17 April 2009, Stockholm District Court, Division 5, Unit 52. 
835
 Proposed and passed to impose on intermediaries a more proactive role in monitoring and preventing 
infringements. These will be later discussed in Chapter Five. 
836
 Para. 5.2.4. 
837
 Para. 5.3.7. 
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Internet access providers are generally not liable for the infringements committed by 
their users and enjoy safe harbour protections. However, there are some exceptions and 
their legal position is evolving due to the emerging consensus over the so-called 
graduated response approach
838
. Online service providers complying with the notice and 
take down regime generally appear to be shielded from liability. 
However, notwithstanding the issue of further harmonisation, the question concerning 
whether intermediaries‘ liability should be resolved with traditional or new laws is still 
unanswered
839
. Importantly, it is difficult to determine a general rule for facilitators‘ 
liability worldwide; the assessment has to therefore be conducted on a case-by-case 
basis. It appears that
840
: 
 ‗ignorance is a blessing‘, but may not be enough to avoid liability: the absence of 
specific knowledge of infringing acts together with the non-obligation to monitor 
shields a vast range of intermediaries, however questions arise regarding the 
obligation to monitor further infringements when a notice has been served and 
regarding services expressively designed to facilitate infringing activities; 
 courts tend to apply a broader set of considerations in order to determine liability, 
including the nature of the service, the relationship with the users; the degree of 
human intervention in providing the service, and to some extent the intention of 
the provider; 
 the inducement and authorisation theories overlap, and have been interpreted more 
broadly; and 
 it is important to ensure that the products/services are not advertised or solicited in 
a way that is suggestive of infringing use
841
. 
The picture that emerges is complex due to the increasing number of previously 
unknown actors involved, which may not fall within the definition of intermediaries 
842
, 
as well as by the unclear definition of ‗financial gain‘. Copyright infringing activities 
obviously increase users‘ bandwidth demand and permit a new range of internet 
services to flourish, but whether this implies that intermediaries directly ‗profit‘ from 
their users‘ infringing activities is still open to debate. 
                                                 
838
 Para. 5.3. 
839
 Professor G. Dinwoodie opening the panel session at the UCL IBIL seminar, 24 February 2010. 
ipkitten.blogspot.com/2010/02/trade-mark-law-and-internet-ibil.html. [15/08/2010]. 
840
 Dixon A.N [2009], op.cit. 35. 
841
 Daly, M. [2007], op.cit. 
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 Search engines, informationa management tools, etc. Edwards, L. [2009], op.cit. 87. The latest 
example is the unreported fine of a British pub for providing wi-fi facilities to its customers. 
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3.6 - Conclusion 
‗Judges have no specialized technical ability to answer questions about present or 
future technological feasibility or commercial viability where technology 
professionals, engineers, and venture capitalists themselves may radically 
disagree and where answers may differ depending upon whether one focuses upon 
the time of product development or the time of distribution‘843. 
The purpose of this Chapter has been to identify the challenges that networking 
technologies present for copyright, and accordingly to analyse the reasons associated 
with legal uncertainty governing these new technologies. It has been shown that: 
 it is difficult to enforce copyright in an environment in which copyright 
infringements are widespread and difficult to detect; 
 the applicability and extension of making available and distribution rights are 
unclear; 
 limitations, exceptions and defences may not apply; and 
 facilitators are in an unclear legal position. 
This legal uncertainty has a detrimental effect over technology innovation since 
software, services and internet access providers tend to focus on avoiding liability for 
the infringements committed by their users, instead of developing faster and more 
reliable networks
844
. Users suffer a restriction of their right of privacy by the monitoring 
of their activities online
845
 and of their right of freedom of expression by the filtering of 
their transmissions
846
. Finally, authors and other copyright owners are in the 
exasperating position of having to enforce their rights through court orders to receive 
the deserved compensation for the dissemination of their works online. 
Moreover, it should be noted how courts show a tendency to rely upon 
technologically inaccurate opinions, thereby making the analysis of the legal liability 
arguable
847
. The law is also so uncertain that the operators of public domain sites—such 
as Project Gutenberg—feel they should post notices similar to the following: 
‗Copyright laws are changing all over the world, be sure to check the copyright 
laws for your country before posting these files!‘848 
This has led commentators to ask: 
                                                 
843
 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studio Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005), Breyer J. concurring. 
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 Para. 2.2.2.9. 
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846
 Para. 5.2.4.2. 
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 For instance in Scarlet and PirateBay. 
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 www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext00/0ws2310.txt. [15/08/2010]. 
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‗What measure does the intellectual property industry propose to counter this 
development? A ban on the technology? Obligatory surveillance programmes on 
every private PC?‘849 
A number of possible solutions to this legal uncertainty have been proposed; they 
provide the focus for the following Chapters. Chapter Four continues the investigative 
journey by defining the actors involved, and analyses the relationship between 
copyright and networking technologies from a philosophical and social-economic 
perspective. 
                                                 
849
 K. Sigfid, Swedish MP, commenting on the development of anti-tracking file-sharing softwares. 
Quoted in E-commerce Law & Policy 2009, 11(3), One Swarm to end file-sharing tracking by monitoring 
agents, www.e-comlaw.com/lp/archive/volume_11_issue_3.htm. [15/08/2010]. 
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Chapter Four 
Contextualizing Networking Technologies within a 
Legal-Socio-Economic Perspective 
- 
‗if thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought‘
850
 
 
4.1 - Introduction 
In the on-going war between the entertainment industries and new technologies, 
something has been misplaced
851
. A legislative or technical outcome to the threats 
which networking technologies pose to copyright is still awaited
852
; however, in the 
meantime, copyright law palpably entered the mainstream consciousness, causing 
sometimes emotive complaints from users
853
, preoccupied by the extreme—whilst 
sometimes bizarre—deterrents to piracy854. Networking technologies are transforming 
everyday life
855
, allowing perfect replications, instantaneous transmission and abundant 
storage. They reach a global audience virtually inexpensively, in the process 
undermining the existent copyright commercial structure
856
. 
The debate is starkly polarised, whilst some wish to ensure that copyright holders 
capture ‗all value that can derive from property‘857. They associate networking 
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 Orwell G. [1946], Politics and the English language, www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/orwe1146.htm. 
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557; Dam, K.W. [1999], Self Help in the Digital Jungle, 28 J. L. Stud. 393; O‘Rourke, M. A. [1997], 
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technologies with an unprecedented spread of copyright infringements, a ‗highly-
infectious micro-organism‘858, which undermines the legal rights of authors and other 
copyright owners, and which negatively affects the market. They promote expanded 
rights, technical barriers, additional rights structures, and stronger enforcement 
powers
859
. They consider the failure to provide a robust copyright protection an offence 
against the ‗international order‘860. On the opposite side, however, others claim that 
copyright has never been a ‗one-sided entitlement‘; it is not based on ‗unassailable 
societal norm‘ and should not be a mechanism for preserving the status quo: if new 
technologies produce new useful means of creation and dissemination, then whoever 
was responsible for exploiting the old ones then has the choice of joining the new 
technology or otherwise stepping aside
861
. 
Obviously, the aforementioned argument provides an extreme simplification of 
the opposite factions. The most critical point in the debate is that no reliable 
comprehensive method of data collection is available; accordingly, both arguments are 
theoretically sustainable. This Chapter therefore aims to clarify some preliminary key 
issues in order to help to determine the more suitable solution to the problems described 
in the previous Chapters. 
 
4.2 - Actors 
Technology has constantly changed the relationship between creators, industries, and 
the users. Today, this triumvirate appears to be corrupted by a number of new entities, 
jeopardising the old established positions
862
. History, however, shows us that this 
triumvirate has remained consistent, and that the market usually compensates for any 
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shift in control and power caused by technological improvements
863
. It is essential for 
copyright legislation to balance this triumvirate‘s different interests864; however, public 
choice
865
 and collecting actions‘866 theories show how the policy-making process tends 
to satisfy the interests of the better-organised groups of actors—the entertainment 
industries—at the expenses of the groups which are less organised-authors and 
performers- or dispersed-users
867
. 
‗As a result copyright law is unlikely to reflect users‘ interests‘868. 
 
4.2.1 – The Authors and the Performers 
Authors and performers do not necessarily play an active role in the formation of 
copyright laws; however, they have nevertheless become active participants, and 
thereby form their own associations when they perceive unfair exploitation
869
. Authors 
and performers have conflicting responses to networking technologies and the tactics of 
their associations; some enjoy their creations being shared
870
. Some market or otherwise 
test the quality of their creations via disseminating their works, free of charge, through 
their websites or various other channels
871
; others accept the potential of online 
distribution, but are concerned with the impact on their incomes
872
, and/or fear that their 
moral rights may be infringed
873
. A small group is generally seen to be against online 
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distribution, thinking it may undermine the very sense of acquiring and enjoying content 
itself
874
. Moreover, in all likelihood, few authors privately wish networking 
technologies would disappear, though they prefer not to admit it publicly
875
. 
Much of the discourse surrounding networking technologies has centred on the 
revenues authors and performers—in addition to the entertainment industries—are 
potentially losing. The entertainment industries‘ anti-piracy campaigns are substantially 
based on the assumption that sharing is stealing, which consequently undermines 
creativity
876
. Notwithstanding the arguments that the industry alone—not authors and 
performers—is losing revenues877, it is submitted that creativity is not driven only by 
profit. A more detailed analytical map is therefore required in order to assess authors‘ 
own intrinsic motivations
878
.  
Some commentators argue that authors and performers are insufficiently 
supported by the rewards that copyright systems promise, yet they still create new 
works
879
. Profits are merely one variable; the gratification of creating in itself combined 
with the gratification of being acknowledged and appreciated by the public-rewards, are 
also important variables
880
. It could be argued that even a non-proprietary model that 
exalts the value of hedonic and socio-psychological rewards can guarantee production 
and thereby allow dissemination of creation without the need for copyright monopoly 
incentives
881
. The extent of this correlation should not be overstated; however, profit 
alone is likely to prove insufficient to stimulate creation
882
. In this sense, from a 
creator‘s perspective, networking technologies could be argued to diminish the 
economic return in exchange for other benefits: for instance, a wider audience
883
. 
Nevertheless, it is argued that individuals are naturally creative beings who engage in 
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their scientific and artistic activities for diverse reasons and rewards, notwithstanding 
the legal and technological framework provided
884
. 
 
4.2.2 – The Industries 
The entertainment industries are the principal investors in authors—not only recording 
their creative effort, but also marketing them. Without a copyright system to guarantee 
return for investment, the industry would stop investing, which would be 
disadvantageous to society in its entirety
885
. The industry strategy is concerned with 
maximising returns, and accordingly appears to concentrate on three factors: expanding 
the boundaries of the law so as to capture more and more intellectual property goods
886
; 
supporting the creation, manufacture and distribution of a variety of goods
887
; and 
protecting the pre-existent distribution network in some cases by preventing the 
entrance of new services and products
888
. 
Networking technologies have had a considerable impact on the industries‘ 
control over the distribution networks, satisfying several types of consumers‘ demands, 
previously unanswered by the industries
889
. The result of this approach has been the 
opening of new lucrative markets, which—either directly or indirectly—profit from the 
lack of enforcement of copyright laws. New industries have also entered the market as a 
result of networking technologies, namely file-sharing software providers, online 
service providers and, most importantly, internet access providers. These new players 
represent relevant competitors to the old industry since, notwithstanding their liabilities 
under the law
890, they are ‗profiting‘ from widespread copyright infringements. In a 
sense, they could be considered the next generation broadcasters
891
. Instead of 
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competing with or otherwise trying to impose royalties on such services, the 
entertainment industries firstly attempted to ‗shut down‘ networking technologies 
services in the courts, and only lately began collaborating with internet access 
providers
892
. An interesting point to consider is that the entertainment industries and 
these new players often belong to the very same business conglomerates
893
. 
A recurring question is how to convince users to buy something they can get free 
of charge. It is submitted, however, that the main question should be how to compensate 
the copyright owners for the unauthorised online usage of their protected materials. 
New media have historically supported pre-existing media in the short-term to replace 
them later. Opportunities exist to arbitrate between the different distributions 
mediums
894
. 
 
4.2.3 – The Users 
‗What makes the constitution of a state really strong and durable is such a close 
observance of (social) conventions that natural relations and laws come to be in 
harmony on all points, so that the law … seems only to ensure, accompany and 
correct what is natural‘895 
International copyright law is complex, and it is often complicated in order to determine 
whether some activities are copyright infringements or are otherwise permitted. 
Moreover, users appear to know that existing copyright regulations are increasingly 
unenforceable within the internet, and the likelihood of being punished for such sharing 
activities is remote. Solid knowledge concerning file-sharing is rare, but the following 
graph (Figure 19) attempts to illustrate the percentage of internet users who file-share 
without authorisation
896
. In Finland, for example—which has one of the highest rates of 
access to the internet
897
- 87% of all internet users are file-sharers
898
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Figure 19 - File-Sharers in UK, France, Germany, Italy, NL, and Finland 
 
These statistics are far from conclusive, but it can be safely assumed that a vast number 
of infringements are committed through networking technologies
899
. File-sharing is an 
everyday practice for a significant portion of internet users. Apparently repression, 
DRM, filtering and ‗awareness‘ campaigns have shown no tangible effect900. By 
downloading, users save the purchase price of a copy of the file; however, by uploading, 
users do not receive any direct benefit from infringing copyright
901
; nevertheless it has 
become a common and ‗socially-acceptable‘ activity902. An interesting academic 
literature explores the reasoning behind this behaviour
903
, thereby explaining it with the 
‗neutralisation theory‘904 or the ‗de-individuation theory‘905.  
A different reading might be suggested. Users are used to accessing content 
paying indirectly for it—radio and television being perfect examples for this. 
Broadcasters are licensed to broadcast protected content; however, users receive 
contents paying for the ‗right‘ to potentially access it by paying taxes on the potential 
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reception and/or paying a TV licence. Moreover, they also pay for the content indirectly 
by being forced to listen to or watch advertisements during the programming. The 
internet is no exception. Users are, to some extent, paying for the content they access or 
download through the subscription to the service, and are also being forced to 
watch/listen to advertisements. It is arguable that such users realise that they do not 
compensate the correct right holders for the content enjoyed, but there is no doubt they 
are paying an amount in order to share/access such content. Moreover, users know 
sharing is an activity undertaken by millions of individuals. 
 
4.3 – Justificatory Rhetoric 
Copyright is present in the awareness of the public and is the subject of heated debates. 
However, its importance and relevance are increasingly undermined by the belief of 
some that copyright is no longer justifiable, and fundamentally places unnecessary 
restrictions on competing products; infringement is not harmful, and users will not 
experience legal consequences for infringement. Copyright is governed by a 
fundamental principle of balance; however, there is the general perception that the 
balance has shifted towards copyright holders—partly because copyright continually 
expands, and partly because the balance has not been recalibrated appropriately with the 
advent of networking technologies
906
. When a legal system
907
  
‗no longer maintain the correct balance or neglect it, then respect for system by 
the public erodes‘908 
The ‗sword of copyright law‘ has been arguably wielded too vigorously in relation 
to more recent technological innovations, thereby consequently undermining the 
aforementioned balance
909
. Some critics have subsequently adopted a strong anti-
intellectual property attitude
910
, which is: 
‗coalescing around frustration with the way that digital media is dealt with by the 
established copyright […] regime‘911.  
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Furthermore, some assert that the copyright system is no longer justifiable
912
: the law is 
incapable of keeping up with technological developments
913
, and enforcement is hardly 
possible
914
. Therefore, it is necessary to question whether or not the current copyright 
system is justifiable, taking into consideration that 
‗justifications supporting strong copyright protections are often very limited‘915.  
Multiple justifications theories
916
 underline the need to ‗strike a balance‘ between 
authors‘ rights, users‘ rights, and technology development. In a sense, the scope of 
copyright is to provide a system to remunerate the creators. A simple way to achieve 
this—although not necessarily the best—is the grant of a monopoly917. Thus, copyright 
must be limited and its justification constantly challenged, since it can be misused to 
engage into anti-consumer, anti-competitive, and anti-innovative behaviours. Therefore, 
it is unavoidable to mention the philosophical patterns dominating the copyright 
discourse
918
. 
 
 
                                                 
912
 Barlow, J.P. [1994], op.cit. Phan, D.T.T. [1998], Will fair use function on the internet? 98 Columbia 
L.Rev. 169, 206; Borland-Yamamoto [2000], The P2P myth, news.cnet.com. [15/08/2010]. Higham, N. 
[1993], The new challenges of digitisation, 15(10) E.I.P.R. 355. Ixon-Hansen, [1996], The Berne 
Convention Enters the Digital Age, 18(11) E.I.P.R. 604, 607. Interestingly, a similar notion can already be 
found in Donaldson v. Beckett [1774] 4 Burr. 2408. Lord Camden questioned what happened to thoughts 
‗if he speaks, and lets them fly out in private or public discourse? Will he claim the breath, the air, the 
words in which his thoughts are clothed? Where does this fanciful property begin, or end, or continue?‘ 
Wiese, H. [2002], The justification of the copyright system in the digital age, 24(8) E.I.P.R. 387-396. 
913
 Wiese, H. [2002], op.cit. 
914
 Stone-Harrington [2000], Is it the end of the line for copyright? 38 Commercial Lawyer 66, 67. 
Shipchandler, S. [2000], The Wild, Wild Web: non-regulation as the answer to the regulatory question, 
Cornell International L.J. 436. Wiese, H. [2002], op.cit. 
915
 Tamura, Y. [2009], op.cit. 63. 
916
 On the philosophy of intellectual property, in particular copyright, generally: Fisher, W.W. [2001], 
Theories of intellectual property, in Munzer, S. (ed.) [2001], New essays in the legal and political theory 
of property, Cambridge University Press, 168; Menell, P.S. [2000], Intellectual property: general 
theories, in Bouckaert-de Geest (eds) [2000], Encyclopaedia of law & economics: Volume II, Edward 
Elgar, 129; Drahos, P. [1996], A philosophy of intellectual property, Ashgate; Boyle, J. [1996], op.cit.; 
Palmer, T.G. [1990], Are patents and copyrights morally justified? The philosophy of property rights and 
ideal objects, 13 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 817; Hughes, J. [1988], The philosophy of 
intellectual property, 77 Georgetown L.J. 287. 
917
 Patry, W. [2009], op.cit. xvi-xvii. 
918
 The main sources used to philosophically justify copyright are: Locke, J. [1690], Second Treatise on 
government, edited by Laslett P. [1988], 2
nd
 ed., Cambridge University Press, Chapter V; Kant, I. [1785], 
On the injustice of counterfeiting Books; Hegel, G.W.F. [1821], Philosophy of rights, Knox, T.M. [1967] 
translation, Oxford University Press; Foucault, M. [1977], What is an Author Cornell University Press. 
The following division is open to debate and is by no means conclusive. Moreover, the power of these 
theories is not limitless. Fisher, W.W. [2001], op.cit, 173-175, 177. It is arguable whether intellectual 
property theory lends itself to categorisation. It has been argued that ‗no theory displays sufficient 
justificatory power on which to base a coherent theoretical approach to copyright‘ and that only all 
together, the bundle of copyright theories provides the requisite theoretical framework for copyright 
policy and practice. Zemer, L. [2006], op.cit. Theories are normally divided into utilitarian and non-
utilitarian, but some suggest ulterior divisions. Menell P. S. [2000], op.cit, 129. 
  130 
4.3.1 - Utilitarianism 
Utilitarianism endorses the granting of intellectual property rights to promote 
innovation and productivity, limiting the interests of right holders with the ones of the 
users
919
. It assumes that monopolies—limited in duration and scope—help 
innovation
920
. Thus, copyright promotes creativity granting a monopoly, justified as the 
economic reward for the creators‘ efforts921. This monopoly, however, has a social 
cost
922
, which can be balanced under the utilitarian justifications alone, since these 
mainly focus on the property component of production
923
. 
 
4.3.2 – Labour-based Justifications  
The most famous is perhaps Locke‘s labour theory. Notwithstanding, it does not 
directly refer to intellectual property, but is often quoted in modern copyright debates
924
 
and court references
925
. The labour theory states that,  
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‗everyone has a natural property right in his/her own ‗person‘ and in the labour 
of his/her body‘926; and that ‗men share a common right in all things‘927.  
Locke introduces the concept of ‗expenditure of labour‘928 to justify the 
appropriation of an object by the labourer
929
. However, the right is not unconditional
930
, 
and there are some limits, such as the ‗no-harm principle‘931: property is protected on 
the condition that it does not conflict with the common good. Copyright is never 
absolute, and copyright works are non-rivalrous in nature
932
. Thus, it is open to doubts 
whether, 
‗Lockean property theory can be re-imagined to shape a copyright system that 
furthers […] maximum creation and dissemination of intellectual works‘933. 
Moreover, Locke‘s theory could be misused in order to promote unbalanced copyright 
expansionisms, not valuing the socio-cultural aspects of copyright
934
. 
 
4.3.3 – The Personhood Approach  
The personhood theory derives from Kantian and Hegelian philosophies
935
. It assumes 
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that ‗property‘ is part of, and is necessary for, the individual‘s personality936. Thus, 
copyright is justifiable, simply because it protects the manifestation of the creator‘s 
personality in his/her intellectual expressions
937
. Scholars supporting the personhood 
theory employ different, sometimes contrasting, approaches
938
, because, in all 
likelihood, personality theories alone cannot justify the present copyright regime. For 
instance, it could be argued that copyright is not indispensable for the development of 
the individual‘s personality, or that it limits the development of the personality of others 
individuals, thereby imposing restriction to the dissemination of works. 
 
4.3.4 – Social-Institutional-Planning  
The social-institutional-planning theory claims that a strong civic culture can be 
maintained only with a balanced social and institutional intellectual property regime. It 
formulates ‗a vision of a just and attractive culture‘939. Theorists of this approach 
advocate that a less rigid set of copyright laws will fundamentally facilitate the 
expansion of cultural exchange and social interaction
940
.  
 
4.3.5 – Traditional Proprietarianism  
Traditional proprietarianism scholars suggest that, if copyright is a form of property
941
, 
then ownership and the title of traditional property should be applied, thereby 
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disregarding the social nature of copyright. The purpose of the approach is to emphasise 
that every theory relates, in one way or another, to the traditional tangible right of 
property
942
. Therefore, the key aspects of copyright should be entitlement and control, 
similar to traditional property
943
. However, according to property theories: ‗property 
has no purpose where there is abundance‘944. 
 
4.3.6 – Authorial Constructionism 
‗Authorial constructionism‘ scholars analyse the copyright system from a social 
perspective, and accordingly criticise the notion of the ‗author‘, arguing that ‗creation‘ 
is collaborative in nature
945
. This approach to copyright, however, is more 
fundamentally based on the interaction of the author with other authors than with 
society as a whole, or by virtue of being a member of society. This view, for instance, 
questions authorship and its origin, but does not sufficiently challenge the author‘s 
personal creation process
946. Notably, others criticise the idea of ‗romantic authorship‘ 
and its effects on the scope of copyright in modern times
947
: authorial entities do not 
stand alone, but are built on contributions from various sources
948
. Explicitly or not, 
many scholars support this theory
949
, thereby demonstrating the need to evaluate 
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authorship in a social context. 
 
4.3.7 – In Search of Clarity 
Considering the development of copyright, one cannot base the system‘s justification on 
only one particular theory
950
. Only by sustaining a plurality of views can a system be 
secured which successfully balances competing interests and the currently 
underestimated social and cultural needs
951. Humankind‘s fundamental freedoms 
include a right to be recognised and rewarded for any scientific, literary or artistic 
production
952
; however, the notably continuous stream of justifications resulted in an 
unbalanced proprietary component within copyright law over the public interest 
component
953
. This conclusion does not imply that the theories have no practical use; 
rather, they fail to provide a solution to the problems emanating from the fact that 
theory and practice have to be balanced. 
‗Copyright is here to stay. […] Copyright theories are specifically designed to 
criticise the moral and ethical flaws inherent in present copyright legislation‘954. 
Importantly, however, theories cannot be developed in isolation from practice
955
, and 
practice shows that: 
 Copyright works can be consumed without the supply being exhausted. Copyright 
artificially creates scarcity, thereby allowing the building and protection of 
barriers. Causes and effects should not be inverted
956
. 
 Content is available virtually inexpensively owing to networking technologies. 
Consequently, arguing for a strong deontological but impractical rhetoric based on 
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natural rights and personal dignity
957
 might be outdated. Detailed legal rules on 
collective management, levies and contractual arrangements
958
 could allow 
everyone from authors to users of the industries—or even the state—to benefit 
from the exploitation of copyright works
959
. 
 Every human creation is derivative960. 
 If there is a choice between protecting copyright and facilitating technological 
development
961
, it must preliminarily assessed whether  
‗gains on the copyright swing would exceed the loses on the technological 
roundabouts‘962. 
Explicitly or not, most modern legal systems recognise legal protection for intellectual 
property in order to maximise creation and distribution in a socially optimal manner
963
. 
‗Copyright protection […] trades off the cost of limiting access to a work against 
the benefits of providing incentives to create the work in the first place. Striking 
the balance between access and incentives is the central problem in copyright 
law‘964 
Therefore, the objective of a justifiable copyright system should be the successful 
remuneration of the creator in a ‗socially optimal manner‘—not to enforce out-dated 
methods of distribution or to favour one type of provider over another. Copyright law 
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should ‗maximise value not protection‘965 whilst taking into consideration the interests 
of technology—not only the interests of copyright holders966. 
 
4.4 – Marketing Myopia967 
This work focuses on the legal issues concerning networking technologies; however, the 
theoretical examination of many of these issues indicates that economic theories should 
be taken into account
968
. Consequently, the following paragraph presents a brief 
examination of some related economic issues. Entertainment industries argue that 
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The effect of file-sharing on record sales: an empirical analysis, 115 Journal of Political Economy 1; 
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software piracy 2.0? 46(7) A.C.M. 107; Meisel, J. B. [2008], Entry into the market for online distribution 
of digital content: economic and legal ramifications, 5(1) SCRIPTed 50; Rob-Waldfogel [2006], Piracy 
on the high C's: music downloading, sales displacement, and social welfare in a sample of college 
students, 49(1) Journal of Law and Economics, 29-62; Johnson, W. [1985], The economics of copying, 93 
Journal of Political Economy 158; Png-Chen [2003], Information goods pricing and copyright 
enforcement: welfare analysis, 14 Information Systems Research 107; Takeyama, L. [1994], The welfare 
implications of unauthorized reproduction of intellectual property in the presence of demand network 
externalities, 42 Journal of Industrial Economics 155; Belleflamme, P. [2002], Pricing information goods 
in the presence of copying, Working Paper No.463, Department of Economics, Queen Mary University of 
London. 
  137 
networking technologies harm the market, but the data presented is often inaccurate, and 
the catastrophic predictions not convincing
969
. The discourse is mainly based on the 
intuition that two following situations are related: 
1. the sales of protected contents are in decline; and 
2. this decline coincides with the advent of networking technologies. 
The extent of the casual relationship between these two situations is not clear
970
. As a 
result, several authors have documented specific economic effects of user participation 
in unauthorised file-sharing
971
, such as the consumer-welfare effect
972
, the substitution 
effect
973
, the sampling effect
974
, and the wealth effect
975
. The analysis of such effects is 
beyond the scope of this work; however, it is nevertheless considered important to 
underline the difficulties in determining the market displacement caused by networking 
technologies. 
‗In April 2009 […] between 44 and 79 percent of global Internet traffic is taken 
up with file sharing, the lower figure is for America, the higher for the region, 
‗Eastern Europe‘ – though we have found no way of measuring how much of this 
traffic is the up or downloading of unauthorised, unlicensed or illegal material. 
16 percent of UK online consumers are said to regularly ‗file share‘, and whilst 
the figure is said to have remained ‗flat‘ in the recent past, various studies 
concede that the figures could be much higher. Academic research suggests that 
those who ‗file share‘ are at least 30% less likely to purchase music in addition. 
The IFPI (2009) estimates that there were 890 million unauthorized music 
downloads in the UK in 2007 through file-sharing, in contrast to 140 million 
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paid-for downloads: this is ratio of 6:1, and does not take into account any 
subsequent off-line sharing using disk burning or hard-drive transfers
976
. 
Industries and researchers disagree concerning the effects of networking 
technologies over the sales of copyright goods. Some argue that sharing activities do not 
act as substitutes for market mechanisms, but instead exist alongside them. 
Furthermore, it is also argued that they are not barriers to entry to the online retail 
market for music
977
, whereas others argue that networking technologies provide a direct 
challenge to the traditional models of distribution
978
. A number of studies concerning 
consumer behaviours have attempted to determine whether unauthorised file-sharing 
has a displacement effect in the sales of copyright goods
979
. It appears to be a war on 
figures ranging from disastrous predictions to researches claiming downloads 
‗have an effect on sales that is statistically indistinguishable from zero‘980 
The entertainment industries publish reports every year claiming losses of billions of the 
relevant currency
981
. Some experts claim that these figures are suspect
982
, whilst others 
suggest that the content industries are misinterpreting their own statistics
983
. These 
statistics may be interpreted to indicate two types of market harm
984
: 
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 from the perspective of copyright owners, this downturn in purchasing may 
indicate that unauthorised perfect substitutes are available in the marketplace due 
to the sharing phenomenon; 
 from the perspective of the user, this downturn may indicate that the networking 
technologies offer new goods in terms of alternate pricing and format. 
Or two types of market benefits
985
: 
 networking technologies may drive consumer demand high enough to balance or 
even offset the negative effects of unauthorised file-sharing; 
 the browsing activities of users may replace costly marketing and promotion 
activities implemented by the industry, and so the industry would actually 
increase its profits in spite of lower revenues. 
Although the entertainment industries point to networking technologies as the 
leading reason for the loss of sales, it has been argued that, 
‗there is no proven correlation between downloads and the decline in sales‘986.  
The researches have ultimately experienced difficulties when striving to analyse and 
compare, since the data contained is hardly possible to retrieve elsewhere and the 
conclusions debateable. For instance, the falling economy and prices could also be 
potential reasons for the decline in sales
987
.  
 
4.4.1 – Copyright ‘Goods’ and Substitutability 
Copyright goods, have two unique characteristics: once the good is produced, ‗it is 
possible at no cost for additional persons to enjoy the same unit‘988; and one person‘s 
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enjoyment of the good is in no way affected by another‘s consumption989. 
Consequentially, rights structures should extend 
‗into every corner where consumers derive value from literary and artistic 
works‘990.  
The market should then create mechanisms for ensuring optimal dissemination of 
works, and that new works, which satisfy the consumers‘ preferences, are produced. 
Copyright markets aim to achieve efficiency by using price discrimination
991
 in order to 
fully include exclusive rights and reduce the transaction costs
992
. Networking 
technologies, however, may threaten this goal by amplifying the public good 
characteristics of content, and it is open to doubt whether the networks can be modified 
to mirror market norms at a micro level
993
, since networking technologies permit the 
dissemination of works a virtually zero marginal costs
994
. Price discrimination relies on 
the ‗willingness to pay‘, clearly aligned with the ability to pay in most circumstances. 
However, copyright goods are not simply mere articles for consumption
995
: when 
assessing what consumers are prepared to pay, it is also necessary to clarify what is 
actually being paid for, and the positive benefits realised by purchasers. These ‗positive 
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995
. Fisher, W.W. [1998], op.cit. 1241-1251; Merges, R.P. 
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J.E. [2000], op.cit, 17-22. 
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externalities‘ remain curiously unexplored by economic analyses in the copyright 
market
996
. More importantly, it can be argued that digital files are not substitutes for the 
‗original‘ goods, but rather parallel versions997. Notably, such arguments can be 
simplified with an equation (Figure 20): 
Figure 20 - The Networking Technologies Equation 
P x $ 
© x D 
P is the number of individuals who want and can obtain copyright content; $ is the 
amount of money they are willing to invest in it; © is the amount of content available; 
and D is the desirability of the content itself. 
Assuming P and © are stable, the equilibrium is determined by: 
$ 
D 
When adding networking technologies to the equation, the result is: 
P x $± NT 
© x D ± NT 
 
Networking technologies increase the number of people who want and can access 
content, reduce associated transaction costs, and increase the amount and desirability of 
the available content. This does not mean that networking technologies did not change 
the way in which copyright works are obtained; in fact, they provide a direct challenge 
to the traditional models of distribution. Neoclassical economics posits that consumers 
who are unhappy with the terms offered will shop somewhere else, thereby forcing the 
                                                 
996
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initial seller to reconfigure its offerings in order to remain competitive
998
. The model 
rests on two important assumptions: that substitute products exist; and that terms 
offered by producers will in fact differ
999
. 
Ultimately, the characterisation of copyright works as ‗goods‘ might have 
damaging consequences on copyright law itself. Substitutability is empirical, and it 
could be suggested that copyright works are less interchangeable than traditional 
goods
1000
. Importantly, divergence of terms is questionable
1001
; consumer sovereignty in 
this instance being limited to the notion of ‗take-it-or-leave-it‘1002. Notably, users value 
goods accurately in other markets; however, this is impossible in context of 
copyright
1003
. 
A theoretical economic analysis, therefore, might lead to ambiguous results. On 
the one hand, if original and copy are close substitutes, the copy can displace the 
original consumption; that is, the individual consumes the unpaid copy instead of 
paying for the original
1004
. On the other hand, information-sharing can stimulate paid 
consumption
1005
. The results should be carefully considered: the data is scarce and the 
applied studies are contradictories. In the case of digital piracy, there are two 
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must be produced within that market‘. Boyle, J. [1997], A politics of intellectual property: 
environmentalism for the net?, 47 Duke L.J. 87, 95. Also Boyle, J. [1996], op.cit, 35-46. 
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phenomena which can be hardly explained by traditional approaches
1006
: some users 
supply unauthorised files at zero price; whilst some users continue to pay certain price 
for legitimate content, notwithstanding, they could obtain an unauthorised copy at zero 
price. An explanation could be that the attitude and behaviours of users towards 
protected content online and in the physical world are very different
1007
. 
 
4.4.2 – Creative Destruction1008 
‗From the economic standpoint, the objective of policy makers is to achieve the 
optimal point at which the maximum amount of wealth is created by copyright. 
The challenge is that optimal conditions are contingent on and a function of a 
number of changing social conditions, therefore no stable point of optimal 
copyright policies can be identified and maintained‘1009. 
The entertainment industries—as any industry—should regard themselves as a 
‗customer-creating and satisfying organism‘ in order to achieve success:1010 
‗Management must think of itself not as producing products but as producing 
customer value satisfaction‘1011. 
A common economic assumption is that competitors will introduce new business 
models when there is an unsatisfied market demand
1012
. It could be argued that 
networking technologies‘ providers are competitors, but it is debatable whether they are 
solely market substitutive providers. Other important queries are whether copyright can 
be effectively used in order to eliminate competitive distribution means
1013
, and whether 
there is real danger that anti-competitive practices may escape the competition 
authorities
1014
. Nevertheless, if one believes in capitalism, its evolution pattern has to be 
accepted.  
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‗Stabilised capitalism is a contradiction in terms‘1015. 
Innovation incessantly revolutionises the business structure, destroying the old 
ones. Therefore, every industry ‗must prepare the way for its own destruction‘1016. 
Thus, the focus should not be on the preservation of the existent entertainment 
industries‘ structure, but rather on establishing a workable solution in order to 
remunerate the copyright owners for unauthorised dissemination of their works. 
‗Control‘ as a business strategy appears not to be a viable solution1017. Moreover, 
securing goods and enforcing copyright is expensive: financial costs are probably not 
worth paying
1018
. Protecting property is, of course, a vital component of modern 
democracy when the ‗property‘ in question refuses to lend itself naturally to the concept 
of scarcity the protection is harder to achieve and the investment has risks
1019
. 
‗While copyright may operate in the market, copyright‘s fundamental goals are 
not of the market‘1020. 
Copyright laws should ultimately provide mechanisms for remunerating copyright 
owners without damaging the entire society; however, it has been suggested that these 
will prove ineffectual as long as the focus remains on the threats which networking 
technologies pose to the integrity of copyright law
1021
. 
‗Instead, the opportunity the internet offers us to advance copyright‘s progress 
goal by encouraging creative endeavours through the wide dissemination of 
works requires more careful consideration‘1022. 
The debate appears to be defined by the quantifications of the economic 
implications of networking technologies, whilst the advances it brings to society as a 
whole are undisputed
1023
. 
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‗In other words, never mind the piracy- The pirate technologies generate more 
growth
1024
. 
The popularity of flat-rate internet access and mobile telephony should critically caution 
against forcing the market too much: today, content is available virtually free of charge. 
Moreover, the architecture and philosophy of networking technologies seems to conflict 
with the vertically controlled business models in use of distributing copies in the world 
of physical artefacts
1025
. Allied to this point there is concern regarding the integrity of 
decisional privacy
1026
.  
 
4.5 – Sharing 
Networking technologies are important for scientific reasons
1027
, and sharing activities 
are therefore important
1028
, and have notably been proven to be of more benefit to the 
economy and societal development than private capital mechanisms
1029
. The internet 
itself has expanded due to the ‗Samaritan‘ nature of most of its users1030. 
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‗Anecdotal evidence indicates that at least for some material, untamed digital 
sharing turns out to be a more efficient method of distribution than either paid 
subscription or the sale of conventional copies. If untamed anarchic digital 
sharing is a superior distribution mechanism, or even a useful adjunct to 
conventional distribution, we ought to encourage it rather than make it more 
difficult‘1031. 
Sharing should not be automatically considered a potentially infringing, illegal or 
nefarious activity; perhaps it is just the next stage in societal development
1032
. File-
sharing, in itself, is a popular entertainment option—and arguably a successful 
marketing tool for the creators and the industries
1033
. These days, nobody knows the 
precise size of the entire media catalogue with regard to music, software, and films; 
however, thanks to the internet, the number of works available is rapidly increasing as 
millions of users are ‗self-publishing‘ online the materials they possess. Without users, 
copyright works fade away and disappear. In a global economy, this crucial user base 
can only be achieved by networking technologies. Furthermore, sharing a copyright 
work may also be considered to increase its value
1034
. 
It is, therefore, submitted that sharing is not stealing and that using terms such as 
‗theft‘ and ‗piracy‘ to describe the unauthorised use of copyright works1035 is 
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inaccurate
1036
, and it is also ‗a disservice to honest discussion‘1037. The ‗pirates‘ copy 
for profit, they make multiple copies and sell them. Sharers make copies for personal 
use and for sharing them within a network. They ‗save money‘; however, their 
motivation is not financial
1038
. The use of the term ‗pirate‘ is metaphorical—but this is 
not the case for terms like ‗theft‘ and ‗stealing‘. There is some plausibility in thinking of 
the relevant copying activities as really being ‗theft‘1039: copyright owners suffer a 
financial deprivation as a result of file-sharing
1040
. However, another view is that 
copyright infringement is not theft
1041
. 
‗Whether unauthorised copying of a work protected by copyright is technically 
and legally in fact a ―theft‖ probably depends upon the technicalities of criminal 
law and nomenclature in any particular jurisdiction. Although it is perhaps 
doubtful, there may be some jurisdictions in which ―theft‖ is defined broadly 
enough to cover circumstances such as those under consideration. But that would 
certainly not be the legal norm‘1042. 
The use of these terms in the context of copyright infringement came under 
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judicial scrutiny in copyright cases in Australia
1043
 and the UK
1044
. The point was 
specifically addressed by the US Supreme Court
1045
, which rejected the argument that 
copyright infringement was an attack on the value of a copyright owner‘s property or 
actually theft
1046. ‗Downloading is stealing‘ appears not to be a statement of law, but 
rather a statement which aims to: 
‗draw upon and mobilise the ordinary, almost instinctive response or ordinary 
people to dislike, disdain and despise the unauthorised user of copyright works as 
they would dislike, disdain and despise the ordinary thief who takes away from 
another ‗ with intent to permanently deprive‘1047. 
Moreover, in Network Ten
1048
, the court noted how this is often used in 
conjunction with the rhetoric of linkage
1049
 to ‗stigmatise‘ infringing activities. Rhetoric 
may be used to win others over to a particular belief, ‗in any given case, every available 
means of persuasion‘1050. It is nevertheless the point of this discussion that, 
notwithstanding infringement of copyright is a civil and criminal wrong, the use of 
words such as ‗theft‘ or ‗piracy‘ in the discourse of copyright and networking 
technologies appears nonetheless to be ‗an inaccurate and manipulative distortion of 
legal and moral reality‘1051. 
 
4.6 - Conclusion 
The impact of networking technologies on copyright is not yet clear, nor is a definitive 
picture of the phenomenon. The cases involving these technologies reveal a dilemma, as 
it is believed that they could simultaneously pose a threat and an opportunity for 
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copyright
1052
. The question is then pondered: how then should we deal with these 
technologies?
1053
 A fundamental concern is also ‗who harms the market‘—the users 
infringing copyright or the industry with anti-competitive behaviour?
1054
 Essentially, the 
war between copyright and technology is also one between two giant industrial sectors, 
each of which is in the throws of competing for market space and power: namely, the 
offline entertainment industries and the online service, comprising internet access 
providers, online service providers, and networking software providers. The heart of the 
problem is what has been named ‗creative destruction‘1055: innovation in products and 
business models displace the old ones. A healthy competitive market requires a plethora 
of technology to challenge existing modes and to create new modes of creation, 
dissemination and consumption. However, whilst the potentially infringing technologies 
of earlier periods were easier to control, this is no longer the case. Nowadays 
enforcement of copyright risks to undermine users‘ integrity and technological 
innovation while doubtfully granting copyright owners compensation for the 
unauthorised uses of their works over networks, as it will be later discussed
1056
. 
In its 300-year history, copyright law has been constantly expanding
1057
. Although 
networking technologies have presented fresh problems, the European Commission 
concludes that  
‗copyright is the most flexible and, […] the most appropriate, form of protection 
for legal needs of industry in the development of the information society‘1058.  
As a result, expanding without control, copyright has now invaded new fields, and new 
gaps are subsequently exposed in the law
1059
. It is submitted that the secret of this 
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‗success‘ is the structure of copyright itself: a life plus 70 years ‗monopoly‘ with 
relatively low requirements and no formalities. More precisely, copyright is a 
‗balanced‘ state-granted monopoly which has lost its balance. This so called 
‗technology copyright‘ has created the related problem of ‗technology copyright 
monopoly‘ which, for some, is an ‗artificial and harmful monopoly‘: 
‗In [the] case of copyright not only the medieval chains remain, but they have 
been reinforced with late 20
th
 century steel‘1060.  
This monopoly can be dangerous for both users and creators, simply because 
copyright does not have pro-competition measures. The high politicisation of copyright 
is surely a strong and influential factor on the polarisation of the debate. There is also 
the tendency to offer a caricature of the debates about intellectual property as a battle 
between good and evil: in one extreme, the group who opposes stronger protection; on 
the other, the copyright holders arguing that the existing laws provide inadequate 
protection. In response, a number of ‗No Copyright‘ and ‗Pirate Parties‘ are standing 
up
1061. The term ‗intellectual‘ should be reconciled with the term ‗property‘1062. 
‗Property‘, in the sense of ‗sole and despotic dominion‘, does not fit well with 
copyright, simply because exceptions and limitations continue to form a central pillar of 
the overall design
1063
.  
‗On the internet some exceptions must be preserved, others will need to be 
reformulated, and wholly new ones may need to be created. Transformative uses, 
private use, and informational use are examples which fall into these respective 
categories. Allowing exceptions to be put up for sale through ubiquitous licensing 
characterises them as an inconvenience. In truth, they are much more 
important‘1064. 
Copyright should adapt to technology; however, the current adaptations—rather 
than welcoming the structural significance of network technologies—attempt to 
reinstate analogue-world barriers. 
‗Copyright law is at a crossroads‘1065. 
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The future development of copyright law ultimately remains unclear, and a number of 
solutions have been suggested, as will be discussed in the following Chapters. However, 
as interim observations, can be said that: philosophical justification for a strong 
copyright system are often limited
1066
; the entertainment industries—more than authors, 
performers and users—are the main actors in the copyright discourse, consequently 
leading to unbalances in the system
1067
; networking technologies are more a challenge 
to the old business model than to copyright in general, they increase exposure and hold 
significant potential for authors, industries and users
1068
; and sharing activities are 
perhaps the next stage in societal development
1069
. The journey continues with the 
analysis of the proposed—or implemented—alternative solutions. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Alternative Solutions 
- 
‗The first casualty when war comes is truth‘1070 
 
5.1 - Introduction 
Networking technologies have vastly changed how culture is disseminated and 
accessed
1071
. Such an evolution of consumption of protected works in an environment  
‗where reproduction and communication is both ubiquitous and automated brings 
the need for a fundamental rethinking of copyright law‘1072.  
Accordingly, no comprehensive data have so far been collected on the precise effects of 
networking technologies; however, it is assumed that a large percentage of internet 
transmissions involve the unauthorised use of protected works. The ‗network‘ became a 
space for sharing knowledge and creativity
1073
, thereby making the global legal 
landscape of copyright uncertain
1074
. Several proposals have been put forward and 
different schools of thought have emerged. Notably, some argue that copyright 
adequately deals with new technologies in the past, and it will adjust to such new 
ones
1075—i.e. the so-called ‗wait and see‘ approach. Some argue that strengthening 
copyright protection, increasing control over the internet, and subsequently 
implementing new enforcement tools are the only ways of ensuring the survivability of 
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the copyright system—the so-called ‗beyond copyright model‘ proposing a ‗digital lock 
up‘ to stop infringing uses on the internet1076. Others argue that an internet free from 
copyright is a reality that cannot be resisted, and further claim that exclusive rights in 
cyberspace are harmful
1077
, stating that any legislative and regulatory regime should be 
abolished
1078
. The solution is, however, ultimately likely to rest somewhere in between 
such approaches. Therefore, not surprisingly, the focus is slowly turning towards 
legislation
1079
. 
Historically, entertainment industries have consistently lobbied to ensure that their 
interests—and those of the authors and performers—prevailed. Users rarely participate 
in such discussions, and their interests are often overlooked
1080
. Consequently, the 
copyright balance has steadily moved towards the copyright owners
1081
. Lately, it has 
been recognised that internet access providers should play a particular role in the 
debate; however, there nevertheless remain resistances in including software and online 
service providers. The entertainment industries have been reluctant to accept them as 
legitimate businesses
1082
. Irrespective of such arguments, however, the problem remains 
global; therefore, the solution should accordingly be global. It is submitted that this can 
be only achieved through cooperation amongst networking technologies providers, 
authors and other right owners, users and governments
1083
. 
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5.1.1 – Suggested Approach 
A computer simulation of the phenomenon analysed the impact of alternative strategies, 
such as targeting large-scale contributors to the networks, or downloaders
1084
. The 
results suggest that the effective strategy for eradicating the unauthorised dissemination 
of protected works over networking technologies is to 
‗disturb the network by generating a constant amount of traffic which 
continuously worsens the infrastructure performance, in order to make the 
network collapse eventually‘1085. 
However, it is submitted that this approach is not ‗optimal‘ because it does not respect 
the concepts that are thought to be mandatory for a solution to be satisfactory: 
1. authors‘ and other copyright owners‘ compensations1086; 
2. user integrity: the respect of the users‘ rights including freedom of expression1087, 
the right to take part in the cultural life of the community
1088
, the right to enjoy the 
arts and to benefit from scientific progress, and the right of privacy
1089
; and 
3. technological innovation. 
An optimal solution should ultimately seek to acknowledge the need of all the 
actors involved, grant right holders with the necessary compensation, and subsequently 
respect users‘ rights without banning such technologies altogether, or otherwise stifling 
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innovation. 
In the following, the proposed solutions have been grouped according to their 
aims and consequences. The first group of solutions focuses on ‗control‘ over the 
dissemination of protected works, and it is further divided in terms of ‗use with liability‘ 
and ‗use without liability‘ approaches. These are discussed in this Chapter. The second 
group focuses on abandoning the idea of controlling the dissemination of protected 
works in order to select the most suitable approach to the problems addressed in this 
work
1090
. These will be discussed in Chapter Six. The arguments both in favour and 
against control and liability are discussed below
1091
. 
 
5.2 – Use with Control and Liability 
Maintaining control and subsequently imposing liability on the use of works over 
networking technology has several benefits, including leaving the current status quo 
untouched. Apparently, creativity is encouraged when copyright owners feel confident 
that they can control their works and financially benefit from such
1092
. From a moral 
rights‘ perspective, authors will be assured that that their integrity and attribution rights 
are protected. Notably, in order to obtain this goal, copyright owners should ensure that 
the unauthorised dissemination of copyright works comes to an end
1093
; however, such 
an approach creates limited disadvantages. Copyright owners will have to continue 
increasingly investing in protection, monitor
1094
 and litigation to enforce their 
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copyrights
1095
. There are significant difficulties in consideration of monitoring the usage 
of protected works and thereby identifying infringers, and the costs may ultimately 
‗outweigh the benefits‘1096. Moreover, it is debatable whether or not liability truly 
affects users‘ behaviour1097. Notwithstanding the growing number of authorised file-
sharing sites
1098—and regardless court decisions or changes in the law1099—copyright 
owners may still have difficulties in competing with them
1100
. File-sharing networks and 
Web 2.0 platforms offer vast amounts of content and are currently free of charge. 
According to some, focusing on control and liability may subsequently turn copyright 
into an excessive monopoly over access and use of protected works
1101
. 
In summary, the ‗use with control and liability‘ approach involves enforcement, 
and consequently litigation, but it also includes online distribution alternatives, 
education and monitoring
1102
. These are discussed in the following. 
 
5.2.1 - Enforcement 
The entertainment industries have to rely upon court rulings and international 
cooperation when striving to fight piracy. They have to litigate and target directly with 
enforcement actions the source of pirate operations on a large scale, and may be 
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required to use special force to seize equipment and catch infringers
1103
. The last decade 
has witnessed international bodies in the fields of music, software and film promoting 
enforcement actions against users, services and software providers. In particular, 
litigation against users became 
‗an integral part of the campaign to eradicate file-sharing‘1104,  
although it appears to be costly and unpopular.  
In the past, copyright law expressly exempted a large amount of infringement; 
small-scale infringements were implicitly accepted, partly because of the impossibility 
to prevent them, but also because of the potential benefit these may bring
1105
. 
Networking technologies created a number of enforcement problems, including
1106
: 
 the identification of infringers1107; 
 everyone with a computer or a mobile phone is potentially an infringer due to the 
easiness of accessing unauthorised digital files; 
 files can be easily obtained and further disseminated, notwithstanding 
technological protection measure; and 
 cross-border legal problems. 
The impact of enforcement over networking technologies is considered to be 
debateable. Actions made against users did not achieve a noticeable deterrent effect
1108
. 
Notwithstanding statements declaring the number of users of these technologies have 
decreased as direct consequence of enforcement against users, it has nevertheless been 
argued that users simply migrate to more secure and secret sharing networks
1109
. 
Litigation against software and service providers appears not to have incisive 
consequences: for instance, Pirate Bay remains online; LimeWire is moving to cloud-
computing. The number of infringements reaches beyond the legal system‘s ability to 
cope with them; thus, it is arguable whether enforcement alone is enough to solve the 
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vast amount of issues related to networking technologies
1110
. 
 
5.2.1.1 – European Union. - The Enforcement Directive attempts to harmonise the 
situation amongst Member States; meanwhile, national laws differ in practice. The 
directive met stiff opposition
1111
 since it combines the most extreme of enforcement 
provisions available throughout Europe
1112
. The original intent of the directive was to 
take action against industrial, large-scale smuggling perpetrated by criminal 
organisations; however, networking technology users have become the target of this 
Directive
1113
. A number of states have yet to implement it
1114
; meanwhile, in 2008, the 
European Parliament adopted a report advising against criminalising non-profit making 
users
1115
. Furthermore the EU second Intellectual Property Right Enforcement 
Directive
1116
 has caused debates, in particular the definition of ‗commercial scale‘1117, 
and the crime of ‗aiding, abetting and inciting‘ infringement, because of the concern this 
directive may force networking technologies providers to block any peer-to-peer 
service
1118
. However, it is submitted that criminal law is poorly suited for the purpose of 
regulating copyright
1119
, and that such an approach ultimately presents a risk to 
technological innovation. 
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5.2.1.2 – US. - Various bills have been proposed in mind of increasing penalties and 
providing more remedies to copyright owners
1120
. Most of these have so far been 
abandoned
1121. However, the ‗No Electronic Theft Act‘1122, the ‗Family Entertainment 
and Copyright Act‘1123, and the ‗Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights Act‘1124 
empowered this effort by criminalising unauthorised file-sharing
1125
. The latest Bill, 
containing intellectual property rights enforcement provisions, introduced at the Senate 
is the ‗Cybersecurity Bill 2010‘1126 
 
5.2.2 – Online Distribution 
A successful, alternative, legal business model should accompany a successful ‗control 
with liability‘ strategy1127. As legitimate download services have multiplied1128, the key 
questions have become more concerned with how to persuade file-sharers to use legal 
services
1129
. Therefore, the question of price and desirability has also become of 
extreme relevance. Essentially, price and quality of the files should be competitive. A 
number of alternative business models have been suggested: charging per item, per 
volume of traffic, or per month
1130
. The argument is that, when promoting easy 
accessibility of legal services, there are no valid reasons for using file-sharing networks 
and Web 2.0 platforms for the purpose of accessing/downloading unauthorised content. 
Dissatisfaction with a business model is not a legal defence, but it is submitted that the 
entertainment industries should give users a reason to pay for content they can already 
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obtain free of charge
1131
. An approach concerned with regaining the lost consumer base 
could be to reduce prices and increase the quality of the files offered, and to also 
increase the penalties for infringements—the so-called ‗carrot and stick‘ approach. For 
instance, in the music business, total sales are predicted to decrease as shown by Figure 
21 below. 
Figure 21- Recorded Music Sales
1132
 
  
 
The reasons are numerous, but are mainly related to price, quality and arguably business 
models. For instance, in the US, downloading a song from iTunes costs $ 0.99. In the 
UK, downloading a song costs £ 0.79, but it should cost £ 0.54 at the current exchange 
rates. Moreover, users in Europe pay a different rate: € 0.99 (£ 0.86) for the same 
file
1133
. The problem is clear: the same file charged at different prices
1134
. 
Nevertheless, legal online distribution services create challenges for the traditional 
copyright system and management, which are not easily solved
1135
. These issues reach 
beyond the scope of this work; however, they do deserve to be mentioned, some of 
which include the issues of cross-border distribution, repertoires, and competition 
law
1136
. Notably, even if successfully addressing these challenges, doubts would 
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nevertheless remain concerning the influence of legal online distribution over 
unauthorised dissemination. 
An interesting example is that of Allofmp3.com—an unauthorised Russian music 
service, which has been under threat of litigation by the IFPI and RIAA for almost ten 
years
1137
. A number of legal decisions have been held against the site in various 
jurisdictions
1138
, and the Russian government publicly agreed to close down the site
1139
. 
However, despite all this, the site continues to run under the new name 
‗MP3Sparks.com‘. It claims to be in full compliance with Russian Author‘s Right law 
and provides a clear warning that:  
‗you are not able to download audio and video if it is in conflict with the laws of 
your country of residence‘. 
However, consumers in the UK and other countries are still able to download files 
from the site. Notwithstanding the licensing issues and the probable illegality of the site, 
it offers DRM-free CD-quality files at various prices charging for data downloaded 
instead of per file. In summary, it offers the best audio quality at the best price. It is a 
perfect competitor for legal online distribution, but it arguably does not pose any threat 
to unauthorised file-sharing. Therefore, it is submitted that, even when reducing the 
price and increasing the quality of online distribution services, unauthorised 
dissemination of protected content would nevertheless continue as before. 
 
5.2.3 - Education 
Enforcement and favourable legal alternatives should also be accompanied by extensive 
campaigns to persuade users that sharing is wrong and it is not worth risking criminal 
convictions or damages
1140. Surveys suggest that users are not ‗convinced‘ of the 
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wrongdoing of infringing copyright
1141
. Therefore, prevention through education could 
potentially diminish infringements—in the instance that it could be proven true that 
users are less likely to share protected content if they know it is ‗wrong‘1142. However, 
almost 70% of internet users in the UK know that sharing a file without authorisation is 
considered to be copyright infringement
1143
. Nevertheless, it is arguable whether users 
facing lawsuits for copyright infringement could reasonably claim that they were 
unaware their actions were illegal. 
Most of the campaigns target parents, as they are considered the first source of 
information about rules
1144. The IFPI published ‗Young People, Music and the 
Internet‘1145, a guide providing parents with a glossary of the relevant terminology, an 
explanation of the risks of infringing copyright, and the dangers of computer viruses. 
The IFPI has also produced ‗Digital File Check‘1146, a software which blocks and 
removes file-sharing software as well as shared folders. The latest tool is ‗pro-
music.org‘, a website providing links to educational tools, and ‗everything you need to 
know about online music‘1147.  
All of these efforts are positive signs that a more pragmatic approach is being 
adopted in relation to file-sharing on both national and international levels
1148
. 
However, it appears that such methods lack practical results
1149
. There are several 
assertions that media and the internet in general are to blame for the spread of copyright 
infringements, in view of the fact that they provide the ‗know-how‘, sponsor the 
practice, and put ‗peer pressure‘ on users1150. It is submitted that ‗education‘ is simply 
not working: behaviours are not changing
1151
. Notably, this may be owing to the fact 
that there is no immediately recognisable ‗victim‘ or ‗crime‘ in such a scenario1152. It is 
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submitted that systems considered independent from users‘ intentions or knowledge of 
copyright laws should be favoured
1153
. 
 
5.2.4 - Technology: ‘Is the answer to the machine in the machine?’ 1154 
Some commentators argue that, without technological controls, it is impossible to 
control the dissemination of digital works. Therefore, three types of technological 
controls have been implemented: 
1. control over the file using digital rights management; 
2. control over the internet access-monitoring and filtering; and 
3. control over the hardware. 
There is indeed a certain logic in arguing that technology may help in solving the 
problem it has caused. However, asking a machine to understand the complexity of a 
copyright system is simplistic
1155
. Technological solutions must be carefully addressed 
because there is risk of compromising the users‘ capacity to exercise legitimate rights 
by giving copyright owners perpetual protection of their works. Obviously, one could 
stipulate that technology providers embed in their product or services a mechanism for 
monitoring and restricting copyright infringement
1156
; however, the problem would 
always be that of enforcement. Decentralised open-source softwares have already been 
disseminated. Web 2.0 platforms can be registered in jurisdictions where law considers 
them not liable, or where enforcement is otherwise difficult. Further, various 
technological solutions are so simple to circumvent that legal protection anti-
circumvention measures had to be introduced. Finally, as discussed in Chapter Two, one 
of the characteristics of networking technologies is their ability to quickly evolve in 
order to circumvent technical and legal obstacles
1157
. Thus, notwithstanding the effort in 
creating and promoting technological answers, the results appear to be constantly 
limited to a soft deterrent more than an actual solution. 
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5.2.4.1 – Digital Right Management (DRM). - DRM1158 is the name given to 
technological protection measures designed to secure access—including subsequent 
copying—to digital material and enforce contractual agreements1159. The importance of 
protecting these measures was recognised by the WIPO Treaties
1160
 and also by the 
Copyright Directive
1161
. Consequently, national legislations
1162
 have made the 
circumvention of such technological protection serious offences. 
One positive point of the DRM systems is that they have encouraged the 
confidence of copyright holders in promoting new business models
1163
. However, it is 
submitted that they are not a solution to the problems described in this work, for the 
following reasons: 
1. If they were ‗effective‘ protections, they would not need to be legally protected. 
As a matter of terminology, if they are effective, they cannot be circumvented, 
and if they can be easily circumvented they are not effective, and are therefore not 
worth protecting
1164
. It appears that, as opposed to simplifying enforcement-
reducing infringement, they multiplied the ‗rights‘ to be enforced; 
2. In order to be fully effective, they have to be applied universally. A single 
unprotected file in a network multiplies exponentially, and the unauthorised files 
shared over the internet are normally DRM-free. This makes the technological 
protection measures applied to other versions of the file worthless; 
3. DRM can be so easily circumvented that, most of the time, they do not justify the 
investment in creating them. 
Therefore, their benefits are limited by a significant technological weakness
1165
. 
Moreover from a socio-political prospective, if they were effective, they may ultimately 
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create an environment in which all access to creative material is restricted; a ‗digital 
lock-up‘ world which is not favoured by most1166. Other concerns relate to the effects 
that DRM may have on uses traditionally accepted under copyright law
1167
. These 
technological measures can be used, for instance, to
1168
: 
 prevent access/copy to works not protected by copyright; 
 prevent insubstantial copying or reproduction otherwise permitted under copyright 
law; and 
 impose further limitations, such as the times a lawful purchaser can access a work. 
DRMs may permit the dissemination of works that, otherwise, the copyright 
owners might be reluctant to release, but they are arguably ineffective and may have an 
adverse impact on public access
1169
. The DRM experience is over —at least 
temporarily—for the music industry1170, whilst the system is still utilised by the film 
and videogames industry. 
 
5.2.4.2 – Monitoring. - Monitoring can take on two forms of detection: direct or 
indirect
1171
. Direct detection involves the copyright owner, or one of her/his agents, 
manually joining a network and exchanging data with the peers connected. This method 
is accurate; however, it is extremely costly and time-consuming. Indirect detection 
relies on WebCrawlers
1172
 and the databases of digital fingerprints, which report to the 
copyright owner or her/his agent when a potential infringement is taking place, and 
further details the alleged infringer‘s IP address. This method is cost-effective; however, 
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it may be inaccurate owing to the presence of a large amount of false-positive and false-
negative results. 
Monitoring produced an extensive literature
1173
. The latest softwares have been 
successful in detecting illegal transmissions as soon as they commenced, and are also 
effective against streaming transmission
1174
. Moreover, the latest deep-packet-
inspection tools allow the identification of the actual content of every packet 
transmitted
1175
. Nevertheless, most of the existing monitoring systems remain deficient, 
since they are inaccurate, arguably privacy-invasive, and cost-ineffective
1176
. 
 
5.2.4.3 – Filtering. - Filtering technologies comprise softwares concerned with 
examining for specified criteria, and subsequently blocking all material transmitted over 
a network. Filters were originally conceived as a defence against child pornography and 
their application: for instance, the Internet Watch Foundation has operated such a 
procedure and has been successful
1177
. Some service providers agree with some 
copyright owners concerning a set of principles, including the implementation of 
filters
1178
. Courts, however—such as those in the cases of Napster1179, Aimster1180, 
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Grokster
1181
, Sharman
1182
, Pirate Bay
1183
, Scarlet
1184
, etc.—have suggested ‗filtering 
tools or other mechanisms‘ should be implemented by technology and service providers 
to reduce copyright infringements. In Grokster, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer asked the court 
to impose a positive obligation to filter
1185
, notwithstanding the counter arguments that 
filtering technologies have ‗not been subjected to any significant public testing or 
scrutiny‘1186. It is debateable whether or not they can differentiate effectively between 
the infringing and non-infringing uses of protected material
1187
; they can be easily 
circumvented
1188
, and their costs are too high for ‗benefits that are at best 
uncertain‘1189. 
In general, whilst it is nevertheless understandable that courts request the 
imposition of filtering technology in the aforementioned cases, it is ultimately arguable 
whether filters would actually prevent the infringement and, more importantly, whether 
they are considered to be justifiable when taking into account the limitations which they 
may impose on freedom of expression, privacy, and access to knowledge, all of which 
are acceptable
1190
. Finally, it is submitted that copyright law is based on a degree of 
human interpretation and understanding, which cannot be obtained by a ‗machine‘. For 
instance, it is impossible for an automated system to recognise the fair dealings or fair 
use defences. 
 
5.2.4.4 – Disabling, Hardware Restrictions & Logic Bombs. - Other technological 
solutions have been suggested: for instance, internet access providers could block any 
traffic which is not transmitted through known servers; every computer could be 
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provided with a mechanism concerned with blocking every file that is not legitimately 
obtained. Finally, one could utilise logic bombs
1191
 to infect the computer of the 
infringing users. However, it is submitted that these solutions, even if technically 
possible, are too extreme to be considered. A workable solution should consider and 
respect the users‘ integrity as well as the rights of the copyright owners1192. 
 
5.2.5 – Towards a Shared Responsibility 
If the goal of copyright owners was controlling copying and distribution and realising 
royalty payments from networking technologies providers and users, the tactic of 
aggressive litigation employed  
‗was, to a degree, unnecessary and self-defeating‘1193. 
This simply led to more remote, secure, and de-centralised technologies. Sharman, 
Grokster, Pirate Bay, and lately Limewire and Newzbin, were still relatively easy 
targets, much like Napster. However, they provoked a natural and relatively easy 
strategic response—the moving of technology providers towards different jurisdictions. 
Moreover, the modern generations of networking technologies are open-source, free of 
charge, and particularly difficult—if not impossible—to monitor and block1194. 
Traditional theories of secondary liability are becoming insufficient
1195
, and the problem 
self-perpetuating
1196. Fighting online copyright infringement through standard courts‘ 
ruling has so far proved to be inadequate, slow and costly. Thus, some argue that a 
solution should be established in collaboration with internet access providers. 
 
5.3 – Collaboration with Internet Access Providers 
During recent years, different roles have been suggested for internet access providers, 
including: disclosing the identities of alleged infringers, enacting filters and traffic 
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management, and warning users concerning the illegality of file-sharing
1197
. The French 
and British ‗graduated responses‘ are recent examples of the attempt to address online 
copyright infringement with the collaboration of the intermediaries, which is currently 
under discussion at EU
1198
, international
1199
 and national
1200
 levels. The popularity of 
this approach and the reason similar modules are becoming popular is generally owing 
to the combination of a strong political message—copyright must be respected and 
infringement will be prosecuted—accordingly, splitting the associated costs of 
enforcement between copyright owners and the internet access providers. This concept 
is based on the assumption that: 
‗Rather than new copyright rules, an alternative enforcement system is 
needed‘1201. 
The ‗graduated response‘ can result from a statute, codes of practices, industry 
agreements, or otherwise ordered by a court. The approach is not without precedent. An 
example is the ICANN Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, which many suggest could 
be a quick and effective dispute resolution system for online copyright 
infringements
1202
. However, the aim ICANN is to resolve existing disputes, whilst the 
‗graduated response‘ intends to reduce copyright infringements focusing on the pre-
litigation phase
1203
. 
 
5.3.1 –France ‘Olivennes’, ‘Three Strikes’ or ‘Graduated Response’ 
The ‗Création et Internet‘ law established a new government agency called 
HADOPI
1204
 which had the objective to collect the IP address of alleged infringers sent 
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by copyright owners and to subsequently contact the relevant internet access providers. 
Upon receipt of this information, the internet access providers would send the alleged 
infringers an email in the first instance, subsequently followed by a registered letter, 
warning them about the consequences of their actions. Finally, if the users were found 
to continue with the infringing activities, the internet access provider would then 
disconnect their internet access for a period of three to twelve months
1205
. Moreover, 
special rules are defined in order to circumvent data protection issues, thereby allowing 
certain private parties to collect personal data and to transmit them to the authority
1206
. 
The National Assembly later rejected the HADOPI bill, simply because it was against 
the ‗innocent until proven guilty‘ principle and the users‘ right to access information1207. 
The latter point is of great interest: 
‗Freedom of expression and communication is so valuable that its exercise is a 
prerequisite for democracy
 
and one of the guarantees of respect for other rights 
and freedoms;
 
attacks on the exercise of this freedom must be necessary, 
appropriate
 
and proportionate to the aim pursued‘1208. 
Notwithstanding these remarks, the government resubmitted the law, HAPODI 
2
1209, creating a ‗fast-track‘ procedure before a judge. Under the current and applicable 
version of the law, the role of HADOPI is limited to prevention, whilst enforcement is 
left to ordinary courts. The law introduced a new statutory obligation for internet 
subscribers to control their internet connection, requiring users not to use their 
connection to reproduce or communicate to the public—including making available—
protected works
1210
. This monitoring obligation also requires subscribers to prevent 
third parties from infringing copyright through their connection. Upon a breach of this 
obligation, HADOPI would then send an email to internet subscribers through the 
internet access provider explaining the alleged infringer‘s legal obligation and the 
penalties he/she would incur for further breaches—the first strike. Upon a further breach 
experienced within six months, HADOPI would then send a second email along with a 
recorded-delivery letter—thereby comprising the second strike. Upon a further breach—
and consequent third warning—HAPODI would then report the infringer to a judge, 
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who would then be in a position to decide on the case following a non-adversarial 
hearing
1211
. The subscribers appear to have limited possibilities to challenge such an 
accusation. The sanctions include a fine, imprisonment, and/or suspension of the 
internet access. 
There are serious concerns regarding the consequences for subscribers of Wi-Fi 
connections—in particular open Wi-Fi connections, such as those commonly offered in 
public places—when the infringement is committed by third parties who access without 
authorisation. HADOPI sanctions the subscriber, not the infringer. Moreover, the 
notice‘s process is based upon an indirect detection system1212, which is arguably 
inaccurate and may consequently lead to litigation against innocent users
1213
. Most 
importantly, there are concerns regarding the strong limitations of the freedom of 
expression, which includes freedom to access the internet, and communication
1214
. 
‗The freedom of expression does not include a right to access a particular 
protected work‘1215; [excluding exceptional circumstances1216. However, it 
includes a] ‗right to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers‘1217. 
In a democratic society, limitations to internet access should be imposed under 
strict conditions: for instance, they should be prescribed law, necessary, and 
justifiable
1218
. However, users‘ ‗freedom of expression‘ is not the only argument to 
challenge the graduated response approach. For instance, as discussed in Chapter Two, 
the substantial investment undertaken by governments worldwide shows how the 
internet today plays a fundamental role in the global economy
1219
. Technologically 
advanced, widespread, cheaply accessible and reliable network infostructures enhance 
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productivity, but this requires uninterrupted connectivity. Therefore, disconnecting 
users from the internet may undermine their ‗integrity‘1220 not only potentially 
infringing their freedom of expression, but also their business and financial activity with 
potential direct economic consequences
1221
. Finally, it should be underlined how the 
margin of error in the identification of the potential infringers is hardly acceptable
1222
, 
and there is a tendency to overlook the fact that the notice of infringement generated by 
the copyright owners are simply ‗red flags‘ over potential unauthorised uses of 
protected materials and not un-appealable infringement sentences. 
Nevertheless, a study reveals that file-sharing traffic grew by 3% between 
September and December 2009—despite HADOPI—and that 30.3% of internet users in 
France still infringe copyright
1223
 (Figure 22). 
Figure 22 - Effect of HADOPI on Piracy
1224
 
 
The figure above shows how the ‗menace‘ of HADOPI did not change French 
downloading habits but rather shifted the sources used to obtain unauthorised copies of 
protected works. The use of file-sharing software decreased from 17.1% to 14.6% of 
internet users, but only because they increasingly migrated to streaming services and 
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file-hosting sites
1225
, which are not covered by the HADOPI
1226
. Notably, there are 
several alternative ways to circumvent HADOPI circulate over the internet
1227
. 
‗None of this is of any substance anyway. The feasibility of disconnecting a person 
from the internet, and any attempt to
 
police and enforce such a ban, smacks of the 
futile. It does
 
not require much imagination or initiative to conjure up ways
 
of 
returning and remaining online, and the rate at which telecommunications
 
technology facilitates greater ease of both terrestrial and
 
mobile broadband 
connection suggests that, even if a ban were
 
feasible today, it would be 
meaningless tomorrow‘1228. 
Finally, the costs of the system should be noted
1229
: the planned budget was Euro 
6.7 million per year; accordingly, internet access providers predict costs amounting to 
Euro 70 million per year
1230
; the cost of operating the infrastructure is approximately 
Euro 10-20 million per year
1231
. In addition, it should be considered that there are costs 
associated with the sending of thousands of warnings on a daily basis
1232
, as well as the 
costs for increasing the justice system‘s capacities to handle the appeals1233. It is 
submitted that, in all likelihood, such sums could have been better invested into 
compensating copyright owners. 
 
5.3.2 – Digital Economy Act 2010 
In the Digital Britain Report
1234
, there was no mention of disconnecting users from the 
internet. However, it was suggested at least to throttle copyright infringers‘ connections 
speed
1235
. Early proposals included an obligation for internet access providers to notify 
infringers, and to maintain data relating to such, as well as a code of practice to be 
complied by both internet access providers, and right holders in order to trigger 
actions
1236
. Notwithstanding the opposition of internet access providers and consumer 
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organisations, such as the Openright Group
1237
, on 7 April, the UK Parliament 
nevertheless passed the Digital Economy Act
1238
 to fight 
‗online infringement of copyright […] via a two-stage process. First by making 
legal action more effective and educating consumers about copyright on-line. 
Second through reserve powers, if needed, to introduce technical measures, such 
as disconnection‘1239. 
Clauses 4 to 16 introduced sections 124A to 124N to the Communication Act 
2003. The system imposed is different that of France, and is commonly referred to as 
the ‗two-stage‘ or ‗three-step‘ rather than ‗three strikes‘1240. The first stage requires two 
initial obligations for the internet access providers
1241
, which will be required to send 
letters to alleged infringing subscribers after a notification from the copyright 
owners
1242, and to accordingly collect information about ‗serious‘ infringers1243. Upon 
receipt of a court order, the provider must then disclose this information to the copyright 
holder who, after issuing a ‗final warning‘, can then proceed with legal action against 
the alleged infringer. The practical details will be agreed upon by the relevant entities in 
a Code of Practice approved by Ofcom
1244
. The second stage will start in April 2011 
following the assessment of the Secretary of State and Ofcom
1245
. The Secretary could 
oblige internet access providers to impose limits to the speed of the alleged infringers‘ 
internet connection, suspend the service or limit it in other ways
1246
. 
It is debateable whether or not such a system will fulfil the Government‘s 
objective to reduce online infringing activity by 70%. Already, in 2005, the BPI has sent 
hundreds of thousands of instant messages, such as the one shown in Figure 23 below, 
to users uploading files in the UK with arguably scarce results. 
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Figure 23 - Instant Messages 
  
 
5.3.3 – Ireland 
Eircom, the main internet access provider, agreed to the three-strikes-approach as part 
of a settlement agreement
1247
. The other Irish internet access providers, however, did 
not follow this example. The association of internet service providers of Ireland made it 
clear that they would take such action only if imposed by legislation
1248
 and lately this 
was confirmed by the High Court
1249
 
This formula, known as ‗private ordering‘ is not unprecedented in copyright law. 
In a sense it is understandable that copyright owners failing to succeed in the 
enforcement of their right through the law making process search for a solution 
elsewhere
1250
. The private ordering approach may strongly expand, or limit, the scope of 
protection beyond the carefully balanced boundaries of copyright protection. The use of 
private ordering may be costless in situations where the copyright owners want to limit 
                                                 
1247
 EMI (Ireland) Ltd v. Eircom Ltd. [2010] IEHC 108 (HC (Irl)). Nagle, E. [2010], To every cow its calf, 
to every book its copy - copyright and illegal downloading after EMI (Ireland) Ltd. and Others v. Eircom 
Ltd, 21(6) Ent.L.Rev. 209-214. 
1248
 Statement of 13 March 2009. www.ispai.ie/docs/20090313copyright.pdf. 17/6/09. 
1249
 EMI Records (Ireland) Ltd. et Al. v. UPC Communiactions Ltd , Charleton J. 11 October 2010. 
1250
 Dussollier, S. [2007], Sharing access to intellectual property through provate ordering, 82(3) 
Chicago-Kent L.Rev. 1391-1435, 1392. 
  176 
their own rights. However the situation is different when through private ordering the 
parties involved want to expand the scope, application and enforcement of copyright 
protection. In the graduated response scenario private ordering may have a cost for 
society as a whole that might be detrimental. This approach potentially jeopardises the 
rights and interests of third parties, undermining the balance of interests which is at the 
heart of the copyright regime. Users, for instance, do not take part in the drafting of this 
agreement, nor they are involved in the negotiation between the internet access 
providers and the copyright owners. Their interests cannot be taken into full account
1251
. 
 
5.3.4 – EU Telecom Package  
The key objective of the Telecom Package was to create a new telecommunication 
system throughout Europe which would increase the speed and access to 
communication technology for EU citizens
1252
. It caused heated debate, in particular 
concerning the issue of the right of access to the internet, which was eventually 
compromised
1253
. The amended Universal Service Directive
1254
 states: 
‗This Directive neither mandates nor prohibits conditions, imposed by providers 
of publicly available electronic communications and services, limiting end-users‘ 
access to, and/or use of, services and applications, where allowed under national 
law and in conformity with Community law, but lays down an obligation to 
provide information regarding such conditions. National measures regarding 
end-users‘ access to, or use of, services and applications through electronic 
communications networks shall respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
natural persons, including in relation to privacy and due process, as defined in 
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Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms‘1255. 
This should be read in conjunction with Recitals 29—limitations of user access—and 
30—no requirement to monitor. Notwithstanding the on-going arguments concerning 
internet freedom, net neutrality and the compatibility of proposed and enacted 
legislations regarding internet disconnection
1256
, it can be argued that: 
‗Three-strikes-laws‘, which could cut off Internet access without a prior fair and 
impartial procedure or without effective and timely judicial review, will certainly 
not become part of European law
1257
. 
The principle appears clear. Nevertheless, it is submitted that it will be a matter of 
interpretation determining at a national level what is ‗fair and impartial‘. 
 
5.3.5 – ACTA 
During the ‗stealth‘1258 phase of the Anti-Counterfeit Trade Agreement negotiations, it 
was suggested that the draft internet Chapter include provisions regarding internet 
access providers‘ policy for ‗terminating subscriptions and accounts‘ and ‗procedures 
governing the removal or disabling of access to information‘1259. In April, 2010, a 
‗Public Predecisional-Deliberative Draft‘ was published1260, followed by the EU Trade 
Commissioner declaration that: 
‗[…] the negotiation draft shows that specific concerns, raised in particular by 
the civil society, are unfounded. No party in the ACTA negotiation is proposing 
that governments should introduce a compulsory ‗3 strikes‘ or ‗gradual response‘ 
rule to fight copyright infringements and internet piracy‘1261 
However, Article 2.18, 3(a) Option 2, still includes the ‗possibility of establishing 
procedures‘ for ‗the removal/disabling of access to information‘. It has also been 
pointed out by the Digital Civil Rights in Europe that the proposal to limit the liability 
of internet access providers‘ immunities upon the adoption of policies to control their 
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networks is still in the text
1262
. At this point in time, no consolidated text is available. 
 
5.3.6 – Towards a Use without Liability 
‗George Orwell‘s vision of the loss of privacy assumed both a powerful 
technology and a powerful state. Indeed the State was powerful because it was 
able to control and exploit the technology. As symbolised by Big Brother, the state 
was able not only to collect information but to restrict the flow of information. Big 
Brother represented a model of powerful government with total control over a 
mass medium‘1263. 
The aforementioned proposals appear to be disproportioned
1264
; they increase the 
difficulties in terms of maintaining the delicate balance of interest within copyright 
law
1265
 and between copyright law, human rights
1266
, competition law, and e-commerce 
law
1267
. They will ultimately affect legitimate e-commerce
1268
, as well as the 
potentially-illegal market
1269
 for both legitimate and dubious goods and services
1270
, 
without taking into consideration the social and political contexts. 
File-sharing has undoubtedly normalised over time. What becomes normal 
becomes tolerable and, for a large portion of users, acceptable
1271
. Low-level illegality 
became part of life online
1272
. There is no published data concerning internet access 
provider knowledge regarding the behaviour of their customers
1273
. Thus, the impacts of 
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these proposals cannot be properly estimated.  
On the one side, the idea of monitoring every transmission, although possible in 
certain circumstances, is not a favourable solution. Internet access providers rely upon 
file-sharing. They are ‗copyright dependent‘ in the sense that the volume of their 
traffics, and therefore their income, would be considerably smaller without copyright 
infringement; this does not mean it is acceptable for them to flourish on illegality, but 
rather suggests that a total collaboration of internet service providers is improbable. On 
the other hand, users have grown accustomed to a certain degree of control and methods 
concerned with avoiding what is already common practice. Much of the information 
concerning the internet is empirical or anecdotal; however, studies show how the 
internet is the main information source for most of its users
1274
. Expanding across the 
population regardless of income, education, age, ethnicity or gender the internet is also a 
powerful democratic tool. The internet appears to be ‗indispensable‘, and banning 
someone from the internet for copyright infringement could be an extreme punishment. 
Courts, agencies and human rights‘ watchdog organisations have already expressed 
their concerns: a member of modern society cannot afford to be without internet 
access
1275
. As indicated by the European Parliament: 
‗Internet is a vast platform for cultural expression, access to knowledge, and 
democratic participation in European creativity, bringing generations together 
through the information society… [The Member States shall] avoid adopting 
measures conflicting with civil liberties and human rights and with the principles 
of proportionality, effectiveness and dissuasiveness, such as the interruption of 
Internet Access‘1276. 
Finally, the methods used to indentify infringers are debateable, as well as the 
liability for third party infringements. For instance, in the common scenario of a family-
or flat-sharers subscribing to a single internet connection, copyright infringements will 
cause the subscriber to be banned, even when he/she is not the infringer, with 
consequences for every family member or flat-mate accessing the internet from the 
same connection.  
Notwithstanding the above arguments against this approach, a ‗use with control 
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and liability‘ solution would nevertheless still leave the following issues open1277: 
international harmonisation; exclusive rights
1278
; user rights or limitations
1279
; 
intermediary liability
1280
; secondary or indirect liabilities
1281
; and licensing models
1282
. 
 
5.4 – Use with Control without Liability 
The benefits of a use with control without liability are numerous. Notwithstanding the 
reports of sales decreasing since the advent of networking technologies, users‘ demand 
for copyright works has increased
1283
. A viable solution aimed towards satisfying this 
demand could be licensing: it was deemed suitable for the radio and television 
broadcasting, and would probably be suitable for networking technologies, as proven by 
the late cooperation between service providers and some copyright owners
1284
. Legal 
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access to protected works online would facilitate access to culture and thereby provide 
the legal certainty deemed necessary to take full advantage of networking technologies, 
thereby benefitting society as a whole
1285
. Authors and performers would reach a global 
audience at virtually no costs
1286
; copyright owners would receive royalties whilst 
keeping some mechanisms for controlling and blocking infringing content with the 
collaboration of the online service providers. They would also save the significant costs 
in consideration of monitoring and enforcement. The service providers could offer—or 
at least continue to offer—a wide range of content increasing the number of their users, 
and consequently increasing the revenues. Furthermore, users could access content 
legally. Several business models have been suggested, and these are discussed in the 
following. 
 
5.4.1 – Open Access Licences 
A number of different schemes belong to this category, including copyleft, creative 
common, general public licence, and open source. The analysis of these models 
ultimately reaches beyond the scope of this work, but are nevertheless important. Their 
principal feature is that the copyright owner states in advance the uses he/she would like 
to authorise without further consent or licence fee
1287
. This form of licensing and the 
phenomenon itself of  
‗volunteer produced and freely disseminated information is a significant feature 
of the digitally networked environment‘1288. 
However, the majority of copyright owners—and in particular the entertainment 
industries—tend to reject such models.  
 
5.4.2 – Voluntary Licence Schemes 
Copyright owners could join and offer ‗voluntary collective licences‘1289. They could 
form a new collecting society—or use existing ones—invite authors, performers, and 
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publishers to join it, giving blanket licenses on non-discriminatory terms to everyone—
service and software providers, or users directly—in exchange for a fee. Licences could 
be offered through collecting societies, internet access and/or online service providers or 
the file-sharing software providers, or a combination of such entities
1290
. The collecting 
society would then divide the fees amongst its members. No changes to copyright law 
are required, but it would be compulsory that all copyright owners join. 
 
5.4.2.1 – EFF ‘A Better Way Forward’. - Since 2003, the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation has proposed a blanket voluntary collective licence. Their proposal is 
straightforward
1291
: the music industry should form a number of collecting societies and 
offer the user a ‗licence to share‘ in exchange of a regular fee1292. The sum collected 
would be divided between the copyright owners depending on their works‘ popularity. 
Users could acquire a licence through a website, or it could be included in the services 
offered by internet access and software providers. The advantages of such a system are 
underlined by EFF itself: copyright holders are remunerated, and the system does not 
involve new legislation. The proposal is limited to music file-sharing. It leaves many 
issues uncovered, but this could be solved by generalising the proposed licensing 
system
1293
. However, a major lacuna is that users could simply decide not to pay, which 
would force copyright owners to continue to search for, and accordingly enforce, their 
rights against the remaining ‗free-loaders‘. 
 
5.4.2.2 – GILA System. - Professor Sterling‘s global internet licensing has a more 
general and direct approach to such issues. It covers every digital work and is global
1294
. 
A global internet licensing agency (GILA) should be establishment by existing 
collecting societies to administer the licensing of protected material on the internet 
without territorial restriction. GILA would receive mandate to administer the making 
available right from the copyright owners directly or otherwise from the existing 
collecting societies. All this material would ultimately form the GILA repertoire. Every 
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item would be provided with a ‗GILA Identification Number‘ (GIN), thereby permitting 
the administration of rights and the tracing of online use of such item. The GILA 
website would then contain the details of every item and of various available licences. 
Users and technology providers could then apply to GILA to obtain a global licence. 
The royalties collected would then be distributed amongst the concerned right owners. 
In principle the system enables per-use payments to be made to the right owners. 
However, this proposal relies on global acceptance and a successful identification 
system (GIN). One of the main characteristics of unauthorised file-sharing is the cost-
free act of sharing. Thus, one could argue that a number of users would not apply for the 
licence but would instead continue sharing, regardless the potential liabilities for 
copyright infringement, non-GIN files
1295
, which would multiply exponentially and 
consequently nullify the efforts. 
 
5.4.3 - Digital Retailer Models 
‗Since P2P computing takes place on the Internet and all P2P users use ISPs to 
get access to the Internet, ISPs could play an important role in a possible 
solution‘1296. 
Sobel suggests a digital retailer model. The internet access providers would have an 
obligation to monitor users‘ protected file downloads requiring payment, and bill them 
for the received content periodically
1297
. This would be achieved by digital watermark 
or fingerprint embedded within the content itself. The weakness of such an approach is 
that watermark detection at user level is likely to be ineffective
1298
; the filtering system 
operated by the internet access provider will increase the associated costs
1299
. In 
addition, there are privacy concerns, as the internet access provider would keep detailed 
records of received content for billing purposes; and that this system could create 
artificially high pricing structures
1300
. However, an important innovation to be noted is 
the suggested pay-per-redistribution model
1301
.  
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5.4.4 – Towards a Use without Control 
Voluntary collective licensing depends on the participation of all copyright owners, 
users and facilitators. This is difficult to achieve; therefore, a voluntary solution is 
improbable. The main critique to this approach is that the national licensing structures 
do not work well with networking technologies: for instance there is no international or 
regional licensing system
1302
. There are alternatives; however, it is suggested that they 
would nevertheless still require the abandonment of the pre-networking technologies 
concept of ‗control‘, as will be discussed in the following Chapter. Preliminarily, it 
should be underlined how desiring ‗use without control‘ is different from arguing 
towards a ‗free from copyright internet‘.  
Some commentators assert copyright law does not fit into the internet
1303
. This 
being a consequence of a true information society
1304
: ‗information wants to be free‘1305. 
They argue that the law is incapable of keeping pace with technological developments. 
Therefore, technology—not the law—should govern the internet. Some consider 
copyright law to be inappropriate in the context of digital distribution, and accordingly 
suggest maintaining copyright law for analogue distribution whilst replacing it with a 
privilege allowing users to engage in non-commercial activities in the internet 
context
1306
. Some argue that, in the past, copyright over the internet was superfluous 
simply because users have their own etiquette. They are responsible and qualified to 
settle everything without the need of an external intervention of the law
1307
. They argue 
that  
‗the internet began as and should remain a medium for the free exchange of 
information, ideas and content‘1308. 
This no-copyright approach forms the basis of ‗the Pirate Party‘—a political movement 
started in Sweden and present in the UK
1309
 and other European Countries
1310
. 
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Notwithstanding the arguments pro and against the concern of copyright, it is 
submitted that networking technologies should be ‗free‘ in the sense that everyone 
should have access to the medium, and should be able to access such without civil 
liberties being compromised. Moreover, networking technologies should be neutral in 
the sense of being free from restrictions on content or modes of communication 
allowed
1311. However, they should not be ‗free‘ from copyright. In fact: 
‗It is intellectual property that provides the key to the distribution of wealth, 
power and access in the information society. The intellectual property regime 
could make--or break--the educational, political, scientific, and cultural promise 
of the net … Intellectual Property is the legal form of the information age‘1312. 
Today, a consistent part of the content shared on the internet is protected by 
copyright and is not authorised. Copyright owners have significant difficulties in 
convincing users that they should pay for the works they download and access
1313
. 
Nevertheless, ‗Copyright has adapted in the past; it will again‘1314 
 
5.5 – Conclusion 
Networking technologies undermine copyright owners‘ control over reproduction and 
distribution. It is submitted that any attempt to reinstate old rules in relation to 
enforcement or otherwise concerned with increasing copyright control with alternative 
methods is an ‗exercise in futility‘1315. The real problem is that the entertainment 
industries and the collective societies seem to be trapped in business models where 
content has to be paid for directly. Legal alternatives and civil and criminal enforcement 
actions have so far failed to decrease traffic over networks, but it appears not to put 
pressure on copyright owners
1316
. The only consequence is that the unauthorised 
dissemination of copyright work continues without generating revenues for anyone, 
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perpetuating and extending the already difficult problems of today‘s copyright 
environment
1317
. In January, 2008, the ‗Attali Commission‘1318 issued a report on 
policies to overcome economic growth‘s restrictions1319, and subsequently collected 
hundreds of proposals including a levy on internet use, presented ‗as a reconciliation of 
economic development and free legal downloading‘1320. 
The report suggests that filtering and monitoring conflict with constitutional rights 
and fundamentally undermine economic growth, and subsequently concluded that a levy 
on internet access providers would ensure a fair compensation for authors and other 
copyright owners without penalising internet development
1321
. We continue the 
investigative journey analysing this approach in the following Chapter. 
                                                 
1317
 Litman, J.D. [2004], op.cit., 33-34 
1318
 The Commission for freeing French development. 
1319
 Attali, J. [2008], Rapport de la Commission pour la libération de la croissance française, 
www.liberationdelacroissance.fr/files/rapports/RapportCLCF.pdf. [15/08/2010]. 
1320
 Ibid. Objective leading to Action 57. 
1321
 Ibid. Decision on Action 57. 
  187 
CHAPTER 6 
A Way Forward 
- 
‗You‘d better start swimmin‘ or you‘ll sink like a stone, for the times, they are a-changing‘1322 
 
6.1 - Introduction  
As the previous Chapters have shown, a number of scholars have proposed alternatives 
to the problems described in this work, thereby urging the need for a new system which 
allows the online dissemination of protected works whilst charging users to compensate 
authors and other copyright owners
1323
. Arguably copyright, as it is today, does not 
meet the needs of a functioning information society. A voluntary alternative is not 
emerging. Therefore, solutions involving a legislative intervention-such as compulsory 
licenses, mandatory collective administration and remuneration systems-become 
relevant
1324
. The spectrum of possibilities is reduced, although remains wide and 
appropriate
1325
 to preserve the 
‗balance between the right of authors and the larger public interest, particularly 
education, research and access to information‘1326. 
It is submitted that ‗control over dissemination‘ is, in all likelihood, an out-dated 
concept, highly costly, and potentially dangerous for technological innovation and 
users‘ rights. Nevertheless, unless considering copyright an illegitimate form of 
property, one is unable to argue a public interest to use copyright works without 
compensating the owners. A ‗copyright-free internet‘ is not a workable hypothesis1327. 
Thus, the following approaches analysed in this Chapter 
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  188 
‗are mainly based on the very same idea: authorise the exchange of works and 
allow for payment to the rightful owners‘1328.  
The author‘s proposal concludes this analysis. 
 
6.2 - The Precedents 
 
6.2.1 - Private Copy Levy System 
‗Early laws on copyright were not concerned with the kind of small-scale hand-
made reproduction that occurred in homes or at the work place. Private copying 
exemptions, in one form or the other, have existed in many copyright laws since 
the earliest of times‘1329. 
The reasoning for this can be traced back to 1880, when Kohler suggested that the right 
of reproduction should be infringed only when the copying of the work 
‗is intended to serve as a means of communicating [the work] to others‘1330. 
The justifications of private copying exceptions can be found in the necessity to protect 
users‘ privacy, to restore the copyright ‗balance‘ when licensing and enforcement are 
impractical, and to promote the creativity of prospective authors facilitating the access 
to existing works. In other words, 
‗a form of compensation for right holders based on the premise that an act of 
private copying cannot be licensed for practical purposes and thus causes 
economic harm to the relevant right-holders‘1331. 
Private copy exceptions are provided generally on the condition that copyright 
owners are fairly compensated for the acts of private copying
1332
. This reflects the 
‗remuneration principle‘, but this should not be confused with the term ‗equitable 
remuneration‘1333. 
‗While the notion of ‗equitable remuneration‘ is based on the assumption that 
authors are entitled to remuneration for every act of usage of their protected 
works, fair compensation is linked to the possible harm that derives from acts of 
private copying. Fair compensation is for the harm that could result from the act 
                                                 
1328
 Bernault-Lebois [2005], op.cit. Para. 23. 
1329
 Helberger-Hugenholtz [2007], No place like home for making a copy: private copying in European 
copyright law and consumer law, 22 B.T.L.J. 1060-1098, 1065. For instance, UrhG 1876 and the Dutch 
Copyright Act 1912. 
1330
 Kohler, J. [1880], Das Autorrecht, 230; quoted in Helberger-Hugenholtz [2007], op.cit. 1065. 
1331
 European Commission [2008], Fair compensation for acts of private copying, ec.europa.eu/internal_ 
market/copyright/docs/levy_reform/background_en.pdf. [10/08/2010]. 
1332
 Article 5(2)(b) and Recital 35, Copyright Directive. Not always, for instance: §29 CDPA. 
1333
 Articles 4(4) and 8(2), Rental and Lending Directive. 
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of private copying itself‘1334. 
The Copyright Directive does not specify a particular form of fair 
compensation
1335
, but many Member States impose levies upon recording equipment 
and/or blank media, which are ultimately paid for by the users
1336
. The media and 
equipments on which the levies are applied constantly expanded over time. Today, they 
include, depending on the jurisdiction, memory sticks, flash drives, blank CD/DVD, 
computer hard drives, scanners, printers, CD/DVD writers, MP3 players, and mobile 
phone with internal memory
1337
. These levies are gathered by collecting societies and 
accordingly used to compensate the copyright owners. However, there are other means 
to providing fair compensation
1338
.  
Notwithstanding the legal nature of the private copy has not been fully clarified 
yet -limitation, right or privilege- the system proved to be valuable in the past. 
Therefore, it has been argued that levies are likely to be the best available solution to 
redressing the ‗harm‘ caused by private digital copying1339, and it has been suggested 
that a levy system could readdress the ‗harm‘ caused by networking technologies. The 
private copy exception could be simply extended, adapting the existing remuneration 
systems to the new medium. Internet access providers, in a sense, provide the 
‗equipment‘, and could pass the payment of the levies to the users: 
‗This solution seems compatible with the international treaties given that 
conditions of the three step test are satisfied. The private copy made by the 
Internet user constitutes a ‗special case‘ which ‗does not conflict with the normal 
                                                 
1334
 European Commission [2008], op.cit. The ECJ interpreted the notion of ‗equitable remuneration in 
Stichting ter Exploitatie van Naburige Rechten (SENA) v. Nederlandse Omroep Stichting (NOS), C-
245/00 ECJ, 6 February 2003, 1251, §36. The ECJ stressed that the equitable character of remuneration 
must consider ‗the value of that use in trade‘ (§37), which ‗brings the notion of equitable remuneration 
closer to that of compensation‘. Dussolier-Ker [2009], op.cit. 354. 
1335
 Some authors argue that the Copyright Directive rejected the levy-style remuneration schemes. They 
believe that using the word ‗permit‘ instead of ‗require‘ in Article 5.2(b) was a missed opportunity of 
harmonisation. Commentators have criticised the Copyright Directive, and even suggested it could be 
invalidated, for failing to achieve harmonisation by leaving the implementation of 20 out of the 21 
exceptions contained in Article 5 to the discretion of Member States. Hugenholtz, B. et al. [2003], The 
future of levies in a digital environment, Institute for Information Law, Faculty of Law, University of 
Amsterdam, www.ivir.nl/publications/other/DRM&levies-report.pdf. [10/08/2010]. 
1336
 As mentioned in Para 1.4, the levy system was firstly introduced in 1965 in Germany and quickly 
exported in Europe and beyond. Hugenholtz, B. [2003], op.cit. 501-502. With the exception of the UK 
and Ireland. Malta and Luxembourg have a private copying exception, but not a levy system. European 
Commission [2008], op.cit. Copyright Levy Reform Alliance [2006], Analysis of National Levy Schemes 
and the EU Copyright Directive, www.bitkom.org/files/documents/LegalStudy-100413A1.pdf. 
[15/08/2010]. 
1337
 For details, European Commission [2008], op.cit.  
1338
 For instance, Norway provides ‗fair compensation‘ by means of a state-run fund. European 
Commission [2008], op.cit. 
1339
 A levy or limited tax on copying technology and storage media for private copying is ‗inescapable‘. 
Lunney, G.S. [2001], op.cit. 911-20. 
  190 
exploitation of the work or other protected subject matter‘ and which does not 
cause ‗any unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of the author‘1340. 
This would compensate the copyright owners for the ‗harm‘ caused by the 
infringements
1341
. The adaptability and flexibility of the private copying exception to 
new social and technical scenarios could guarantee a number of practical benefits
1342
. 
Thus, various scholars and commentators suggest a levy on broadband or, perhaps more 
generally, internet connections
1343
. 
 
6.2.2 - Compulsory Licence 
‗A compulsory licensing scheme is one where the government requires that 
copyright owners make their work available to users at a fixed price‘1344. 
Compulsory licences
1345
 have been often used in the past in order to resolve 
copyright issues created by new technologies when copyright owners could not agree on 
licensing terms—in particular in the US1346. The first compulsory licence was adopted 
                                                 
1340
 Bernault-Lebois [2005], op.cit. 
1341
 Ibid. The downloader/accessor is undoubtedly the one taking the initiative to reproduce and could 
benefit from a private copy exception under certain circumstances. In France, for instance, Article L 122-
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1342
 Geiger, C. [2010], The future of copyright in Europe: striking the balance between protection and 
access to information‘, 1 I.P.Q. 1-14; Geiger, C. [2009], Implementing an international instrument for 
interpreting copyright limitations and exceptions, I.I.C. 627; Geiger, C. [2008], op.cit.; Geiger, C. [2008], 
Flexibilising copyright, I.I.C. 178. 
1343
 In 2009, it was reported that the Isle of Man was considering the introduction of a broadband levy, but 
no further details are available.
 
www.nytimes.com/2009/01/19/business/worldbusiness/19digital.html?_r 
=1. In August 2010 a similar proposal has been put forward in Brazil. www.compartilhamentolegal.org/ 
compartilhamento. English translation: pedroparanagua.net/2010/09/02/brazils-proposal-on-monetizing-
p2p. [14/09/2010]. It should be noticed that a tax on broadband was considered in the UK. Lord Carter 
proposed an internet levy of £20 a year to pay the cost of the graduated response. 
technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/article5607744.ece. The proposal disappeared from 
the Digital Economy Act. [15/08/2010]. 
1344
 Liebowitz, S.J. [2003], Alternative copyright systems: the problem with a compulsory license, 
www.utdallas.edu/~liebowit/intprop/complpff.pdf. [15/08/2010]. 
1345
 The UrhG describes statutory remuneration rights (gesetzliche Vergütungsansprüche) or statutory 
licences regarding private copying as opposed to compulsory licenses-where the right holder is obliged to 
grant a licence according to a specific procedure. For instance, see the terminology used in Article 15 
Rome Convention. Guibault, L.M.C.R. [2003], Copyright limitations and contracts. An analysis of the 
contractual overridability of limitation on copyright, Information Law Series Vol. 9, The Hague, 20-27. 
A different view is expressed in Ricketson, S. [2003], op.cit. 4. In contrast, US copyright law and 
literature use the terms compulsory license and statutory license synonymously. Goldstein, P. [2002], 
Copyright, 2
nd
 ed. Aspen Law and Business, §5.8.6.2. 
1346
 ‗Some compulsory licenses have been moderately successful, but their general track record is 
disappointing. At best, these licenses should be viewed as interim arrangements to preserve a balance 
between the extremes of full and no liability during periods of technological or other change‘. Botein-
Samuels [2005], ‗Compulsory licenses in peer-to-peer files sharing: a workable solution?‘ 30 Southern 
Illinois University L.J. 69-83. 
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in 1909 for the player piano
1347
, followed by the compulsory licences for the 
jukebox
1348
, digital audio home-recording
1349
, digital performance right in sound 
recordings
1350
, cable
1351
, public broadcasting
1352
, satellite retransmission
1353
, and local-
to-local retransmission
1354
. Compulsory licences oblige copyright owners to license 
their works, generally in exchange of a fair compensation
1355
. This led various 
commentators to consider whether or not such an adoption of another compulsory 
licensing system could be a workable solution to the problems discussed in this 
work
1356
. 
 
6.2.3 - Mandatory & Extended Collective Managements 
When technology evolution makes the exercise of exclusive rights increasingly difficult 
for the single copyright owner, the logical solution appear to establish organisations to 
manage collectively the rights of groups of copyright owners. In the traditional system, 
copyright owners authorise these organisations so as to exercise some, or all, of their 
rights and to accordingly collect remunerations
1357
. This collective administration is not 
limited to exclusive rights; it may also involve remuneration rights. In some scenarios, 
this collective administration might be compulsory. 
Mandatory collective management systems impose the exercise of rights through 
a single interlocutor: a collective society
1358
. A number of Directives in Europe impose 
this system for cable retransmission
1359
, rental rights
1360
 and resale rights
1361
. In France, 
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 The compulsory licence for mechanical reproduction of phonorecords. USC §1(e) (1909); now 
preserved in USC §115 (2000). 
1348
 Former USC §116; repealed and replaced in 2003. 
1349
 USC §1003–07 (2000). 
1350
 USC §114(d)–(h) (2000). 
1351
 USC §111 (1976). 
1352
 USC §118 (2000). 
1353
 USC §119 (2000). 
1354
 USC §122 (2000). 
1355
 The compensation methods vary, for instance, subscriptions or levies. Netanel, N.W. [2003], op.cit. 
Gordon [2003], ‗How compulsory license for internet might help music industry woes, Entertainment Law 
& Finance (May). http://stevegordonlaw.com/compulsory_license.html. [15/08/10]. However, alternative 
methods could be used, including as advertisement revenue sharing, micro-refunds. No one of the above 
is exclusive. For details about alternative compensation systems, see www.iuma.com, www.emusic.com, 
www.artistdirect.com, and www.templetons.com/brad/dontpay.html. [12/08/2010]. 
1356
 Netanel, N.W. [2003], op.cit. 
1357
 Ficsor, M. [2003], Collective management of copyright and related rights at triple crossroads: should 
it remain voluntary or may be ‗extended‘ or made mandatory? Copyright Bulletin, October. 
1358
 Gervais, D.J. [2006], Collective management of copyright and related rights, Kluwer Law 
International. von Lewinski, S. [2004], Mandatory collective administration of exclusive rights-a case 
study on its compatibility with international and EC copyright law, e-Copyright Bulletin. portal.unesco. 
org/culture/en/ev.php-url_id=19552&url_do=do_topic&url_section=201.html. [12/08/2010]. 
1359
 Article 9.1, Satellite & Cable Directive. 
1360
 Article 4, Rental & Lending Directive. 
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for example, this system is also in use for the reprography right. Extended collective 
licensing is a mechanism which permits collective societies to negotiate licensing 
agreements without authorisation when the copyright owner is unknown or non-
locatable
1362
. The system has also been in use in Nordic countries
1363
 for licensing the 
broadcasting right since the 1960s, and more recently has been extended to the right of 
reproduction
1364
. Notwithstanding the risks concerning the increasing of negotiating 
power of collective societies, these systems have been suggested as possible ways to 
‗legalise file-sharing‘1365. 
 
6.3 - Early Proposals 
 
6.3.1 - Synthesis of Broadband Levies Schemes 
Netanel suggests allowing users to share files and compensating copyright owners with 
a levy on products and services benefitting from file-sharing
1366
. The Levy would be 
divided by organisations representing copyright owners
1367
. The value of the levy 
should be determined via industry agreements, the absence of which would activate 
mandatory arbitration proceedings designed to ensure authors are provided with a fair 
return and users pay a fair levy
1368
. The levy would be shared between copyright owners 
in proportion to how many times their works are downloaded. However, it is open to 
doubt whether current watermarking and sampling technologies are capable of such 
monitoring, and therefore helpful in compiling the aggregate usage statistics
1369
. Ku also 
suggests introducing a levy on internet service subscriptions, and thereby measuring the 
extent of downloads and other uses of digital works with heavy tracking and 
                                                                                                                                               
1361
 Article 6.2, Resale Directive. 
1362
 EU High Level Expert Group [2008], Final report on digital preservation, orphan works, and out-of-
print works, ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/digital_libraries/doc/hleg/reports/copyright/copy 
right_ subgroup_final_report_26508-clean171.pdf. [12/08/2010]. 
1363
 Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. 
1364
 www.kopinor.org/layout/set/print/content/view/full/2090. [12/08/2010]. 
1365
 Bernault-Lebois [2005], op.cit. 
1366
 Examples include software providers, internet access providers, computer and consumer electronics 
manufacturers, storage media and wireless communications equipment. 
1367
 In order to share the sums provided by the levy, Netanel suggests the use of sampling and tracking 
technologies. Netanel, N.W. [2003], op.cit. 35-39 
1368
 This assessment ‗should also reflect the relative roles of the copyright holders and levy payers in 
making the copyrighted works available to the public, taking into account their respective creative 
contribution, technical contribution, capital investment, cost, and risk‘. Ibid. 28. 
1369
 Ibid. 37-38. 
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monitoring
1370
.  
These examples show that a levy solution forms a compromise between ever-
expanding exclusivity and abandonment of copyright. They are attempts to achieve an 
acceptable degree of remuneration whilst minimising restrictions imposed on users
1371
. 
 
6.3.1.1 - Critique. The levy approach satisfies the proposed requirement of 
compensation and technology innovation, but ultimately still raises concerns regarding 
user integrity owing to the fact that they rely on the extensive monitoring of user 
activities so as to afford a distribution of levy funds concomitant to actual 
consumption
1372
. The system appears workable, but not without problems: for instance, 
it might penalise those users who do not infringe copyright. However, the main obstacle 
to this approach appears to be what has been defined as the ‗phasing-out‘ principle1373: 
‗DRM makes it possible to compensate right holders directly for the particular 
uses made of a work. Where such individual rights management is available there 
would appear to remain no need, and no justification, for mandatory levy 
systems‘1374. 
As previously discussed, DRMs are not the universal remedy that some 
promote
1375
. It is submitted that technological protection measures cannot the guarantee 
the economic return private copy levies provide. Thus, 
‗the phasing out rule would only be a cure administered to the wrong illness‘1376. 
Levies systems are still a valuable form of remuneration; in particular, when the process 
of dissemination is horizontal and ‗remuneration‘ needs to be created, collected and re-
                                                 
1370
 Ku, R.S.R. [2002], op.cit. 311-315; Ku, R.S.R. [2003], Consumers and creative destruction: fair use 
beyond market failure, 18 B.T.L.J. 539, 566. 
1371
 Ganley, P. [2004], op.cit. 
1372
 Netanel suggests the monitoring of all subsequent uses of works would be preferable. Netanel, N.W. 
[2003], op.cit. 37-38. For a discussion on DRM and privacy, see Ganley, P. [2004], op.cit. 268-272. 
1373
 Reinbothe, J. [2002], The legal framework for digital rights management, Digital Rights Management 
Workshop, Brussell, 28 February. Samnadda, J. [2002], Technical measures, private copying and levies: 
prospective in implementation, 10
th
 Annual Conference on International Intellectual Property Law & 
Policy, 4-5 April. 
1374
 Hugenholtz, B. et al [2003], op.cit. For instance, Article 5.2(b) Copyright Directive states that ‗fair 
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with the unilateral decision by rightholders to apply them. Vinje, T.J. [2000], Should we begin digging 
copyright‘s grave? 22(12) E.I.P.R. 551-562, 555. 
1375
 Para. 5.2.4.1. 
1376
 Dusollier-Ker [2009], op.cit. 371. 
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distributed
1377
.  
 
6.3.2 - Synthesis of Mandatory & Extended Collective Administration 
Gervais suggested modifying the existing collective licensing to extend it to file-
sharing
1378
, subjecting the making available right to mandatory collective 
management
1379
. This would force collective societies to license certain uses on a fair, 
non-discriminating basis
1380
. Von Lewinski analysed the feasibility of a making 
available right mandatory collective management provision in Hungarian copyright 
law
1381
, affirming its conformity with international and European copyright law. The 
model was further analysed by Bernault & Lebois under the supervision of Lucas
1382
, 
who conclude it was feasible. The study concludes that, adapting the existing system of 
remuneration, downloading could be covered by the private copying exception, and 
further suggests a mandatory collective management for the ‗making available‘ right. 
The study also emphasises the efficiency of the precedent collective managements for 
reprography, and cable broadcast
1383
. 
‗Compulsory collective management is not perceived as reversing the 
fundamental principles of copyright, but instead ‗reinforcing and (…) organising 
the protection granted to authors against infringements of their fundamental 
rights‘1384. 
It appears to be a workable solution, but has the risk of increasing the power and 
control of the collective societies
1385. The proposal was named ‗Global Licence‘ in 
France in 2005
1386
, and was supported by politicians from very different backgrounds. 
The Alliance Public Artistes commissioned two studies on the feasibility of the model 
from a technical
1387
 and economic
1388
 perspective. The proposal implementing the 
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Global Licence was subsequently discussed
1389
, but ultimately was not included in the 
final version of the DAVDSI law. It was contended that the Global Licence was a 
‗communist measure‘; that the method for apportioning the money raised was unreliable 
and would have failed to provide enough revenue; and, finally, that it would have not 
been three-step-test compliant. These arguments are not convincing, as will be 
explained in the following
1390
.  
Finally, Aigrain includes the application of extended collective licence schemes in 
the different possible legal solutions to unauthorised file-sharing
1391
, and NEXA shares 
this position
1392
. 
 
6.3.3 - Bipolar Copyright Systems 
Fisher, in his administrative compensation system, suggests replacing copyright law 
with an licence and a ‗tax‘1393. The system would be voluntary. Copyright owners, 
desiring remuneration for the use of their work online, would register their works to a 
government agency. The agency would then subsequently monitor the use of such 
works online, and share between the registered copyright owners the remuneration 
collected by a ‗taxing‘ internet access providers1394. Lessig proposes the temporary 
introduction of a similar system until licensed streaming replaces file-sharing
1395
. 
Litman suggests that copyright owners should choose between authorising the 
‗sharing‘ of their works and being compensated by blanket fee or levy/tax; and 
‗hoarding‘ their works in exclusively exploited online ventures, DRM-secured1396. The 
default rule would be ‗sharing‘, but copyright owners could ‗opt out‘ of the system1397. 
Copyright owners could choose between the two systems according to the particular 
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1393
 Fisher, W.W. [2004], op.cit. 
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circumstances of each case. Governmental agencies are not involved. It is a market-
based, decentralised solution, which recognises self-determination as a core value of 
copyright in general
1398
. 
 
6.3.3.1 - Critique. - The system is of an extreme complexity. The efforts in establishing 
and organising the system in practice may outbalance the benefits of leaving the 
copyright owner the freedom to choose
1399
. Notwithstanding this, Paukert argues that 
such an approach would not be three-step-test compliant
1400
, and thereby suggests an 
opt-in approach whereby, in order to enjoy the remuneration from a levy/tax, the right 
holders would have to register the works with the competent authority; if not, the use 
will be unauthorised and thus infringing
1401
. This solution does not raise doubts as to 
whether it is in accordance with treaty obligations under Berne, TRIPS, Copyright 
Directive or the WIPO Treaties, nor does it limit the enjoyment or exercise of exclusive 
rights by law. However, it could be argued that the model would only give copyright 
owners an incentive to accept lawful non-commercial file-sharing, but the situation 
would remain unchanged for the copyright owners who do not want this alternative 
distribution channel. The questions concerning this model are therefore practical, 
mainly concerned with how to persuade copyright owners to accept it, and whether or 
not they are any different from a voluntary licence. 
 
6.3.3.2 - The System in Practice. - Interestingly, however, a number of projects have 
been realised under this bipolar approach. Fisher created a software which tracks how 
many times a file is played, and periodically submits such data to the service 
providers—Noank Media Inc.1402. In July 2008, he launched a beta-trial together with 
Cyberport
1403
 and some copyright owners registered their works in the system. Users 
can gain access to the catalogue in exchange of fees, which are, in the large part, passed 
to the copyright owners. Griffin
1404
 set up Choruss
1405
, an experiment based on audio 
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1399
 On a necessary ‗new simplicity‘ in dealing with copyright, see Bechtold, S. [2004] ‗Das Urheberrecht 
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fingerprint
1406
. An interesting project that came close to launch was PlayLouder
1407
 but 
was abandoned, probably because of the entertainment industries‘ plans for a ‗graduated 
response‘ approach1408. Another example is Qtrax1409. 
The Swedish music-collecting society allows Swedish internet access providers to 
offer ‗legal file-sharing subscriptions‘ to their customers1410. In France, Neuf 
Cegetel
1411
, an internet access provider, offers its subscribers the possibility of un-
limited downloading from the Universal Music‘s catalogue for a monthly fee1412. 
Similarly, the Danish Play
1413
, mobile and wire-based broadband providers, such as 
Omnifone
1414
, Orange
1415
, TeliaSonera
1416, and Nokia, have a ‗come with music‘ 
service
1417
. Although they are downloading rather than file-sharing services and are 
limited to music, such experiments show a tendency to accept flat-rate approaches. 
 
6.3.4 - Synthesis of New Rights 
Lincoff proposed the creation of an ‗online transmission right for musical works and 
                                                                                                                                               
epicenter/2008/12/warner-music-gr. www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/03/17/chorussscovenant-the-promis 
ed-land-maybe-for-record-labels-a-lesser-destinationfor-everyone-else. 12/08/2010]. 
1405
 www.theregister.co.uk/2008/12/11/griffin_choruss. [12/08/2010]. 
1406
 www.thelicensingplate.com/jim-griffin-discusses-chorussin-digital-music-forum. [12/08/2010]. 
1407
 playlouder.com. [12/08/2010]. 
1408
 www.theregister.co.uk/2009/01/23/virgin_puts_legal_p2p_on_ice. www.paidcontent.co.uk/entry/419-
fourmore-isps-join-music-piracy-letter-scheme-extended-to-film. playlouder.com now welcome the users 
with this message: ‗Thank you for using the old Playlouder.com. We are sorry to say goodbye to it, but 
we have been working on something much better. We are not ready to tell you what it is yet, but check 
back here from time to time so you are the first to know‘. playlouder.com. [12/08/2010]. 
1409
 music.qtrax.com. www.wired.com/listening_post/2008/01/major-labels-al. www.afterdawn.com/news 
/archive/14544.cfm. www.afterdawn.com/news/archive/17586.cfm. [12/08/2010]. 
1410
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1d66451cbe1b0f81c12573f4002e1ccc. www.stim.se/stim/prod/stimv4eng.nsf/productions/b5ca55f631b0f 
152c125759e0030bd74/$file/pirates_filesharers_music_users.pdf. [12/08/2010]. 
1411
 Neuf Music. www.neufmusic.fr/home.php. www.groupeneufcegetel.fr/html/en/Press/cps/Neuf_ 
Cegetel_adds_unlimited_legal_music_downloads_to_its_100_Neuf_Box_service.html. [12/08/2010]. 
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 This was simple to achieve given the fact that Vivendi owns both Universal Music and 40% of Neuf 
Cegetel. www.marketwatch.com/news/story/french-broadband-providerneuf-cegetel/story.aspx?guid=%7 
be17f6781-aa1e-4269-81c5-32cf7a84aae8%7d. [12/08/2010]. 
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 musik.tdconline.dk. tdc.com/publish.php?id=16268, www.themusicvoid.com/?p=355#more-355, 
designit.com/latest/news/tdc-play-wins-international-acclaim. [12/08/2010]. 
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 www.omnifone.com, www.paidcontent.co.uk/entry/419-vodafone-offers-flat-rate-all-you-can-eat-mus 
ic-downloads-omnifones-fir, www.nytimes.com/2009/02/17/technology, www.guardian.co.uk/business/2 
009/feb/16/bskyb-digital-musicservice. [12/08/2010]. 
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 arstechnica.com/gadgets/news/2008/06/orange-takes-on-nokiascomes-with-music-with-musique-max. 
[12/08/2010]. 
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 www.moconews.net/entry/419-swedish-carrier-teliasonera-startsunlimited-music-subscription-offerin. 
[12/08/2010]. 
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 www.theregister.co.uk/2009/02/09/totally_titsup. www.nokia.com/a4136001?newsid=256586. www. 
gulli.com/news/nokia-comes-with-musicbald-2009-03-02, www.heise.de/newsticker/nokia-will-comeswit 
h-music-in-anderen-europaeischen-laendern-starten--/meldung/121889. [12/08/2010]. 
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sound recordings‘1418, which would combine the rights of reproduction, performance 
and distribution
1419
. It would be limited to the online environment and subject 
compulsory administered by a single collecting society. He proposed registering and 
digitally marking protected works for monitoring purposes and accordingly charging 
service providers and users a licence fee for file-sharing
1420
.  
The Songwriters Association of Canada suggested
1421
 introducing a right covering 
the sharing of music using any technology: the right to share ‗a copy of a copyrighted 
musical work without motive of financial gain‘1422. Canadian internet access providers 
would collect fees from their users and subsequently remit them to collecting societies, 
which would share the sums between the copyright owners. The collecting society 
would be responsible for monitoring the usage and distributing royalties. Users could 
opt-out from the payment agreeing to a predetermined amount of damages if they share 
protected works. These two proposals are local, limited to musical works, subject to 
registration, and not compulsory for the users. However, they inspired the proposal, 
which will be later discussed in this Chapter
1423
. 
 
6.4 - Kultur Flat-rate 
 
6.4.1 - Synthesis of the Kultur Flat-rate 
The German Green political party proposed the introduction of a levy-based file-sharing 
permission in their campaign for the 2009 European Parliament Elections
1424
. 
‗Compensation for artistic contributions on the internet. We want to develop a 
fair process to compensate artists for the dissemination on the internet or 
elsewhere of their works. In the digital era, we need to strengthen the rights of 
consumers. We are committed to a differentiated solution that may include an all-
inclusive fee for music, movies and other media and content. The introduction of a 
                                                 
1418
 Lincoff, B. [2002], op.cit. Point III. 
1419
 The making available right is not included in Lincoff‘s proposal. For a possible reasoning, see Para. 
3.2.3 and 3.2.6.2. 
1420
 Lincoff, B. [2002], op.cit. 
1421
 Songwriters Association of Canada [2009], ‗Proposal for the monetization of the file-sharing of 
music‘. www.songwriters.ca/studio/proposal.php. [01/12/2009-No longer available]. 
1422
 Point 4. ‗The right is limited to activities that take place without motive of financial gain‘. ‗Parties 
who receive compensation for file-sharing would not be covered by this right‘. www.songwriters.ca/ 
studio/proposal.php#details. [01/12/2009-No longer available]. 
1423
 Para. 6.5. 
1424
 Europawahlprogramm (vorläufig, Stand: 31.01.09), Point VIII: Kultur, Bildung und Forschung–Der 
GRÜNE Weg in die Wissenschaftsgesellschaft, 29 Ordentliche Bundesdelegiertenkonferenz, Dortmund, 
23-25 January 2009. www.gruene-partei.de/cms/default/dokbin/267/267132.kapitel_viii_kultur_bildung_ 
und_forschun.pdf. [12/08/2010]. 
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culture-flat-rate, which allows the use of digital cultural assets for non-
commercial use, can be a solution for this. The revenue must come transparently 
and equitably in the first place to the authors‘ own benefit. We clearly reject the 
current massive wave of legal action, interference with privacy, the use of DRM 
or data traffic filters. They are a disproportionate interference with the users‘ 
rights
1425
. 
The German Social Democrats Political Party (SPD) followed the Green lead, 
introducing a similar proposal in their draft for the national election
1426
: 
‗Fair remuneration for creative work. As part of the social democratic creative-
package, we wants to ensure that cultural and media professionals, artists can 
live from their creative work. It depends on the intellectual property to protect 
and compensate them adequately. It is important to protect intellectual property 
and to remunerate it appropriately. Copyright and copyright contract law should 
allow a decent income from the exploitation of intellectual property in the digital 
environment. The future of digitization brings new challenges in the protection of 
intangible products and goods. We need a reasonable balance between usability 
and the rights of the creators. In the framework of the creative-package, we will 
involve network operators and internet service providers in a dialogue with rights 
holders and collecting societies. We are committed to the examination of a culture 
flat-rate‘1427. 
The minimal requirement for a flat-rate solution should be
1428
: 
1. a licence permitting users to share protected works for non-commercial purposes; 
2. a flat-rate levy, possibly collected by the internet access provider; and 
3. a collective management system. 
                                                 
1425
 ‗Künstlerische Beiträge im Internet vergüten Wir wollen faire Verfahren entwickeln, um 
Künstlerinnen und Künstler für die Bereitstellung ihrer Werke im Internet oder anderswo zu 
entschädigen. Im digitalen Zeitalter brauchen wir eine Stärkung der Rechte von VerbraucherInnen. Wir 
setzen uns für differenzierte Lösungen ein, die Pauschalvergütungen für Musik, Filme und andere Medien 
und Inhalte beinhalten können. Die Einführung einer Kulturflatrate, die die Nutzung von digitalen 
Kulturgütern für den nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch ermöglichen soll, kann ein richtiger Weg dahin sein. 
Die Einnahmen müssen transparent und gleichberechtigt in erster Linie den Urhebern selbst zugute 
kommen. Die aktuell massenhaften Klagewellen, Eingriffe in die Privatsphäre, der Einsatz von DRM oder 
die Filterung des Datenverkehrs lehnen wir klar ab. Sie sind ein unverhältnismäßiger Eingriff in die 
Rechte der Nutzerinnen und Nutzer‘. Translation by J.L.A. Himmrich, reproduced with consent. 
1426
 Entwurf des regierungsprogramms der SPD. Antrag des SPD-Parteivorstandes an den 
Bundersparteitag der SPDD am 14 June 2009, 48. www.frankwaltersteinmeier.de/_media/pdf/ 
Entwurf_Regierungsprogramm.pdf. [12/08/2010]. 
1427
 ‗Gerechte Vergütung kreativer Arbeit. Wir wollen im Rahmen des sozialdemokratischen 
Kreativpaktes erreichen, dass Kultur- und Medienschaffende, Künstlerinnen und Künstler und Kreative 
von ihrer Arbeit leben können. Es kommt darauf an, das geistige Eigentum zu schützen und angemessen 
zu vergüten. Das Urheberrecht und das Urhebervertragsrecht sollen in der digitalen Welt ein 
angemessenes Einkommen aus der Verwertung geistigen Eigentums ermöglichen. Die Zukunft der 
Digitalisierung stellt uns vor neue Herausforderungen beim Schutz immaterieller Produkte und Güter. 
Wir brauchen einen vernünftigen Ausgleich zwischen Nutzerfreundlichkeit und den Rechten der 
Kreativen. Dabei werden wir in Rahmen des Kreativpaktes die Netzbetreiber und Internet-Service-
Provider in den Dialog mit Rechteinhabern und Verwertungsgesellschaften einbeziehen. Wir setzen uns 
für die Prüfung einer Kultur-Flatrate ein‘. Translation by J. Himmrich, reproduced with consent. 
1428
 A. Roßnagel, director of the ‗Institut für Europäisches Medienrecht in Zusammenarbeit mit der 
Projektgruppe verfassungsverträgliche Technikgestaltung an der Universität Kassel‘ (hereinafter EML), 
cited in Grassmuck, V. [2009], op.cit. 2. 
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This approach would limit the possibility to enforce copyrights against users
1429
, but the 
copyright owners would be compensated in the form of an equitable remuneration. 
From an economic perspective, this could be argued to be an improvement over the 
current situation where copyright owners are not compensated for the unauthorised 
dissemination of their works over networking technologies
1430
. Copyright, as discussed 
in Chapter Four: 
‗does not imply that a specific exploitation model is irreversibly predetermined 
[…] When a business model has become dated due to changed technological or 
social circumstances it would even be inadmissible to protect and artificially keep 
it alive through massive law-making intervention‘1431. 
The German Green have commissioned a study on the legal feasibility of such an 
approach
1432
. The conclusion was positive, and a number of scholars
1433
, representatives 
from the music industry
1434, collecting societies‘ advisors1435, and activists1436 support 
the culture flat-rate, considering it the only meaningful solution. 
 
6.4.2 - Critique 
The main critique to the flat-rate approach is the accusation of being an expropriation of 
the copyright owners‘ exclusive ‗property‘ rights1437. However, 
                                                 
1429
 Despite the significant attempts to enforce copyright, positive results are rare. Ibid. 19. 
1430
 Grassmuck, V. [2009], op.cit. 
1431
 Ibid. 12, 13. 
1432
 EML [2009], ‗Die Zulässigkeit einer Kulturflatrate nach nationalem und europäischem Recht‘, 
www.boersenblatt.net/sixcms/media.php/747/ kulturflatrate.pdf. [12/08/2010] 
1433
 For instance, Hoeren (www.webseiten-infos.de/youtube-und-das-urheberrecht); Flechsig (blog.beck. 
de/2008/08/12/flechsig-und-die-flatrate); Wandtke (waste.informatik.hu-berlin.de/grassmuck/Texts/08-
03_state-of-flatrate.html); and Peukert (www.heise.de/newsticker/digital-rights-management-welche-
alternativen-sind-rechtlich-moeglich/meldung/55150). [12/08/2010]. 
1434
 For instance, Renner (www.merkur.de/2008_40__eine_loesung_is.30479.0.html?&no_cache=1). 
[12/08/2010]. 
1435
 For instance, Leonhard (www.mediafuturist.com/music_like_water). [12/08/2010]. 
1436
 For instance, http://privatkopie.net and www.fairsharing.de. [12/08/2010]. 
1437
 The Association of German Music Industry recently published its ‗Ten arguments against the kultur 
flat-rate‘:‗1) the culture flat-rate is unfair as consumers pay for something they are not using; 2) the 
culture flat-rate undermines the economic base especially for the new digital business models; 3) the 
culture flat-rate is a disproportionally high burden for all consumers and disadvantages the socially 
deprived; 4) the culture flat-rate requires the set-up of a gigantic bureaucracy; 5) he culture flat-rate 
flattens culture; 6) the culture flat-rate takes away from creators and artists the right to control the usage 
of their works; 7) the culture flat-rate is inconsistent with the economic principles of our society; 8) the 
culture flat-rate is inconsistent with international law; 9) the culture flat-rate devalues intellectual 
property; 10) the culture flat-rate raises more questions than it answers‘. Bundesverband Musikindustrie 
[2010], Bundesverband Musikindustrie veröffentlicht Positionspapier zur Kulturflatrate, 25 January, 
www.musikindustrie.de/fileadmin/news/presse/100125_Kulturflatrate_10_Argumente_FINAL.pdf. 
Translated in Dobusch, L. [2010], Extending private copying levies: approaching a culture flat-rate?, 
http://governancexborders.wordpress.com/2010/01/30/extending-private-copying-levies-approaching-a-
culture-flat-rate. [15/08/2010]. 
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‗the protection of property does not mean an absolute guarantee of preservation 
of the status quo, in the sense that all achieved legal positions are sacrosanct‘1438. 
Promoters of this approach argue it is rather a limitation of rights in conformity to the 
principle of proportionality, not an expropriation: it serves legitimate purposes; it is 
adequate, necessary and appropriate
1439
. It resolves the collision of rights between 
copyright owners and users, ensuring remuneration and respecting the privacy of users. 
Therefore, it is argued that this approach is not only legitimate but also necessary given 
the large numbers of infringements - and infringers - preventing copyright owners from 
enforcing their rights
1440
. This approach appears also adequate and proportionate
1441
. 
Another criticism of this approach is the argument that those users who do not 
infringe copyright would be required to pay a levy anyway
1442
, but this could be 
mitigated as calculating the sums users are required to pay in proportion to their the 
bandwidth consumption
1443
. Sharing a protected work over a network consumes 
substantial bandwidth and if, as it has been claimed
1444
, there is a direct connection 
between high-speed broadband and widespread copyright infringement, then  
‗a graduated levy would be a fair solution‘1445. 
 
6.5 - Conformity with International Obligations 
Every proposal has to conform to the obligation under Berne, TRIPs, WCT and WPPT 
Treaties. In particular, it has to be three-steps-test compliant
1446
. Most of the 
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 EML [2009], op.cit. 14. 
1439
 Grassmuck, V. [2009], op.cit. 
1440
 EML [2009], op.cit. Conclusions. ‗Copyrights in contradistinction to material property are in the 
final instance not intended to exclude others from the use of works but to enable authors to generate 
earnings from their exploitation‘. Ibid. 
1441
 Ibid. 
1442
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 In University campuses, for instance, they have been calculated to consume 75% of the total capacity. 
Wade, J. [2004], The music industry war on piracy, 51(2) Risk Management, 10-15. 
1444
 Para. 2.4.2. 
1445
 Aigraain, P. [2008], op.cit. 
1446
 Gervais, D.J. [2005], ‗Towards a new core international copyright norm: the reverse three-step-test‘, 
9 Marquette Intellectual Property L.Rev. 1, 33. Available at ssrn.com/abstract=499924. Ginsburg, J.C. 
[2001], ‗Toward supranational copyright law? The WTO panel decision and the ‗three-step-test‘ for 
copyright exceptions‘, 187 R.I.D.A 3. ‗The three-step-test is far from providing harmonization‘. Sirinelli, 
P. [1999], ‗Exceptions and limits to copyright and neighbouring rights‘, Workshop on Implementation 
Issues of the WCT and the WPPT, WIPO Document WCT-WPPT/IMP/1 of 3 December 1999, 42. 
www.wipo.int. [13/08/2010]. Peukert, A. [2009], op.cit. 
  202 
aforementioned proposals rarely deal with this aspect
1447
. Lessig acknowledges that 
‗some of the changes‘ he proposes would require amendments to, ‗or the abrogation of 
some treaties‘1448. Fisher admits that his proposed limitation to exclusive rights 
necessitate amendment to Berne and TRIPs
1449
. Litman herself doubts her proposal is 
three-step-test compliant
1450
. Furthermore, Netanel states his levy is TRIPs-
compliant
1451
. The issue is not only theoretical
1452
. The German Ministry of Justice 
already declined to introduce a new limitation for non-commercial file-sharing, 
explicitly referring to the three-step test
1453
. This does not mean that such treaties are 
not perfectible; however, the complexity of the procedure and the required consensus of 
all contracting parties for amendments makes any sort of modification to international 
treaties appear unrealistic
1454
. 
Therefore, a proposal drawing a limitation/exception to one of the exclusive 
rights—which are ‗mandatory minimum rights in international copyright law1455—have 
to be subject to the three-step test
1456
. This test, in its TRIPs version, states: 
‗Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain 
special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder‘1457. 
These steps are considered cumulatively
1458
 and successively
1459
. 
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 Lunney, G.S. [2001], op.cit. 910-918; Sobel, L.S. [2003], op.cit. 673; Ku, R.S.R. [2002], op.cit. 311-
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 Peukert, A. [2009], op.cit. 
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applicable international treaties‘). Eckersley, P. [2004], op.cit. 157. 
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 Article 9(2) Berne and later in Article 13 TRIPS, Article 10 WCT and Article 16(2) WPPT. 
Ricketson, S. [2003], ‗WIPO Study on Limitations and Exceptions of Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Digital Environment‘, WIPO publication SCCR/9/7. 
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 Article 13. 
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 Failure to comply with any one of the three conditions results in the limitation/exception being 
disallowed. WTO Panel, Dispute DS160, §110(5) US Copyright Act, 7 January 2002, Para. 6.74, 6.97; 
Reinbothe-Lewinski [2002], op.cit. Article 10 WCT no. 14. Ricketson, S. [2003], op.cit. 
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 Records of the WCT negotiations, reproduced in Ficsor, M. [2002], op.cit. 71; and in Ginsburg, J.C. 
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balanced copyright protection.With regard to Berne, Ficsor, M. [2002], op.cit. 5.06-8; regarding Article 7-
8 TRIPS, WTO Panel, DS114 Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, 18 August 2000, 
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6.5.1 - ‘Certain Special Cases’ 
Divergent opinions exist as to what this requirement means in detail. A restriction must 
be ‗clearly defined and narrow in its scope‘1460. The scope has to be ‗known and 
particularised‘ so that it becomes foreseeable whether or not a given use will be subject 
to the limitation/exception
1461
. Moreover, the scope has to be ‗narrow‘, both in a 
qualitative and in a quantitative sense
1462
. However this can be read in a number of 
alternative ways. For instance, it has been suggested that ―certain special cases‖ should 
relate to the legitimacy of the policy rationale rather than to the extent of the coverage 
of the exception
1463
. On the other hand, it seems clear that this condition does not rule-
out various other concepts, such as fair dealing or fair use, ‗an incalculable, shapeless 
provision exempting a wide variety of different uses‘ is deemed impermissible1464. 
Concerning the ‗specialness‘ of the limitation or exception, various commentators 
question whether some clear reason of public policy, a rational basis for justification 
exists for the restriction
1465, or whether users‘ interests need to be reconciled the 
copyright owners interests
1466
. The WTO Panel considers the public policy issue of 
subsidiary relevance in applying the first step
1467
. It could be argued, however, that a 
limitation/exception for private non-commercial uses is clearly defined and narrow in 
scope and can easily be distinguished from non-permitted uses
1468
. Consequently, it 
                                                                                                                                               
Para. 7.26; regarding the WCT, Ricketson, S. [2003], op.cit. Reinbothe-von Lewinski [2002], op.cit. 
Article 10 WCT. 
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of Pharmaceutical Products, 18 August 2000, Para. 7.30. Ficsor, M. [2002], op.cit. 151 (extensive use of 
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could theoretically constitute a ‗certain special case‘1469. 
 
6.5.2 - ‘Conflict with a normal exploitation’ 
‗Normal exploitation‘ refers to what a copyright owner may expect from present or 
future and potential markets. However, this is open to contrasting interpretations. For 
instance, with the increasing availability of ways to exercise economic rights, the range 
of ‗normal‘ exploitations increases with the consequent decrease of the margins for the 
introduction, or even maintenance, of limitations and exceptions. Therefore, when 
defining the second step, it should be accepted that a ‗conflict‘ should arise only when 
the exception 
―substantially impair[s] … the overall commercialisation of that work by 
divesting the authors of a major source of income‖1470; 
and that ‗normal‘ exploitation is not the full use of an exclusive right; otherwise, every 
restriction would be impermissible, and thus the provision itself superfluous. ‗Normal‘ 
implies an empirical and a normative element
1471
. 
Regarding the degree of market displacement following from the restriction, 
different standards have been articulated. It has been maintained that a 
limitation/exception conflicts with normal exploitation
1472
: 
 if it causes a serious loss of profit;  
 if it covers uses for which the author would ordinarily expect to receive a fee;  
 if it applies to those forms of exploitation that currently generate significant or 
tangible revenue or which, with a certain degree of likelihood and plausibility, 
could acquire considerable economic or practical importance as opposed to uses 
that do not compete with non-exempted uses (actual and potential effects). 
A passage from Grokster is interesting. The 9
th
 Circuit Court, mentioned 
‗one striking example provided by the software distributors is the popular band 
Wilco, whose record company had declined to release one of its albums on the 
basis that it had no commercial potential. Wilco repurchased the work from the 
record company and made the album available for free downloading, both from 
its own website and through the software user networks. The result sparked 
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 EML [2009], op.cit. 27. 
1470
 Senftleben, M. [2004], op.cit. 193. 
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 Peukert, A. [2009], op.cit. 165. 
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 Ibid. 
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widespread interest and, as a result, Wilco received another recording 
contract‘1473. 
Thus, experience shows that ‗normal exploitation‘ is not eliminated if the work 
had already been available on networks. As has been highlighted, the second-step 
analysis would be better if complemented by ‗market research to draw concrete 
conclusions‘1474. Nevertheless, it is submitted that ‗normal exploitation‘ should not refer 
to a particular business model. Thus, if a new alternative method of exploitation 
differently compensated became ‗normal‘, the limitation that allows it might then be 
argued to comply with the second step
1475
. 
Lately the question was raised of whether non-economic considerations should be 
taken into account, in particular, the public interest. In fact a pure economic approach 
would paralyse too often any application of limitation and exception in the digital 
environment
1476
. This reading appears to break radically with the traditional 
interpretation of the second step, and would practically diminish the importance of the 
third step
1477
. However this author is of the view that user initiated dissemination of 
information is a democratic necessity that needs to be balanced with the rights of the 
authors and other copyright owners
1478
. 
 
6.5.3 - ‘Unreasonable prejudice’ 
The third step requires limitations to be ‗justifiable‘ and ‗reasonably‘ supported by 
public policies or other social needs
1479
. The crucial questions are therefore concerned 
with whether or not the interests at stake are legitimate, and at which point the level of 
‗prejudice‘ may become ‗unreasonable‘1480. Nevertheless, the introduction of a levy-
based compensation system appears to respond to this requirement
1481
. In a sense, a 
                                                 
1473
 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court did not 
refer to this example expressly but stated that ‗some musical performers […] have gained new audiences 
by distributing their copyrighted works for free across peer-to-peer networks […]‘. MGM Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster Ltd. 125 S.Ct. 2764, 2772 (2005). 
1474
 Grassmuck, V. [2009] op.cit. 
1475
 EML [2009], op.cit. 
1476
 Ginsburg, J.C. [2001], op.cit. 48-52; Senftleben, M. [2004], op.cit. fn.9, 181 
1477
 Lucas, A. [2010], For a reasonable interpretation of the three-step test, 32(6) E.I.P.R., 277-282. 
1478
 See, in this sense, Netanel, N.W. [1996], op.cit.; Senftleben, [2004], op.cit. 33-34. 
1479
 WTO Panel, Dispute DS160, §110(5) US Copyright Act, 7 January 2002, Para. 7.69; Gervais, D.J. 
[2005], op.cit. 19-20. 
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 Senftleben, M. [2004], op.cit. 226-241. Ricketson, S. [2003], op.cit. Reinbothe-von Lewinski, [2002], 
op.cit. Article 10 WCT no. 23. Ginsburg, J.C. [2001], op.cit. 53. Peukert, A. [2009], op.cit. 172. German 
Federal Supreme Court, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht (GRUR) 963, 967 (2002). 
1481
 Senftleben, M. [2004], op.cit. 237. 
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remuneration system rebalances the prejudice making ‗reasonable‘ what it would 
otherwise be ‗unreasonable‘, if left uncompensated1482. 
‗The interests of authors and exploiters of the third step have to be weighed 
against the interests of the general public and against possible alternatives. 
Assuming an appropriate remuneration […] the prejudice would not be 
unreasonable‘1483. 
 
6.5.4 - Critique 
The above analysis is controversial, and some of the commentators disagree with such 
statements and conclusions
1484
. The reason for this negative assessment is that all 
international conventions rest upon the perception that copyright is a private, exclusive 
right. Accordingly, non-voluntary licences are the exception to this rule, and they have 
to be of a limited nature
1485
. Moreover there is a tendency to overlook the fact that the 
three step test was introduced as a diplomatic agreement with relatively loose constraint, 
permitting parties of the Berne Convention to retain their existing limitation and 
exceptions and to avoid a disharmonised evolution of national limitations and 
exceptions. The interpretation of the test should therefore be flexible and balanced. 
Restrictive interpretations appear to be unjustified when they contrast with the test‘s 
original ratio. 
Nevertheless, the test itself produces a number of problems in an era in which 
legislative freedom and broad harmonisation are needed. In particular, it has been noted 
that 
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 Dusollier-Ker [2009], op.cit. 353. 
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1484
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was rejected in 1967, during the Stockholm Conference. Report in Ricketson, S. [2003], op.cit. 481. 
Germany suggested that exceptions to the reproduction should not conflict with the author‘s right to 
obtain equitable remuneration. Ibid. 196. Remuneration schemes for private copying were discussed prior 
to the WIPO conference in 1996, but they were not included in the conference‘s agenda. This holds true 
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‗Organisations representing right-holders now frequently suggest that expansions 
to the scope of exceptions in copyright law would, or might, be incompatible with 
the ‗three-step test‘ and would therefore contravene international and European 
law. […] Given the fundamentally uncertain requirements of the ‗three-step test‘ 
and taking into account the role it was originally designed to fulfil, these claims 
are usually little more than misleading wishful-thinking‘1486. 
Thus, the test has come under pressure owing to its rigidness and restrictive 
approach, as well as its inability to allocate the balance between the interests involved. 
An international consensus regarding the scope of the test is still missing, and it has 
been suggested how the test may block the limitations adjustments needed, in particular, 
for networking technologies
1487
. The serious risk is that: 
‗the three-step test will further constrain the existing architecture of copyright, 
will limit both judicial and legislative freedom, and incrementally suppress and 
subdue balances that exist in national systems‘1488. 
Considering the above, the author favours a different approach in order to solve the 
issues described in this work: a ‗positive‘ remuneration right for authors and copyright 
owners, centrally and collectively administered. As it will be later discussed this new 
right will not limit the pre-existent exclusive ones, but will rather specify the condition 
under which the communication to the public and the reproduction rights might be 
exercised. 
 
6.6 - A New Regime 
The proposals discussed, however, have the limit to be linked to the current 
technologies available or directly to file-sharing. Whilst considering the speed of 
technology innovation, it would be advisable to adopt a more general approach. At this 
point, 
‗the enigma is [still] this: If our property can be infinitely reproduced and 
instantaneously distributed all over the planet without cost, without our 
knowledge, without its even leaving our possession, how can we protect it? How 
are we going to get paid for the work we do with our minds? And, if we can‘t get 
paid, what will assure the continued creation and distribution of such work?‘1489 
A new regime is necessary in order to guarantee copyright holder remuneration for the 
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 Griffiths, J. [2010], op.cit. 309. 
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 Westkamp, G. [2008], ‗The three-step-test and copyright limitations in Europe: European copyright 
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use of their works
1490
. This regime has to be internationally harmonised, and must also 
consider the interests of every group involved, including creators, performers, users, 
technologists, states and relevant industries. This legal framework should regulate the 
issues described in this work, but should be drafted in neutral terms so as to anticipate 
future challenges. This regime would apply whenever exclusive rights are difficult to 
implement or could have negative effects on society. This regime should not restrict 
fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression and communication, privacy and data 
protection
1491
, and should consider copyright in its complexity, taking into account its 
legal aspects, but also its philosophical, economic, social aspects
1492
. In line with the 
Kultur Flat-rate and Open-Access/Content approaches, the following proposal is 
submitted. 
 
6.6.1 - The Global Dissemination Treaty 
Unauthorised dissemination of protected works over networking technologies is a 
global phenomenon; therefore, it is fundamental for a solution to be global. It is 
submitted that the best procedure to introduce a global instrument in order to address 
the issues described in this work is the adoption of an international treaty. Owing to the 
borderless nature of the environment, a national or regional approach would leave the 
problem unsolved ‗elsewhere‘, thus rendering the proposal futile. Moreover, a globally 
disharmonised system is likely to be a dysfunctional system
1493
. 
The task of developing a global system to address the issues discussed in this 
work is one of the major challenges the copyright system is currently facing: 
                                                 
1490
 ‗Under conditions of the digital age a new social contract between creatives and audiences  has to be 
negotiated, a new arrangement for the reciprocal creative contribution― by authors and by society‘, 
Grassmuck, V. [2009], Sustainable production of and fair trade in creative expressions, Research 
Workshop on Free Culture, Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University Cambridge, 
MA, 23 October, cyber.law.harvard.edu/fcrw/sites/fcrw/images/Grassmuck_09-10-23_Free-Culture_ 
Berkman_txt.pdf. [15/08/2010]. Also, Aigrain, P. (2008), op.cit. 
1491
 On the importance of fundamental rights in the European legal framework, see Geiger, C. [2006], 
Constitutionalizing intellectual property law? The influence of fundamental rights on intellectual 
property in Europe, I.I.C. 371. 
1492
 This paragraph includes most of the suggestions from Geiger, C. [2010], op.cit. 
1493
 Clear examples are current disharmonised levy systems, even within Europe. Anderson N. [2010], 
Europes dysfunctional private copying levy to remain, Ars Technical (8 January). arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2010/01/europes-dysfunctional-private-copying-levy-will-stay-dysfunc tional.ars. Niemann, 
F. [2008], Copyright levies in Europe, Bird&Bird, www.twobirds.com/english/news/articles/pages/ 
copyright_levies_europe.aspx. GESAC [2010], GESAC regrets Digital Europe‘s unilateral decision to 
abandon talks on Private Copying Levies, www.gesac.org/eng/news/communiquesdepresse/download/ 
communiquesen_20 100107_private%20copying%20levies.pdf. Digital Europe [2010], Digital Europe 
calls for the European Commission to take regulatory measures (7 January), www.digitaleurope.org/ 
index.php?id =32&id_article =404#. [15/08/2010]. 
  209 
As new technologies challenge copyright‘s internal balance, and as the costs of 
globalization heighten the vital need for innovation and knowledge dissemination, 
a multilateral instrument that can effectively harness various national practices 
with regard to L&E‘s, and that can provide a framework for dynamic evaluation 
of how global copyright norms can be most effectively translated into a credible 
system that appropriately values author and user rights, is a necessity
1494
. 
The introduction of an international instrument is a unique opportunity to coordinate, 
harmonise and balance the global copyright regime on the path set by the Berne 
Convention Revisions, the TRIPS Agreement and WIPO Treaties. As discussed by 
Hugenholtz and Okedji in their proposal for an international instrument on limitations 
and exceptions, the goal of an international approach is to
1495
: 
1) eliminate trade barriers, in particularly in regard to internet and access service 
providers; 
2) facilitate users‘ access to protected works; 
3) promote technological innovation; 
4) promote/reinforce fundamental freedoms; 
5) explicitly promote the normative balance necessary to support diffusion of 
knowledge. 
The Global Dissemination Treaty shares these goals, but suggests a different approach 
to achieve them: a positive global centrally administered collectively managed 
remuneration right to compensate authors and copyright owners, which respects user 
integrity and promotes technological innovation. It is suggested that the treaty should be 
drafted and applied under the WIPO umbrella. Notably, WIPO has experience in 
administering and co-ordination the management of rights internationally
1496
. This 
proposal is in line with WIPO‘s ‗Medium Term Strategic Plan‘: 
‗The impact [of digital technology and the internet on the production, distribution 
and consumption of cultural works] is profound and signals a fundamental 
challenge for the institution of copyright. The objective […] is clear: to provide a 
market-based mechanism that extracts some value from cultural transactions so 
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as to enable creators to lead a dignified economic existence while, at the same 
time, ensuring the widest possible availability of affordable creative content. The 
question is not so much the objective of the system, but the means of achieving 
that objective amid the convergence of the digital environment. Many experiments 
in better achieving the objective are going on around the world, both in terms of 
legislative solutions and in terms of new business models‘1497. 
Moreover, WIPO could also guarantee the presence at the negotiation of all the 
relevant interest groups from both developed and developing countries. Finally, this 
proposal could be presented under the WIPO Development Agenda, which has opened 
its remit to consider collective management of copyright in the online environment
1498
. 
The involvement and participation of other forums is not excluded.  
As Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss declare: 
‗[…] WIPO brings to the table an intellectual property sensibility […] WIPO‘s 
Development Agenda also suggests that its approach to intellectual property 
rights is changing in a manner conducive to a more sophisticated analysis of the 
role intellectual property plays in the economy‘1499. 
The Global Dissemination Treaty will: 
1. introduce a new remuneration right for the dissemination of protected works for 
authors, performers and other right owners-the Global Dissemination Right 
(GDR); 
2. create a new agency, within WIPO, for the purpose of administering the system—
the Global Dissemination Agency (GDA); and 
3. implement a new global remuneration system-the Global Dissemination 
Remuneration System (GDRS). 
The treaty will be flexible and will leave room for cultural autonomy of the member 
states allowing diverse local solutions
1500
. The treaty will include six articles, which will 
be drafted in technologically neutral terms, under the headings below (Figure 24). 
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Figure 24 - The Global Dissemination Treaty 
Whereas: 
Desiring to develop and maintain the protection of the rights of authors and owners of related 
rights in a manner as effective and uniform as possible
1501
 
Desiring to establish a supportive legal framework which requires various economic, social, 
cultural and technological implications of the networked society to be taken into account
1502
 
Realising national and regional approaches would leave the situation unresolved and lead to a 
dysfunctional legal framework
1503
 
Recognising that there are situations where right owners fail to receive remuneration due to lack 
of control, failure of national licensing schemes, and impracticality of enforcement
1504
 
Recognising that there are situations where enforcement might jeopardise technology innovation 
and access to culture
1505
 
Recognizing the need to introduce a new global instrument to provide a solution to the questions 
raised by unauthorised dissemination of protected materials over networking technologies
1506
 
Recognising the need to describe the minimum standards of the global dissemination right and
1507
  
Recognising that the global dissemination right will co-exist with existing obligations
1508
 
Emphasising that the obligations of Contracting Parties as provided herein in relation to moral 
rights and technological protection measures will not be replaced but shall exist alongside such 
obligations
1509
 
Emphasising that the global dissemination right shall not replace existing exclusive rights but 
instead will protect users, as it will allow them to disseminate protected works legitimately, and 
for right owners, as it will allow them to be remunerated
1510 
Article 1 – Relationship with Berne, TRIPs, WIPO Treaties and EU Directives 
This article will specify that the Treaty is a special agreement within the meaning of Article 20 of 
the Berne Convention, and that nothing in this Treaty shall derogate from existing obligations of 
Member States
1511
. 
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 The so-called ‗Grandfather Clause‘. For instance, see Article 1 WCT, Article 2(2) and 4 TRIPs, and 
Article 1(2) Copyright Directive. The Global Dissemination Treaty is a ‗special arrangement‘ between 
members of Berne under Article 20 of the convention. It is submitted that the Global Dissemination Right 
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conditions under which the right of communication to the public have to be exercised when the 
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Moreover, it is further submitted that the Treaty is not contrary to the WIPO treaties. Article 8 WCT 
specifies that the right of communication to the public includes the right of making available, and the 
agreed statement concerning Article 8 further clarifies that nothing in this Article precludes member 
states from applying Article 11(bis)(2) Berne Convention. The WPPT introduced the making available 
right for performers (Article 10) and phonogram producers (Article 14), but this is not arguably part of 
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Article 2 - Global Dissemination Remuneration Right 
(a) This article will define the right. The right shall be a remuneration right1512 enjoyed by 
authors, performers and other right owners (including related rights) to ‗compensate‘ them 
for the non-commercial user-initiated disseminations of their works, including reproduction 
and transmission by any means. The right shall apply only to non-commercial 
disseminations of protected materials
1513
.  
(b) The right shall be based on a remuneration system collectively administered at international 
level
1514
. 
Article 3 - Global Dissemination Agency 
This article will define the power and obligations of the Central and National Branches of the 
Global Dissemination Agency
1515
. 
Article 4 - Remuneration System 
This article will describe the minimum standards of the remuneration system to be complaint to 
the Treaty. Details will be left to the National Agencies to be determined nationally under the 
supervision and control of the Central Agency
1516
. 
Article 5 - Relation with Other Rights 
This Treaty shall not replace existing rights, and shall leave intact and shall in no way affect 
existing provisions under international agreements relating to
1517
: 
a) moral rights; 
b) digital rights management. 
Article 6 – Exceptions and Limitations 
This article will define the exceptions and limitations that can be accorded to States, 
Organisations and groups of individuals. 
Agreed statements concerning the current available technologies and other matters will follow the 
Treaty 
 
6.6.2 - The Global Dissemination Right (Article 2 and 5) 
Historically, copyright has expanded in line with technology increasing its capability to 
create, record and disseminate a work, and notably, every time technology stretched the 
perception of the definition of ‗public‘1518. Networking technologies are, in a sense, the 
first user-initiated worldwide dissemination technology. Today, everyone is a 
‗broadcaster‘. The dissemination of protected works over networking technologies 
involves most of the rights which copyright grants, but mainly two economic rights
1519
: 
the reproduction right and communication to the public (including making available and 
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distribution)
1520
. However, as described in Chapter Three, 
Technology may render certain traditional rights unenforceable and blur the 
distinction between others
1521
. 
Internationally, the scenario complicates at a greater level when considering that a 
single copyright work may involve multiple rights-and related rights-of multiple owners 
in multiple jurisdiction. Nevertheless, according to classical law and economic 
arguments
1522
, when the same type of problem constantly repeats, a clarification through 
legislation is more efficient than a case-based examination
1523
. It is submitted that a new 
right could simplify the scenario
1524
. In a sense, what is needed is: 
‗One [Right] to rule them all‘1525 
The right should be a remuneration right. It should be the only right covering 
user-initiated non-commercial dissemination of protected work. In a sense, this will be 
closer to the resale right of Article 1 of the Resale Directive and Article 12 of the Rome 
Convention 
‗Resale Directive. Article 1 - Subject matter of the resale right. 1: Member States 
shall provide, for the benefit of the author of an original work of art, a resale 
right, to be defined as an inalienable right, which cannot be waived, even in 
advance, to receive a royalty based on the sale price obtained for any resale of 
the work, subsequent to the first transfer of the work by the author‘. 
‗Rome Convention. Article 12 - Secondary Uses of Phonograms. If a phonogram 
published for commercial purposes, or a reproduction of such phonogram, is used 
directly for broadcasting or for any communication to the public, a single 
equitable remuneration shall be paid by the user to the performers, or to the 
producers of the phonograms, or to both. Domestic law may, in the absence of 
agreement between these parties, lay down the conditions as to the sharing of this 
remuneration‘. 
It will be a remuneration right from the start and will be ‗residual‘ in the sense 
that, even if the other rights are assigned, this will not. It will be similar to the right of 
equitable remuneration described in Article 4 of the Rental and Lending Directive: 
‗Article 4 - Unwaivable right to equitable remuneration. 1: Where an author or 
performer has transferred or assigned his rental right concerning a phonogram 
or an original or copy of a film to a phonogram or film producer, that author or 
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performer shall retain the right to obtain an equitable remuneration for the 
rental. 2: The right to obtain an equitable remuneration for rental cannot be 
waived by authors or performers. 3: The administration of this right to obtain an 
equitable remuneration may be entrusted to collecting societies representing 
authors or performers. 4: Member States may regulate whether and to what extent 
administration by collecting societies of the right to obtain an equitable 
remuneration may be imposed, as well as the question from whom this 
remuneration may be claimed or collected‘. 
Copyright owners enjoying the remuneration right shall not be entitled to enforce 
their economic rights against users for the non-commercial dissemination of their work, 
provided remuneration is paid and the Treaty conditions are observed
1526
. Importantly, 
moral rights shall not be affected. The right does not prevent copyright owners from 
applying technological protection measures so as to prevent access or copy to their 
works. Copyright owners wishing to apply DRM to their works will still potentially 
enjoy the remuneration. Notably, if the DRM is ‗effective‘, their work will not be 
disseminated and no remuneration will be paid. On the other hand, in case of 
circumvention of DRM, the remuneration will be paid, but users disseminating the 
‗circumvented‘ works will be immune from paying damages for the infringement of 
copyright. The circumvention of the DRM itself is a separate matter, which would be 
enforced by the owner him/herself. The right does not modify pre-existent remuneration 
systems, since the compensation by them provided is for different acts/harms. 
 
6.6.2.1—Exclusive Rights versus Remuneration Rights. - 
‗By characterising intellectual property rights as exclusive rights, it is submitted 
by definition that they confer on their proprietor the entitlement to exclude others 
from making unauthorized use of the protected subject matter. As it is also widely 
recognized that IPR enjoy protection under the title of property in the meaning of 
constitutional laws and even human rights instruments, any encroachment of that 
entitlement may appear as a form of expropriation. […] Furthermore, in spite of 
their canonisation as a special type of human rights, and irrespective of the strong 
flavour of personal rights permeating copyright law, IPR in the first place have 
been created to ‗do a job‘—namely to foster creativity and innovation. This means 
that exclusivity should be the dominant regulatory model only where and to the 
extent that other, non-exclusive schemes cannot achieve the same or even better 
results, and/or generate more beneficial effects for society as a whole. This does 
not necessarily mean that access or use must be free whenever exclusivity entails 
                                                 
1526
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suboptimal effects. Instead, the proprietary element may persist in the sense that 
the user is obliged to pay for the privilege of unrestricted access‘.1527 
Historically, exclusivity has been an ‗essential feature‘ of copyright1528. Exclusive 
rights, however, need to be constantly balanced and recalibrated over time
1529
 with the 
introduction of limitations, exceptions and defences
1530
. These, however, rarely involve 
remuneration for the use
1531
. The Copyright Directive, for instance, refers to a right to 
remuneration only with regard to private copying
1532
. Notwithstanding, the terminology 
and classification of limitations/exceptions, and the accompanying rights to 
remuneration, differ substantially in terms of national copyright laws
1533
; they all reduce 
the right holder‘s control to a remuneration right1534. On the other hand, a remunerations 
system appears to be preferable to a licensing system, despite the fact that national and 
international legislation would need to implement it—notwithstanding, it would not be 
necessary in the case of comprehensive licensing by the right owners or their 
representatives.  
This comprehensive licence is not emerging due to the complexity of dealing with 
multiple copyright owners of multiple rights in multiple jurisdictions. A ‗levy‘ is a 
better approach when licensing is impractical
1535
. One remuneration right centrally 
administered appears a more efficient approach
1536
. Figure 25 below addresses the 
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differences between licence and levy. However, it should be noted that they both lead to 
the same effect: a transfer of sums from the users to the right owners
1537
. 
Figure 25 - Licence versus Levy
1538
 
Licence Levy 
Payment per use No payment per use 
Known identifiable licence Unknown users 
Exercise of rights Compensation in lieu of licence and 
control 
Private negotiation Government imposed 
Terms and conditions Statutory scope 
Exchange of data on media usage Unidentified uses 
Limited to use copyright works Media is potentially used for non-
infringing purposes 
Control or limit any further uses through 
terms/conditions of sale or technology 
No insight or control of infringing 
uses 
 
Nevertheless, as discussed
1539
, the copyright system itself provides alternative ways to 
modify this exclusivity when deemed necessary. The idea not to grant exclusive rights 
but rather to limit them to a right to indirect remuneration is nothing new to copyright 
law
1540
. Accordingly in relation to the German Supreme Court, the right of 
remuneration is a natural right that  
‗merely find recognition and form through legislation. [It arises from the] debt of 
gratitude […] grounded in the fulfilment of the individual appetite for art. 
[Therefore,] it is precisely the individual enjoyment of the work - irrespective of 
whether this enjoyment of the work occurs in the public or in the domestic domain 
- that constitutes the internal justification for the copyright owner to reasonable 
remuneration‘ 1541. 
Some commentators have previously argued that copyright in the digital network 
environment will at least partially have to be replaced or supplemented by levies owing 
to the fact that exclusive right are increasingly difficult to enforce and can 
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fundamentally limit the ‗free flow of information1542. The aim of this proposal is to 
recalibrate the equilibrium. This new remuneration shall not be limited to private copy, 
but shall cover all non-commercial uses
1543
 in which the enforcement of copyright is 
considered to be too complex or impossible to achieve without undermining user 
integrity or technology innovation
1544
. If technological innovation would not constantly 
decrease the ability to control the dissemination of protected works, exclusive rights 
should then remain the cornerstone of the system
1545
; otherwise, it is submitted, the 
shifting towards a remuneration right is the necessary step
1546
. The congeniality of this 
solution rests upon the fact that it preserves the benefits of technology innovation, 
whilst at the same time guaranteeing copyright owners‘ compensation. In other words:  
‗compensation without control‘1547. 
As discussed in relation to the Kultur flat-rate
1548
, this remuneration right does not 
constitute expropriation of constitutional rights, nor is it a form of ‗sovietisation‘ of 
copyright, as argued in relationship to the ‗Global License‘ in 20051549. It could be 
interpreted as a limitation/compression of rights and, if that is the case, it is submitted 
that it serves legitimate purposes and is adequate, necessary and appropriate
1550
. The 
purpose is to remunerate copyright owners without stifling technology innovation or 
otherwise undermining user integrity
1551. It is necessary simply because the ‗limitless‘ 
number of infringements and infringers prevent copyright owners from enforcing their 
right. It is adequate and appropriate because the copyright owners quantify the 
remuneration in collaboration with the national collecting societies, the state, the 
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relevant industries and users‘ association. More precisely, it is a right that covers a form 
of non-commercial exploitations which are only ‗theoretically‘ covered by pre-existent 
rights. In practice, however, such rights are so difficult to enforce to question whether 
their owners ‗effectively‘ enjoy them. In a sense, the global dissemination right will 
grant remuneration instead of a bundle of non-enforceable rights. 
 
6.6.2.2 - Commercial Use versus Non-Commercial Use. - It is difficult to define what 
a ‗commercial use‘ constitutes. In a number of jurisdictions, a compromise has been 
reached with wording such as ‗for profit‘ or ‗for monetary gain‘. Thus, ‗saving money‘ 
because of not paying for content could arguably be considered commercial use. 
Moreover, it appears that uses accepted as non-commercial in the analogue world can 
become commercial in the online digital environment
1552
. The reason behind this could 
be the presence of a detrimental effect; however, there is no empirical evidence, and any 
arguments on economic basis can mislead
1553
. The solution of this issue is beyond the 
scope of this work. Nevertheless, it is submitted that what constitute a ‗commercial use‘ 
should be clearly defined at international level and should not be left to personal 
perspectives. 
 
6.6.3 - The Global Dissemination Agency (Article 3) 
The Global Dissemination Agency will be set up in Geneva at WIPO. Its primary role 
would be to monitor the system and supervise/control the National Agencies. Moreover, 
it will be required to collect information gathered from the National Agencies, and to 
accordingly calculate the international flow of works and to share such data with the 
National Agencies for them to calculate the sharing of the sum collected. It will finally 
be required to assess and approve the calculation of the remuneration methods 
suggested by the National Agencies. 
The National Agencies will include the state (ministry of culture and ministry of 
telecommunication), relevant industries (network providers), collecting societies, 
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copyright owners‘ representatives, consumer organisation, etc. They will administer the 
system on behalf of the Central Agency and collect and redistribute the sum. They will 
determine in consultation with the entities named above the method utilised in order to 
calculate the amount, who should pay for it, and how to distribute to the national right 
owners. They will also collect the information on the dissemination of works on behalf 
of the Central Agency. The method of collection of the remuneration and information 
will be left open to be determined on national grounds. It may be a ‗levy‘ on the 
network providers, could be ‗state-funded‘ or any other method the Central Agency will 
deem to be appropriate. Information could be collected through non-intrusive traffic 
analysis, anonymous monitoring, recruiting volunteers (Nielsen families
1554
), or any 
other method deemed appropriate by the Central Agency. 
 
6.6.4 - The Global Dissemination Remuneration System (Article 5) 
Contracting parties shall impose a remuneration system, as set out in Figure 30, which 
will incorporate the following features: 
(a) This remuneration system can be imposed on products and services, which 
directly or indirectly benefit from unauthorised uses of protected work (i.e. 
internet access providers and mobile networks providers)
1555
.  
(b) The remuneration shall be determined, as well as the modality to calculate the 
subsequent distribution of sums to the copyright owners, by the state in agreement 
with the representative of copyright owners, consumer associations and the 
relevant industries.  
(c) The remuneration shall be calculated on national bases, taking into account the 
purchasing power of its citizens, the market for product and services, which 
directly or indirectly benefit from unauthorised uses of protected works, the 
usage, and the estimated amount of unauthorised uses.  
(d) Products- and services-providers may pass the remuneration on their users.  
(e) The remuneration will then subsequently be collected by the National Agency, 
which will also calculate in the most accurate way possible (determined by the 
national agreements) the nature and volume of the works disseminated (Figure 
31). 
(f) For a fair distribution of the sums collected, the user identity is irrelevant.  
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(g) The information will be transmitted to the Central Agency, which will calculate 
the international flow and will accordingly advise the National Agency how much 
of the sum has to be nationally retained, transferred aboard, or otherwise received 
from abroad (Figures 31, 32 and 33).  
(h) The National Agency will then transfer the sums to the relevant national 
organisation/representative of copyright owners (authors, performers, film 
producers, phonogram producers, etc.), and such individuals/parties will then 
receive the sum on behalf of their members.  
(i) Unclaimed sums (orphan works, works licensed under creative commons, works 
in the public domain, creators refusing to collect the remuneration, etc.) will be 
retained by the relevant member state, to be re-invested into supporting heritage, 
culture and the communication infrastructure. Governmental and non-
governmental organisations may be entitled not to pay the remuneration on the 
basis of adopting measure to prevent access to protected works via their 
communication systems.  
(j) Member States may exempt particular entities or groups of people, whether the 
imposition of the remuneration would undermine their right to access to 
information.  
(k) Developing countries may apply under the Global Dissemination Treaty to the 
Central Agency for an exemption from the remuneration system, which will be 
determined by the Central Agency. 
 
6.6.4.1 - Compensation Systems versus Levies and Taxes. - 
‗The term ‗levies‘, although used frequently in the English language, should be 
avoided, because it draws attention to the less important issue of how the 
remuneration is calculated. Yet, attention should be drawn to the essence of this 
phenomenon, namely the fact that it is a statutory right of remuneration for the 
use of works, the law having permitted the use without authorisation of the author 
or other right holders. In other words, it is a compensation for use and thereby an 
essential element of an adequate protection of authors' rights in their works, and 
this independent of any ‗harm‘. Conversely, the term ‗levies‘ is all too often 
associated with ‗taxes‘ and thereby tends to be misleading. Therefore, it is 
strongly recommended in the future to speak of (statutory) remuneration rights for 
private reproduction (or other specified uses). This would, in addition, be 
consistent with the terminology used in the national laws of Member States within 
their legal systems‘1556. 
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It has also been clarified that the concept of remuneration is unrelated to the 
identification of an ‗economic harm‘, simply because it is not a justification of the 
existence of copyright. Copyright is granted to guarantee that copyright owners are able 
to benefit from the use of their work
1557
. 
‗Remuneration is a compensation for the value that is reflected in the use of the 
work. The ‗economic harm‘ is in no way a condition for the recognition of the 
rights of authors or neighbouring right holders‘1558. 
 
6.6.4.2 - Methods for the Calculation of a Fair Remuneration. - Private copy levies 
are generally calculated upon a percentage of the selling costs of related copy-machine 
and blank support. Different countries use different systems
1559
. The Global 
Dissemination Remuneration System will leave the National Agencies to determine 
how to calculate the remuneration level, and who should be responsible for the 
payment. An important point is that the remuneration will have to be paid at the point of 
origin and at the point of destination
1560
. Alternatives could be a creation of a state fund, 
a ‗levy‘ on providers of ‗networks‘ and/or ‗networks equipment‘. The levy could be 
‗flat‘ on the equipment or on the ‗connection‘ provided—such as, for instance, TV and 
radio licenses, in the sense that users pay notwithstanding actual usage—or on the 
bandwidth used, which is generally considered more appropriate. 
The remuneration should take into account the state of the internal economy, the 
level of the infrastructure provided, the attitude of users towards copyright works, and 
the level of education of the population. It should not take into account the estimated 
‗harm‘ to copyright owners, as mentioned, but rather should determine what, 
considering all the above, would be a ‗fair remuneration‘. 
Recently an interesting project was launched, which could help in determining the 
correct remuneration: ‗A Price for Music‘1561. The aim of the project is to prove that 
there are ways to make profitable the unauthorised dissemination of music through 
networking technologies. The model allows users to modify a number of settings to 
replicate multiple scenarios so as to estimate the financial impact that different 
approaches may have on copyright owners‘ incomes. It bases the analysis of music 
consumption patterns. Figure 26 below shows the default graph of the model, based on 
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data collected from music industry reports. All the variables are modifiable. The model 
could be adapted to calculate a fair compensation for the Global Dissemination Right. 
Figure 26 - A Price for Music
1562
 
 
 
6.6.4.3 - Methods for the Measurement of a Fair Distribution. - In order to 
‗quantify‘ the user-initiated dissemination of protected works, and consequently share 
the sum collected fairly, National Agencies should develop a method to measure the 
volume of the disseminations, and accordingly develop an estimate of the works 
disseminated
1563
. The issue is known, in fact, under the UK Digital Economy Act 2010, 
Ofcom duties include: 
‗an assessment of the current level of subscribers‘ use of internet access services 
to infringe copyright‘1564. 
There are various methods available, some of which have been already tested. For 
instance, Detica
1565, a traffic analyst company studying users‘ behaviours on the behalf 
of a number of internet access providers, created the CView. The system provides an 
index which can measure and track the nature of the plausibly unauthorised work 
disseminated over a network (Figure 27). The index is based on anonymous sampling. It 
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provides an estimate of the volume of users disseminating works without authorisation 
and of the works disseminated
1566
. 
Figure 27 - Detica CView System
 1567 
 
Less technologically advanced systems may be preferred, such as recruiting volunteers 
to provide feedbacks regarding their online activities, as equivalent of Nielsen 
families—a system already in use to divide Television advertising revenues, which 
could be adapted
1568
. The imperfections of the model could be mitigated automating the 
process through softwares or browsers plug-ins
1569
. No one of these methods is 
considered exclusive. It would be a matter for the National Agency to decide on the 
cost/benefit of an accurate or less accurate determination of the nature of the works 
shared.  
Once the nature of the works is estimated, the following issues are to be 
considered: how to determine which of the often multiple copyright owners of the same 
work should be remunerated, and in which proportion—and, consequently, to which 
collective society—the sum should be transmitted. Such issues are normally addressed 
by different collective society in different jurisdictions in a number of ways. However, 
there is an extreme lack of transparency in this area. A common method is to assign a 
given percentage of the remuneration to different copyright owners depending on the 
equipment used to copy. SIAE in Italy use the following (Figure 28): 
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Figure 28 - SIAE Levies‘ Allocation Scheme1570 
Audio Equipment and Blank-Tapes Video Equipment and Blank-Tapes 
50% Authors 30% Authors 
25% Performers 70% to be divided equally between 
producers of ‗original‘ film, 
producers of ‗videograms‘, and 
performers. 
25% Producers 
 
Any work that can be disseminated by users should be considered. Thus, the allocation 
of the remuneration should be between who creates, who performs, and who produces, 
as shown in Figure 29. In case no one performs (literary works for instance), this share 
should go to the author. 
Figure 29 - Suggested Allocation of the Remuneration 
40% - Authors 
Authors of literary, dramatic and musical works, of 
films (list depending on jurisdiction), of softwares 
and databases 
30% - Performers Performers of dramatic and musical works, and films. 
30% - Producers 
Publisher, producers, broadcasters, and database‘s 
makers 
 
If a work disseminated includes multiple works, the remuneration will be shared 
between all the right owners entitled. Finally, authors and other right owners are free to 
refuse the remuneration. 
 
6.6.4.4 - Willingness to Pay. - Whichever method the National Agencies will deem 
appropriate, it is important to keep users‘ participation to the system minimum. Ideally, 
it would be preferable not to have users involved at all. One way or another, the users 
will eventually pay for the system in any circumstance. Moreover, it is submitted that 
users do pay for culture
1571
: they pay broadcast fees, mobile phones, internet and games 
subscriptions. Several researches show users are willing to pay remuneration for 
disseminating protected works
1572
. 
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Everyone will pay, in proportion to the use, or for the ‗potential‘ to use. This may 
be deemed ‗unfair‘. However, as mentioned, each National Agency will have to 
estimate the user-initiate dissemination of works. It is predicted that the estimate will 
determine that only a percentage of the network transmission relate to copyright work. 
This percentage of the remuneration collected will be reallocated to copyright owners, 
the rest will be retained by the relevant National Agency and, for instance, could be re-
invested into supporting heritage and culture or in the infrastructure returning to the 
users in form of improved services and modernised communication system. 
 
6.6.5 - The System in Practice 
The system will be administered via a Central Agency (for example, as suggested, 
WIPO) through its National Branches. The National Agencies will be responsible of the 
collection and distribution of both the remuneration and information. Network providers 
will be responsible for the collection of the information on behalf of their National 
Agencies. As previously explained, users may be asked to pay the remuneration and to 
accordingly provide information on the works they disseminate, if the network operator 
they subscribed to requires it. The system is described in Figure 30, which shows both 
the remuneration and information flow described separately below. 
Figure 30 - The System in Practice 
 
                                                                                                                                               
file-share. Spedidam conducted a survey in 2005 finding that 75.5% of internet users are ‗ready and fully 
prepared‘ to pay a levy to be allowed to file-share. Thoumyre L [2007], Livre Blanc sur le peer-to-peer, 
54. www.legalis.net/pdf/p2p%20livre%20blanc.pdf. Nokia suggested an ‗acceptance value‘ of $90 per 
year. latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2008/10/nokiacomes-wit.html. [15/08/2010]. Richter found 
that the amount users would to pay is ‗roughly equivalent to the local price of a movie ticket‘. Richter, W. 
[2007], First findings on students‘ behaviour and attitudes on illegal file-sharing in China, HPAIR 
conference 2007, Beijing, August 2007. As quoted in Grassmuck, V. [2009], op.cit. 
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6.6.5.1 - The Information Flow. - Network providers are responsible for the collection 
of the information regarding the protected works disseminated through their systems 
and for the transmission of such information to their National Agency. The National 
Agencies subsequently transmit the information to the Central Agency, which calculates 
the global dissemination flow. The nature and amount of works disseminated by users 
catalogued by nationality of the copyright owner and nationality of the users are shown 
in Figure 31 below. 
Figure 31 – The Information Flow 
 
A percentage of the transmission will be intra-national; the rest will involve two 
countries‘ National Agencies. The Central Agency, upon receiving all the required 
information, will then subsequently provide a report to the relevant National Agencies. 
Figure 32 offers an example of such a report where the numbers shown are examples 
which are not necessarily accurate or realistic. Notably, the term ‗bandwidth‘ would be 
interpreted generally as the network basic unit to calculate usage. 
Figure 32 - Example of a Central Agency Report 
 UK Italy Germany 
Bandwidth used  100 100 200 
Bandwidth used for 
disseminating protected 
works 
 
60 
 
80 
 
140 
UK works 45 30 60 
Italian works 5 45 30 
German works 10 5 50 
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Thus, in the above example, remuneration would be based on the bandwidth used. As 
only 60% of the bandwidth is utilised in the UK for the dissemination of copyright 
protected works, the UK National Agency would allocate that 60% in the following 
manner: 45% to go to UK rights holders; 5% to go to Italian rights holders; and the 
remaining 10% to German rights holders. In the UK itself, the amount collected (i.e. 
45%) will be transferred to the relevant national organisation/representative of copyright 
owners (authors, performers, film producers, phonogram producers, etc.). 
 
6.6.5.2 - The Remuneration Flow. - National Agencies are responsible for the 
collection of remuneration. They are free to determine who should pay the 
remuneration. The UK, as seen in Figure 33 below, decided to charge the network 
providers, whilst Germany decided to provide the remuneration with a dedicated state 
fund. Network providers in the UK may ask the users to contribute to it (even entirely) 
or otherwise to provide for it themselves. Network Provider A charges its users, whilst 
B does not
1573
. Both providers pay the National Agency. All the National Agencies 
worldwide share the sums collected and redistribute them to their national copyright 
owner in accordance with the information provided by the Central Agency. The Central 
Agency receives a sum for the administration cost, divided between all the National 
Agencies proportionally to the sum by them collected. As shown in Figure 33 below. 
Figure 33 - The Remuneration Flow 
 
 
                                                 
1573
 Internet access providers could decide not transfer the remuneration payment to the users. Broadband 
is a full market. It could be expected that at least some small providers would not to charge directly users. 
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6.7—Conclusion 
As mentioned
1574
, all the proposals included in this Chapter have in common the aim to 
permit the dissemination of protected works thought networking technologies, 
designing a system to compensate the copyright owner. The approach is not 
unprecedented. Private copy levy systems, compulsory licences and mandatory 
collective managements are a part of the copyright systems, and have been used in the 
past to approach similar situations. Control through enforcement is arguably not 
achieving the expected result. An alternative is required, simply because the 
‗uncertainty‘ surrounding networking technologies harms not only the copyright 
owners, but also the users and technology providers. Therefore: 
‗The legal introduction of the culture flat-rate … is nothing less than the logical 
consequence of the technical revolution introduced by the internet.‘1575 
The analysis showed the viability of the approach. Summing up, a remuneration 
system is submitted as being a viable and just method for maximising the potential of 
networking technologies for copyright owners, technology providers and users. 
                                                 
1574
 Para. 6.1. 
1575
 EML [2009], op.cit. 63 
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Conclusion 
- 
‗Once you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, 
however improbable, must be the truth‘1576. 
 
Historically, as described in Chapter One, copyright law has been forced to adapt to a 
number of technological developments with two consequences. On the one hand, the 
system expanded with new rights, new methods of management, and new limitations 
and exceptions; on the other hand, copyright owners experienced a constant decrease of 
the power to control the dissemination of their works. The latest developments to 
undermine this control are what have been defined in this work as ‗networking 
technologies‘. In Chapter Two, these technologies have been analysed with particular 
attention towards their innovative aspects, the possible future synergies, and their 
challenge to copyright. In Chapter Three, these challenges were identified, and the 
reason for the current legal uncertainty analysed. This uncertainty subsequently led to 
the questioning of the entire system.  
In Chapter Four, it was emphasised that: (a) philosophical justifications for a 
‗strong copyright system‘ are often limited; (b) the entertainment industries—more than 
authors, performers and users—are the main actors in the copyright discourse, 
consequently leading to unbalances in the system; (c) networking technologies are more 
a challenge to the old business model than to copyright in general, they increase 
exposure and hold significant potential for authors, industries and users; and (d) sharing 
activities are perhaps the next stage in societal development. In other words, networking 
technologies are more a ‗blessing‘ than a ‗curse‘ for society as a whole1577, as shown in 
Figure 34: 
Figure 34 - Pro and Contra of Networking Technologies 
PRO CONTRA 
Lower costs of dissemination Perfect unauthorised copies 
Wider dissemination Lack of control over dissemination 
User-initiated dissemination No remuneration for copyright owners 
Knowledge accessibility  
Cultural diversity and preservation  
                                                 
1576
 Spock in Star Trek (2009), directed by J.J. Abrams. Original quote from Sherlock Holmes in Sir 
Arthur Conan Doyle’s ‘The Sign of the Four’ (1890). 
1577
 The following table is based on Dutfield-Suthersanen [2008], Global Intellectual Property Law, 
Edward Elgar, 235-236; and Fisher, W.W. [2004], op.cit. 18-37. 
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Networking technologies are here to stay, at least until they are substituted by next 
technology. Thus, the legal uncertainty surrounding them has to end. 
 ‗Ten years after the emergence of Napster, the illegal download of music via 
peer-to-peer file-sharing networks is at least as widespread now as it has ever 
been (…) The growth of Europe's online population has driven the growth of the 
number of European music P-to-P users. Between 2004 and 2009, the Internet 
population across the UK, Germany, France, Spain, and Italy grew by more than 
45 million. Thus, even though regular music P-to-P rates are relatively flat over 
the period, the total number of regular music P-to-P users grew from 18.9 million 
in 2004 to 29.8 million in 2009‘1578. 
Networking technology exacerbated the so-called ‗digital dilemma‘1579, facilitating 
global dissemination of content at very low cost. The technology is extremely efficient 
and economically feasible, but fundamentally diminishes the control of rights owners 
over their works. Once a work is available over a network, it multiplies in an indefinite 
number of identical, unauthorised copies without the author being compensated. This 
inevitability creates a tension between the phenomenon of ‗sharing‘ and the copyright 
owners interests in remuneration
1580
. Networking technologies became the 
communication standard whilst the proposed solutions cover almost everything from 
abolishing copyright to abolishing networking technologies. 
Chapter Five explained the limits of enforcement, the flaw in the DRMs and in the 
‗Graduated Response‘ approaches and the improbability of solutions involving ‗control‘ 
over the dissemination of protected works. An efficient control of network technologies 
is not possible without banning the technology altogether, or without otherwise 
experiencing severe drawbacks with regards to monitoring and privacy
1581
. The 
situation is that either exclusive rights are practically not enforceable, or their exercise 
would have too many negative side effects. In order to avoid such disadvantages, non-
commercial unauthorised dissemination of protected works must be legalised
1582
. It has 
been argued that there are two ways available: licensing and levies. In all likelihood, 
however, there is probably 
                                                 
1578
 Jupiter-Research [2009], Analysis of the European Online Music Market Development & Assessment 
of Future Opportunities. Data made available by Gabriela Lopes upon consultation with Shira Perlmutter 
(Executive Vice-President Global Legal Policy, IFPI) and quoted in Akester, P. [2010], op.cit. 374. 
1579
 Committee on Intellectual Property Rights and the emerging Information Infrastructure [2000], Cited. 
1580
 Lessing, L. [2004], op.cit, 296; OECD [2004], Peer-to-peer networks in OECD Countries, 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/57/32927686.pdf, 2 [15/08/2010]; Einhorn-Rosenblatt [2005], Peer-to-peer 
networking and digital rights management: how market tools can solve copyright problems, 52 
J.C.S.U.S.A. 239, 255. Netanel, N.W. [2003], op.cit. 19-22. 
1581
 EML [2009], op.cit. 19. 
1582
 Litman, J. [2004], op.cit. 
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‗… the need to explore further, in close co-operation with relevant stakeholders, 
issues deriving from the use of copyrighted material or the exploitation of user-
generated content by media-like services to protect and promote the freedom of 
expression and information‘1583. 
In Chapter Six, non-voluntary approaches have been analysed, including the 
Kultur Flat-rate and the proposed ‗Global Dissemination Remuneration Right‘, which 
appear to represent comprehensive solutions. 
Copyright is at a critical stage of its history, and the near future will reveal 
whether or not it is possible to maintain the established protection and sources of 
remuneration of right owners
1584
. It must be acknowledge that the difficulties posed by 
networking technologies are formidable, and that the implementation of out-dated rules 
to regulate new phenomena has the obvious disadvantage that they will not necessarily 
fit the current situation very well. A way by which to regulate technologies which 
allows user-initiated dissemination of protected work is needed. Once a way to regulate 
them is established, society will then benefit as a whole and will enjoy a new ‗era‘. 
Copyright aims to protect the ‗most sacred […] property of the human mind‘1585, 
rewarding creators for their contribution to society. However, 
‗the current model is not working‘. […and…] ‗This is unacceptable‘1586. 
The impact of networking technology has not been clearly quantified, whilst the 
balance between rights and exceptions and defences has been slowly but steadily shifted 
towards the first. It would be favourable for copyright to re-focus on achieving a new 
balance between the rights of the owners and those of users. Notably, there are 
advantages in permitting a use without control of protected works, as identified in this 
work. 
This analysis addresses only a small element of a much larger debate over 
networking technologies; the proposed solution should be read in this sense. The 
consequences of the approach suggested are difficult to predict; however, 
notwithstanding the uncertainty of the long-term effectiveness, a solution needs to be 
sought and subsequently implemented. Models are designed for the future and it is 
important for copyright policies to be technology-neutral in order to last longer, thereby 
                                                 
1583
 First Council of Europe Conference of Ministers responsible for Media and New Communication 
Services (Reykjavik, Iceland, 29 May 2009), MCM (2009)011, Resolutions. Quoted in Geiger, C. [2010], 
op.cit. 13. 
1584
 Sterling, J.A.L. [2008], cited, 6-7. 
1585
 Le Chapelier‘s report (1791), Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), Bently-Kretschmer eds, 
www.copyrighthistory.org. [15/08/2010]. 
1586
 Department of Culture, Media and Sport [2009], op.cit. 109, points 17-18. 
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maximising the opportunities and limiting the risks. Any attempts to regulate 
networking technologies if limited to the current file-sharing technologies, will soon be 
out-dated. It is desiderable, therefore, to find a technology-neutral solution to the 
impossibility of controlling the dissemination of works in a networked environment. 
Copyright law has proven able to adapt, but copyright law is inherently conservative. 
The author realises that 
‗if the suggested divergence from the existing norms and regulations is too 
radical, the likelihood of such legislation being passed is decreasing‘1587. 
However, promoting alternatives to the exclusive right over dissemination is not an 
‗expropriation‘ of copyright: 
‗innovation and creative destruction are essential elements of a free market‘1588 
and ‗in a free market there can be no legal entitlement by businesses to a 
preservation of the status quo‘1589 
The market has failed to integrate networking technologies in such a manner as to 
generate revenue for authors and other rights owners, whilst allowing sharing activities 
to continue. In such a scenario, an alternative modus operandi to the current legislative 
framework becomes relevant. The proposal sets out one such remuneration system, 
which it is submitted, is a practical and promising approach in relation to the securing of 
compensation for authors and other rights owners for the non-commercial dissemination 
of protected materials, without undermining users‘ integrity and technology innovation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‗Thence we came forth to rebehold the stars‘1590 
                                                 
1587
 Grassmuck, V. [2009], op.cit.. 
1588
 Schumpeter, J. [1942], Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 5
th
 ed. Harper & Brothers.  
1589
 Grassmuck, V. [2009], op.cit. 
1590
 ‗E quindi uscimmo a riveder le stelle‘. Dante Alighieri, the Divine Comedy, Inferno, Canto XXXIV, 
139. Translation by H.W. Longfellow. 
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